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PRISONERS’ RIGHTS

Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez

Issues

Does a court’s dismissal without prejudice for failure to state a claim count towards a prisoner’s three strikes under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which would ban him from filing future legal complaints without filing fees?

The Supreme Court will decide whether a dismissal without prejudice for failure to state a claim counts as a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Section 1915 contains a “three-strikes rule” holding a prisoner liable for litigation costs incurred when filing a civil lawsuit if the prisoner has had three or more prior civil lawsuits dismissed. Petitioner Arthur J. Lomax argues that a court’s dismissal of a complaint without prejudice does not count towards the three-strikes rule that would ban him from filing future legal complaints without filing fees. Lomax supports this argument by noting that dismissal without prejudice does not fall within the meaning of “dismissal” in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Respondent Christina Ortiz-Marquez asserts that this type of dismissal does count towards the three-strike rule because the statute does not differentiate between dismissal with or without prejudice. The Court’s decision will affect a prisoner’s ability to bring civil actions while incarcerated.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a dismissal without prejudice for failure to state a claim counts as a strike under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g).

Petitioner, Arthur Lomax, is currently a prisoner at Limon Correctional Facility. Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez at 2. Before being incarcerated at the Limon Facility, Lomax was incarcerated at the Centennial Correctional Facility in Colorado. Id.

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Millbrook v. United States

Kim Millbrook, a federal inmate at the United States Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") for the alleged sexual assault and battery he suffered from three correctional officers at the prison. The important issue in the case is how to understand the sovereign immunity provisions of the FTCA, and when federal correctional officers can be sued for their tortious conduct. Millbrook contends that while the FTCA generally provides sovereign immunity to the Government for torts committed by their employees while at work, the FTCA waives sovereign immunity for specific intentional torts committed by law enforcement officers during the scope of the officers’ employment. The Third Circuit has limited this waiver of sovereign immunity to instances where the enforcement agent is executing a search, seizing evidence, or making an arrest for violations of federal law. The Supreme Court will resolve a circuit split over how narrowly the waiver of sovereign immunity should be read. How the Court decides this case will determine when a federal correctional officer can be sued for his tortious conduct, and has significant implications for the protection of vulnerable prisoners against assault and abuse.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether 28 U.S.C §§1346(b) and 2680(h) waive the sovereign immunity of the United States for the intentional torts of prison guards when they are acting within the scope of their employment but are not exercising authority to “execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of federal law."

Issue

Are prison guards, as officers of the United States government, protected by the sovereign immunity of the United States against intentional tort claims

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Perttu v. Richards

Issues

In cases under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, do prisoners have a right to a jury trial concerning whether they have exhausted alternative non-legal remedies when the facts required to prove exhaustion are connected to the merits of the claim?

This case concerns the right to a jury trial under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Specifically, the PLRA requires prisoners to exhaust all administrative remedies before filing suit. Kyle Richards argues that, when the facts needed to demonstrate exhaustion are the same facts which support the merits of his claim, the PLRA requires a jury trial to resolve these disputed facts. Richards asserts that allowing a judge to evaluate the facts of the exhaustion claim and dismiss his case would deprive him of his Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial on the merits of the case, since the facts underpinning the merits and exhaustion are the same. Thomas Perttu counters that exhaustion is a threshold requirement which plaintiffs must meet before reaching a jury trial on the merits, and it is thus proper for a judge to evaluate exhaustion and gatekeep PLRA cases from reaching a jury. This case will affect litigation under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, define exhaustion’s place as a doctrine of law or equity, and heavily impact the role of the jury in future disputes.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, in cases subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, prisoners have a right to a jury trial concerning their exhaustion of administrative remedies where disputed facts regarding exhaustion are intertwined with the underlying merits of their claim.

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a prisoner must exhaust available administrative remedies before filing suit on Constitutional rights claims. Richards v. Perttu at 917. Several circuit courts have affirmed that “administrative exhaustion” requires prisoners to properly go through all steps that an agency holds out. Id.

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