ineffective assistance of counsel

Ayestas v. Davis

Issues

Is the Fifth Circuit’s “substantial need” test for awarding investigative resources to indigent defendants consistent with the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3599(f)?

Carlos Manuel Ayestas brought a state habeas petition after he was sentenced to death in Texas for murder. After the state denied his petition in 2008, Ayestas petitioned for federal habeas relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Ayestas requested funding for “investigative, expert, or other services” under 18 U.S.C. § 3599(f) to help support his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Both the district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Ayestas’s claim and denied his § 3599(f) motion, finding that he had not demonstrated a “substantial need” for investigative assistance. Ayestas now challenges this substantial need test on appeal, arguing that it is inconsistent with the text, history, and purpose of § 3599(f). The Director of the Correctional Institutions Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Lorie Davis, on the other hand, argues the test is proper in light of the requirements of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. This case will allow the court to determine the appropriate statutory interpretation of § 3599(f), as well as its applicability to federal habeas proceedings. The case could have significant consequences for the resources available to capital defendants bringing ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Fifth Circuit erred in holding that 18 U.S.C. § 3599(f) withholds “reasonably necessary” resources to investigate and develop an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim that state habeas counsel forfeited, where the claimant’s existing evidence does not meet the ultimate burden of proof at the time the § 3599(f) motion is made.

Petitioner Carlos Manuel Ayestas was convicted and sentenced to death for murder in 1995. See Ayestas v. Stephens, 817 F.3d 888, 892 (5th Cir.

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Bell v. Kelly

Issues

Must federal courts defer to the decisions of state courts on a constitutional claim when a criminal defendant attacks a state court decision in a federal court with a claim backed by evidence that was not developed in state court?

 

Petitioner Edward Bell claims that he is entitled to habeas relief from his death sentence for the murder of a police officer because his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel was violated. Bell’s court-appointed attorneys did not introduce mitigating evidence to show that he did not pose a threat of future violent acts. Bell sought habeas relief in the Supreme Court of Virginia, which denied both an evidentiary hearing and habeas relief. Upon Bell’s petition for habeas corpus at the federal level, the district court granted an evidentiary hearing and held that Bell’s counsel acted unreasonably but that Bell was not prejudiced by this action. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that § 2254(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) required deference to Virginia’s summary rejection of Bell’s ineffective assistance claim, even though certain evidence supporting Bell’s claim was introduced for the first time in his federal habeas proceeding. This case could clarify the boundaries of deference toward claims “adjudicated on the merits” under the AEDPA.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Petitioner asserted ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing, and the district court found that he had diligently attempted to develop and present the factual basis of this claim in state court, on habeas, but that the state court’s fact-finding procedures were inadequate to afford a full and fair hearing. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found deficient performance but no prejudice and denied relief. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The question presented is:

Did the Fourth Circuit err when, in conflict with decisions of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, it applied the deferential standard of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which is reserved for claims “adjudicated on the merits” in state court, to evaluate a claim predicated on evidence of prejudice the state court refused to consider and that was properly received for the first time in a federal evidentiary hearing?

On October 29, 1999 in Winchester, Virginia, Sergeant Ricky Timbrook and two probation officers encountered Petitioner Edward Bell and another man while searching for a wanted parolee. See Bell v. Kelly, No. 06-22 at 10 (4th Cir. Jan.

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Berghuis v. Thompkins

Issues

Whether a state court’s determination that a defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were not violated — where he was interrogated for three hours while silent before making an incriminating statement and where his lawyer failed to request a limiting instruction — is entitled to deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

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In February of 2001, Southfield, Michigan police officers questioned Van Chester Thompkins (“Thompkins”) for roughly three hours about a shooting that had occurred over one year prior. Although Thompkins remained silent for much of the interrogation, he ultimately provided police with incriminating statements. In 2002, Thompkins was convicted of first-degree murder. In a habeas corpus proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the Sixth Circuit reversed the conviction, finding that Thompkins had not waived his Miranda rights and that he had been unfairly prejudiced by ineffective counsel. The Supreme Court will decide whether the Sixth Circuit (1) erroneously expanded the Miranda rule so as to prevent officers from persuading defendants to cooperate who neither invoked nor waived their Miranda rights and (2) violated 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) by failing to afford the state appellate court deference with respect to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The decisions will likely impact the manner in which the police approach and question suspects who have neither explicitly invoked nor waived their Miranda rights.

