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political question doctrine

Moore v. Harper

Issues

Can a state supreme court, without the explicit instruction in its state constitution, void the state legislature’s election law and replace it with judicially-devised election law?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the judicial branch has the authority to overrule a state legislature’s redistricting map. In 2021, the North Carolina Legislature created a redistricting map that the North Carolina Supreme Court subsequently struck down for violations of the North Carolina State Constitution. The Elections Clause of the United States Constitution declares that state legislatures shall determine state election laws, but it does not explicitly state whether state courts can review those laws for state constitutional violations. Moore argues that the Elections Clause grants state legislatures the sole authority to regulate the time, place, and manner of elections and, consequently, other branches are prohibited from interfering with this authority. Harper counters that Moore’s reading of the Election Clause is erroneous, as it would allow state legislature to violate their own state constitutions. The United States Supreme Court’s decision could affect voter perception of election integrity, as well as how much power state legislatures have in determining election law.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a state’s judicial branch may nullify the regulations governing the “Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives . . . prescribed . . . by the Legislature thereof,” and replace them with regulations of the state courts’ own devising, based on vague state constitutional provisions purportedly vesting the state judiciary with power to prescribe whatever rules it deems appropriate to ensure a “fair” or “free” election.

On November 4, 2021, the North Carolina Legislature passed new redistricting maps for its congressional elections. Moore v. Harper at 18a.

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Rucho v. Common Cause

Issues

Do voters targeted by partisan gerrymandering have standing to bring a constitutional claim; is such a claim justiciable, or is it barred by the political question doctrine; and, how would voters then prove a constitutional violation?

In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether claims of partisan gerrymandering may be heard by the courts, and if so, upon what standards such claims should be evaluated. In 2016, North Carolina adopted a new congressional district map with the express purpose of protecting Republican congressional delegates. Federal district court judges from the Middle District of North Carolina invalidated the map after voters and related groups claimed that the new district map violated voters’ rights under the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Elections Clause. As part of this ruling, the lower court determined that there was an injury sufficient to give the voters standing while also holding that the issue of partisan gerrymandering is not barred from judicial review by the political question doctrine. The case was then appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which will seek to answer the procedural and substantive questions while wrestling with a large body of competing jurisprudence. The decision could potentially open the courts to additional challenges by voters in several states and have implications for the scope of lawful electoral redistricting.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Whether plaintiffs have standing to press their partisan gerrymandering claims.
  2. Whether plaintiffs’ partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable.
  3. Whether North Carolina’s 2016 congressional map is, in fact, an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.

North Carolina’s congressional redistricting takes place every ten years in a process overseen by both chambers of the state’s General Assembly. Common Cause v. Rucho, 279 F. Supp. 3d 587, 599 (M.D.N.C.

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Zivotofsky v. Clinton

Issues

Whether a U.S. citizen born in Jerusalem can demand that the State Department record his place of birth as Jerusalem, Israel under Section 214 (d) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act in spite of U.S. foreign policy against expressing an official view on whether Jerusalem is part of Israel.

 

The U.S. Embassy refused to record the place of birth of Petitioner Menachem Zivotofsky as “Jerusalem, Israel” in accordance with U.S. foreign policy to refrain from expressing an official view on whether Jerusalem is part of Israel. His parents filed suit on his behalf, demanding that the State Department comply with Section 214 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, which requires the State Department to record the place of birth of a U.S. citizen born in Jerusalem as Israel, if the child’s legal guardians so request. The district court held that the judiciary has no authority to order the executive branch to change its foreign policy under the political question doctrine; the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed this holding. Petitioner Zivotofsky (through his parents) argues that the political question doctrine does not apply because the case involves a question of statutory interpretation. Secretary of State Clinton contends that Section 214 is unconstitutional because Congress has no authority to recognize foreign sovereigns. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will clarify the political question doctrine, and may shed light on the issue of separation of powers among the judicial, legislative, and executive branches.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether the “political question doctrine” deprives a federal court of jurisdiction to enforce a federal statute that explicitly directs the Secretary of State how to record the birthplace of an American citizen on a Consular Report of Birth Abroad and on a passport.

2. Whether Section 214 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, impermissibly infringes the President’s power to recognize foreign sovereigns.

Since the United States recognized the state of Israel in 1948, the executive branch has remained neutral on whether Jerusalem is part of Israel. See Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State571 F.3d 1227, 1228 (D.C. Cir.

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