lawful permanent resident

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Blanche v. Lau

Issues

Does the government need clear and convincing evidence that a lawful permanent resident committed a crime to parole them into the United States when they reenter the country?

This case asks whether the government must show that it had clear and convincing evidence that a Lawful Permanent Resident committed a crime of moral turpitude at the time that the Lawful Permanent Resident was temporarily paroled by the Department of Homeland Security. Petitioner former Attorney General Pamela Bondi argues that the government only needs to present clear and convincing evidence that the Lawful Permanent Resident committed a crime at removal proceedings and not before. Bondi also argues that a court cannot review the discretionary decisions of the Department of Homeland Security. In response, Respondent Muk Choi Lau argues that Lawful Permanent Residents cannot be paroled unless the government can prove the noncitizen committed a crime at the time of their reentry. Lau also asserts that the decision to parole him was a mixed question of law and fact and therefore can be reviewed. The outcome of this case has implications for screening procedures at the border, the rights of noncitizens, and public safety.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, to remove a lawful permanent resident who committed an offense listed in Section 1182(a)(2) and was subsequently paroled into the United States, the government must prove that it possessed clear and convincing evidence of the offense at the time of the lawful permanent resident’s last reentry into the United States.
 

The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) governs how the U.S.

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lawful permanent resident (LPR)

A lawful permanent resident (LPR) is a non-citizen who has been granted the right to live and work in the United States indefinitely. LPRs are issued a Permanent Resident Card, commonly known as a “green card,” which serves as proof of their status. LPRs enjoy many of the same rights as U.S.

Lee v. United States

Issues

When analyzing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, would it be irrational for a longtime legal resident of the United States to reject a plea offer and proceed to trial in the face of strong evidence of guilt when the plea would result in mandatory deportation?

Petitioner Jae Lee pleaded guilty to possession of ecstasy with the intent to distribute, an aggravated felony and deportable offense. Lee argues that he is entitled to Strickland relief because ineffective assistance of counsel prejudiced his case. The United States argues that, although Lee did experience ineffective assistance of counsel, he is not entitled to Strickland relief because it would have been unreasonable to seek trial in lieu of a guilty plea in this case. This case allows the Supreme Court to examine what Sixth Amendment constitutional relief is available to noncitizen United States residents that experience ineffective assistance of counsel resulting in mandatory deportation.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In the context of a noncitizen defendant with longtime legal resident status and extended familial and business ties to the United States, whether it is always irrational for a defendant to reject a plea offer notwithstanding strong evidence of guilt when the plea would result in mandatory and permanent deportation.

In 2009, Jae Lee, a legal resident of the United States, was charged with the possession and intent to distribute ecstasy. See Lee v. United States, No. 14-5369, at 2 (6th Cir. June 8, 2016). Following his lawyer’s incorrect advice, Lee pleaded guilty to the charges against him, not realizing at the time that he ran the risk of mandatory removal from the United States.

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Maslenjak v. United States

Issues

Can a naturalized American citizen have her citizenship revoked for making an immaterial false statement in her naturalization application?

Divna Maslenjak and her family immigrated to the United States as refugees in the aftermath of the Bosnian War, claiming they feared persecution because Maslenjak’s husband had avoided military conscription during the war. Maslenjak became a United States citizen in 2009, indicating on her application that she had never lied to immigration officials. United States officials, however, discovered that Maslenjak’s husband served as an officer in the Serbian Bratunac Brigade at the time the unit committed war crimes in the Bosnian War. Maslenjak was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) with “knowingly procuring” her citizenship “contrary to law” due to her misrepresentations of her husband’s military service on her family’s refugee application. Maslenjak argues that materiality is a required element of § 1425(a), and therefore the government must prove that the false statement influenced the decision to approve the citizenship application. The United States argues that § 1425(a) only requires knowledge of the underlying offense, here making a false statement to a government official, and does not require proof of materiality. The Supreme Court’s decision will determine the circumstances under which naturalized citizens can be denaturalized and the government’s burden of proof in denaturalization proceedings.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Sixth Circuit erred by holding that a naturalized American citizen can be stripped of her citizenship in a criminal proceeding based on an immaterial false statement.

In the 1990s Divna Maslenjak and her family lived in the former Yugoslavia, in what is today Bosnia and Herzegovina. See United States v. Maslenjak, 821 F.3d 675, 680 (6th Cir. 2016). Maslenjak and her family, who are ethnic Serbs, were displaced from their home during the Bosnian War.

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Vartelas v. Holder

Issues

Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(c)(v), as amended in 1996 by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, applies to a lawful permanent resident whose commission of a crime prior to the amendment creates grounds for inadmissibility.

 

Petitioner Panagis Vartelas, a Greek citizen and lawful permanent resident of the United States, pleaded guilty to counterfeiting and was convicted in 1994. In 2003, following a brief trip to Greece, Vartelas received notice to appear for removal proceedings. The immigration judge ordered Vartelas’s deportation, after deeming Vartelas inadmissible under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Vartelas argues that application of this 1996 Act to his 1994 crime violates the presumption against retroactivity and the reasonable expectations he had when entering his guilty plea. Respondent Attorney General Eric Holder argues that Vartelas’s case does not have a retroactive effect because it penalizes acts conducted after the statute’s enactment: Vartelas’s decision to leave and re-enter the United States. This case affects lawful permanent residents who were convicted of crimes prior to the Act’s enactment. The Supreme Court’s decision could restrict their ability to travel internationally, which in turn could damage their ability to maintain family ties or fulfill religious obligations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Prior to the effective date of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996), April 1, 1997, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(13), provided: The term "entry" means any coming of an alien into the United States, from a foreign port or place or from an outlying possession, whether voluntarily or otherwise, except that an alien having a lawful permanent residence in the United States shall not be regarded as making an entry into the United States for the purposes of the immigration laws if the alien proves to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that his departure to a foreign port or place or to an outlying possession was not intended or reasonably to be expected by him or his presence in a foreign port or place or in an outlying possession was not voluntary.

In Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963), this Court held that a lawful permanent resident ("LPR") who made an "innocent, casual, and brief" trip across an international border did not "intend" a "departure" within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13).

However, effective April 1, 1997, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) repealed 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13). The amended 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) provides: (C) An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the shall not be regarded as seeking an admission into the United States for the purpose of the immigration laws unless the alien, (v) has committed an offense identified in section 212(a)(2), unless since offense the alien has been granted relief under section 212(h) or 240A(a). (Emphasis added)

Two other Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that the amended 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) cannot be retroactively applied to an alien who pled guilty to a crime involving moral turpitude prior to the effective date of IIRIRA.

The question presented is:

Should 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v), which removes LPR of his right, under Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963), to make "innocent, casual, and brief" trips abroad without fear that he will be denied reentry, be applied retroactively to a guilty plea taken prior to the effective date of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996)?

In 1994, Petitioner Panagis Vartelas, a lawful permanent resident (“LPR”) of the United States, was convicted of conspiring to make or possess a counterfeit security, following entry of his guilty plea. See Vartelas v.

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The Huffington Post: Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Eight New Cases (Sept. 28, 2011)

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