 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

I. Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit expanded the Miranda rule to prevent an officer from attempting to non-coercively persuade a defendant to cooperate where the officer informed the defendant of his rights, the defendant acknowledged that he understood them, and the defendant did not invoke them but did not waive them.

II. Whether the Sixth Circuit failed to afford the State court the deference it was entitled to under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), when it granted habeas relief with respect to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim where the substantial evidence of Thompkins' guilt allowed the State court to reasonably reject the claim.

On January 10, 2000, Samuel Morris and Frederick France were repeatedly shot while driving through a strip mall parking lot in Southfield Michigan. See Thompkins v. Berghuis, 547 F.3d 572, 575 (6th Cir.

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Buck v. Davis

Issues

Did the Fifth Circuit use an improper standard to deny Petitioner a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) on his motion to reopen the judgment against him?

This case addresses the correct standard to be applied in granting a Certificate of Appealability
(“COA”) on a motion to reopen a judgment. As per the standard, Petitioner Duane Buck argues that he deserved a COA, as a reasonable juror could consider his ineffective assistance of counsel claim to be valid, as well as debate the validity of the district court’s denial of his Rule 60(b)(6) motion. In opposition, Respondent Lorie Davis, Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, contends that Buck’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was meritless and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. This case will settle the correct standard for granting a COA, while also addressing issues of implicit racial biases against African American defendants. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Duane Buck’s death penalty case raises a pressing issue of national importance: whether and to what extent the criminal justice system tolerates racial bias and discrimination. Specifically, did the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit impose an improper and unduly burdensome Certificate of Appealability (COA) standard that contravenes this Court’s precedent and deepens two circuit splits when it denied Mr. Buck a COA on his motion to reopen the judgment and obtain merits review of his claim that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for knowingly presenting an “expert” who testified that Mr. Buck was more likely to be dangerous in the future because he is Black, where future dangerousness was both a prerequisite for a death sentence and the central issue at sentencing?

Petitioner Duane Buck was convicted of capital murder for the July 1995 deaths of his ex-girlfriend Debra Gardner and her friend Kenneth Butler. See Buck v. Stephens, No.14-70030 at *2 (5th Cir., filed Aug 20, 2015). During the sentencing phase, Buck’s counsel called Walter Quijano, a clinical psychologist, to testify regarding Buck’s future dangerousness.

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Burt v. Titlow

Issues

  1. Did the Sixth Circuit fail to give appropriate deference to the Michigan Court of Appeals under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996? 
  2. Is subjective testimony that a convicted defendant would have accepted a plea, but for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel, sufficient to show that the defendant would have in fact accepted the plea? 
  3. Does the Supreme Court’s holding in Lafler v. Cooper require a state court to resentence a defendant where the defendant has shown that he would have accepted a plea deal but for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel?  Should the resentence itself serve as the remedy?

On August 12, 2000, police officers found Donald Rogers dead on his kitchen floor.  Donald’s wife and niece had engaged in “burking,” a practice of inebriating a person with alcohol to the point of unconsciousness and then smothering the person to death.  Donald’s niece, Vonlee Nicole Titlow (a transgender individual hereinafter referred to as a male), accepted a plea deal in exchange for testifying against Donald’s wife, but later withdrew from the plea.  The prosecutor charged Titlow with murder rather than manslaughter, and a jury subsequently found Titlow guilty of second-degree murder.  On appeal, Titlow argued that his trial attorney was ineffective for allowing Titlow to withdraw his plea.  The Michigan State Court of Appeals rejected this argument and affirmed the trial court’s decision, and Titlow subsequently filed for habeas relief.  The District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied Titlow’s petition, but the Sixth Circuit reversed and ordered the prosecutor to re-offer the plea, concluding that the state court based its decision on an unreasonable determination of the facts.  In this case, the Supreme Court will consider (1) whether the Sixth Circuit gave appropriate deference to the Michigan state courts, (2) what type of evidence is required to show that a defendant would have accepted a plea deal but for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel, and (3) what state courts are required to do when such defendants succeed on their ineffective-assistance claims.  This case will address issues regarding the integrity of the country’s plea-bargaining system, and the evidentiary standards defendants must meet to be successful on ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.

