personal injury

The Dutra Group v. Batterton

Issues

Are punitive damages available in personal­‑injury suits involving a breach of a general maritime duty?

The Supreme Court will determine whether the Jones Act allows punitive damages to be awarded in a personal‑injury suit involving a breach of the general maritime duty to provide a seaworthy vessel. The Dutra Group contends that Supreme Court precedent supports the proposition that the Jones Act bars punitive damages in unseaworthiness cases because it does so in negligence cases, and they are simply alternative causes of actions for the same injury. The Dutra Group also argues that punitive damages were not historically awarded in pre-Jones Act unseaworthiness cases. Christopher Batterton counters that punitive damages have traditionally been available in general maritime claims at common law and that the Jones Act did alter the remedies available in general maritime suits prior to its enactment. Additionally, Batterton asserts that the Jones Act allows for recovery of punitive damages under certain circumstances. From a policy perspective, this case is important because it has implications on the American maritime industry’s ability to compete with the foreign maritime industry, as allowing recovery for punitive damages could increase the business costs and sales prices.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether punitive damages may be awarded to a Jones Act seaman in a personal‑injury suit alleging a breach of the general maritime duty to provide a seaworthy vessel.

Respondent, Christopher Batterton, worked as a deckhand on a ship owned and managed by the Dutra Group, Petitioner. Batterton v. Dutra Group at 4. In a work accident, pressurized air blew a hatch cover open, crushing Batterton’s left hand and leaving him permanently disabled.

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Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent

 

Under Michigan law, individuals may bring personal injury suits against manufacturers of FDA-approved prescription drugs only if the plaintiffs can show that FDA approval depended on fraudulent submission or withholding of information. 27 Michigan residents sued Warner-Lambert Co., claiming personal injury arising from using Rezulin, Warner-Lambert's FDA-approved drug for diabetes treatment. Warner-Lambert argues that Michigan law is preempted by federal law because permitting state courts to second-guess the FDA's product-approval and fraud-detection processes interferes with the agency's essential functions and promotes regulatory uncertainty. The Michigan plaintiffs respond that federal preemption does not apply to traditional state tort claims. The decision in this case will clarify the scope of FDA autonomy in policing the drug-approval process and plaintiffs' freedom to assert state tort claims in areas regulated by federal entities.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether, under the conflict preemption principles in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001), federal law preempts state law to the extent that it requires the fact-finder to determine whether the defendant committed fraud on a federal agency that impacted the agency's product approval, where the agency-which is authorized by Congress to investigate and determine fraud-has not found any such fraud, and thus-as in Buckman-the state requirement would interfere with the agency's critical functions.

2. Whether, under the conflict preemption principles in Buckman, federal law preempts the provision in a Michigan statute that allows a product liability claim to be maintained against a manufacturer of an FDA approved drug where, without an FDA finding of fraud on that agency, the fact-finder is required to make a finding under state law as to whether the manufacturer committed fraud-on-the-FDA and whether, in the absence of that fraud, the FDA would not have approved the drug.

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