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Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Whether the Sixth Circuit failed to give appropriate AEDPA deference to a Michigan state court by holding that defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective for allowing Respondent to maintain his claim of innocence.  
  2. Whether a convicted defendant’s subjective testimony that he would have accepted a plea but for ineffective assistance, is, standing alone, sufficient to demonstrate a reasonable probability that defendant would have accepted the plea.  
  3. Whether Lafler always requires a state trial court to resentence a defendant who shows a reasonable probability that he would have accepted a plea offer but for ineffective assistance, and to do so in such a way as to “remedy” the violation of the defendant’s constitutional right, or merely requires a re-offer of the plea.

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Facts

Respondent Vonlee Titlow is a transgender male prisoner currently serving a twenty-to-forty year sentence.  See Titlow v. Burt,680 F.3d 577, 582 (6th Cir.

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Davila v. Davis

Issues

Can a prisoner bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding his appellate counsel when he procedurally defaulted on the claim due to the ineffective assistance of his state habeas proceeding attorney?

This case presents the Supreme Court with the opportunity to determine whether the Martinez ruling, which held that ineffective assistance of counsel in a state habeas proceeding could provide cause to excuse the procedural default of a claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel, extends to excuse the procedural default of a claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Davila argues that Martinez does so extend, since the Court’s reasoning in Martinez applies equally to claims for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and the practical consequences of extending Martinez would be limited. The state of Texas argues that the Court should refuse to extend Martinez, since the right to appellate counsel is not as vital as the right to trial counsel and allowing so-called “Davila” claims would unduly burden the court system.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the rule established in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012) and Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013) – ineffective assistance of counsel in an initial-review collateral proceeding can provide cause to overcome the procedural default of a substantial claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel – also applies to the procedural default of a substantial claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

In February 2009, Erick Daniel Davila killed Annette Stevenson and her five-year-old granddaughter, Queshawn Stevenson, while the Stevensons were attending a family member’s birthday party in Fort Worth, Texas. See Davila v. Davis, 650 F. App’x 860, 863 (5th Cir. 2016). All of the party guests were women or young children, except for Queshawn’s father, Jerry Stevenson.

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Florida v. Nixon

Issues

What is the appropriate standard to determine whether defense counsel was ineffective in a capital trial, where, as a matter of strategy in the face of overwhelming evidence, counsel chooses not to contest guilt in order to enhance defense credibility at the penalty phase of the trial?
Is trial counsel's strategic defense opening and closing comments the functional equivalent of a guilty plea, thereby requiring an affirmative showing that the client voluntarily and intelligently waived constitutional protections?
Court below

 

A Florida court sentenced Joe Elton Nixon to death following a trial in which his lawyer conceded that the prosecution had proven its case, telling the jurors, "I think you will find that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element of the crimes charged, first-degree premeditated murder, kidnapping, robbery, and arson." In the face of seemingly overwhelming evidence against Nixon, the defense lawyer hoped that his frank admission would curry favor with the jurors and compel them to spare Nixon's life. On appeal, Nixon argued that his lawyer's admission was tantamount to a guilty plea, and that the lawyer lacked the authority to enter such a plea without Nixon's consent. The State argued that it was a reasonable trial strategy, not a guilty plea. Nixon claimed his defense lawyer was ineffective; however, Nixon and the state dispute by which standard of ineffectiveness the court should measure the lawyer's performance. Nixon argues that admitting guilt without his consentwas such grave misconduct that it automatically negates any validity the strategy may hold. Florida argues for a more flexible standard that would measure the lawyer's performance against prevailing professional norms and consider whether Nixon was prejudiced by any possible ineffectiveness. A second question is whether the lawyer's statements constituted a guilty plea. Without an affirmative showing that a guilty plea was intelligent and voluntary, it is unconstitutional. Here, it is undisputed that Nixon did not affirmatively acquiesce to defense counsel's strategy. While such a strategy is very likely to have the effect of a guilty plea, namely a criminal conviction, strictly speaking it lacks a waiver of the constitutional rights that accompanies a guilty plea, including the right to be free from self incrimination and the right to a trial by jury.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether in a capital murder case, the Florida Supreme Court:
 
 
Applied an incorrect standard, contrary to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002) and Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 120 S.Ct. 1029 (2000), by finding defense counsel ineffective per se under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) despite having found counsel's strategy not to contest overwhelming evidence of guilt but to vigorously contest the sentence in the defendant's best interest and reasonably calculated to avoid a death sentence.
Erred in concluding that Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) prohibited trial counsel from adopting a strategy, after fully informing his client, without objection, not to contest overwhelming evidence of guilt to protect the best interest of his client in contesting the appropriateness of imposing the death penalty.
Joe Elton Nixon was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, robbery and arson for his involvement in the 1984 murder of a Tallahassee, Florida woman. Nixon v. Florida, 857 So.2d 172 (Fla., 2003). Nixon's attorney offered the prosecutor a guilty plea in exchange for a life sentence.
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Gilberto Garza, Jr. v. Idaho

Issues

Does an attorney’s failure to file an appeal when instructed to do so by the defendant create a presumption of prejudice even though the defendant previously signed an appeal waiver?

Court below

The Supreme Court will decide the scope and validity of appeal waivers balanced against a defendant’s right to file an appeal. Gilberto Garza, Jr. contends that Roe v. Flores-Ortega supports the proposition that there is a presumption of prejudice when an attorney fails to file an appeal when instructed, even if the defendant previously signed an appeal waiver and underlying plea bargain. The State of Idaho counters that Flores-Ortega does not create a blanket rule that an attorney’s failure to file prejudices a defendant because the defendant already waived their right and risks additional criminal charges in breaching their plea bargain agreement. The outcome of this case will affect States that use appeal waivers to prevent frivolous appeals in order to promote judicial efficiency and will determine whether an appeal waiver completely bars a defendant from seeking an appeal.  

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the “presumption of prejudice” recognized in Roe v. Flores-Ortega applies when a criminal defendant instructs his trial counsel to file a notice of appeal but trial counsel decides not to do so because the defendant’s plea agreement included an appeal waiver.

In 2015, Gilberto Garza, Jr. was charged with aggravated assault and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Garza v. State of Idaho at 1. Garza entered an Alford plea to aggravated assault and pleaded guilty to the other charge.

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House v. Bell

Issues

Under Schlup v. Delo and Herrera v. Collins, how much evidence must an individual present in order to prove his actual innocence to obtain habeas corpus relief and review of procedurally defaulted claims?

 

 

Carloyn Muncey was murdered on July 13, 1985 in Union County, Tennessee. Her badly beaten body was found the next day in a brush pile about one hundred yards from her house, and it appeared as though a strong blow to her head had killed her after a long struggle. That same day, two witnesses saw Paul House emerging from the area where Muncey’s body was discovered wiping his hands with a dark rag. Several witnesses, as well as House, gave conflicting statements as to where he was the night of the crime. Over the course of the investigation of the murder, FBI officials found blood on House’s jeans that they determined was Muncey’s blood, as well as semen on Muncey’s clothes that they determined was likely House’s. Based on this circumstantial evidence, a jury in Union County convicted House of first-degree murder and sentenced him to the death penalty based on three aggravating circumstances. During post-conviction relief proceedings in state and federal courts, House presented evidence that he was actually innocent of the crime. This new evidence included a confession from Muncey’s husband that he had murdered her, DNA evidence that it was not House’s semen on Muncey’s clothes, and evidence that the blood on his jeans was spilled onto his jeans after the autopsy on Muncey. None of the courts reviewing House’s case found his evidence sufficient to establish his actual innocence, however, and did not allow for review of his procedurally defaulted claims, such as ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, or to obtain relief from his conviction. The United States Supreme Court must now determine how much evidence an individual such as House must present to prove his actual innocence and overturn a jury’s conviction and death sentence, as well as how much evidence is necessary to establish House’s innocence so that a court can review his procedurally defaulted claims.

 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1.  Did the majority below err in applying this Court’s decision in Schlup v. Delo to hold that Petitioner’s compelling new evidence, though presenting at the very least a colorable claim of actual innocence, was as a matter of law insufficient to excuse his failure to present that evidence before the state courts – merely because he had failed to negate each and every item of circumstantial evidence that had been offered against him at the original trial?

2.  What constitutes a “truly persuasive showing of actual innocence” pursuant to Herrera v. Collins sufficient to warrant freestanding habeas relief?

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