Procedure

Puckett v. United States

Issues

The right to have an error corrected by a Federal appellate court can depend on the nature of the error, specifically the underlying rights that were affected by the error. This case will answer the question of whether or not a discretionary standard, Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, should apply to errors involving a plea agreement breach by a prosecutor that was not objected to by the defendant’s counsel when it was made.

 

James Puckett was charged in Federal District Court with armed bank robbery and use of a firearm during the commission of the crime. Puckett agreed to plead guilty to both charges partially in exchange for the prosecutor’s promise to recommend a sentencing reduction to the judge based on Puckett’s acceptance of responsibility for his crimes. After the plea agreement but before the sentencing, Puckett engaged in acts to defraud the United States Postal Service, and the prosecutor refused to recommend the sentencing reduction. Puckett’s counsel did not formally object to the prosecutor’s refusal to file the recommendation, thus creating a “forfeited” error. Consequently, when the court sentenced Puckett, he received no reduction in his sentence. On appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Puckett requested that the case be remanded and that he be allowed to revoke his guilty plea. The Fifth Circuit denied Puckett’s request and upheld the sentence, finding that Puckett had not met his burden under Rule 52(b). Under Rule 52(b), the party challenging the error must prove that the error was significant enough to warrant reversal even though the party forfeited his right to have the court consider the error by not objecting when it occurred. Puckett sought review by the Supreme Court and his writ of certiorari was granted on October 1, 2008.​

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a forfeited claim that the government breached a plea agreement is subject to the plain error standard of Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In July 2002, petitioner James Benjamin Puckett was charged in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas for bank robbery and use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence. See U.S. v. Puckett, 505 F.3d 377, 381 (5th Cir.

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Slack Technologies v. Pirani

Issues

Are plaintiffs required to plead and prove that they bought securities when claiming that a registration statement is misleading under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a plaintiff suing under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 must plead and prove that they bought shares registered under the allegedly misleading registration statement. Slack Technologies argues that the text of the statute reflects congressional intent to limit liability to only those who bought shares registered under the relevant registration statement. Slack additionally argues that past judicial and regulatory precedent supports this theory. Fiyyaz Pirani counters that the text of the statute reflects congressional intent to create broad liability by including a range of securities so as to protect investors. Pirani contends that this particular issue is novel and was undecided prior to the district court decision below. The outcome of this case will determine the extent to which investors are protected by the Securities Act of 1933 and the availability of remedial measures to investors under the Act.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 require plaintiffs to plead and prove that they bought shares registered under the registration statement they claim is misleading

In 2018, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) issued a new rule allowing companies to publicly sell stock through a direct listing. Pirani v. Slack Technologies, Inc., at 6. Normally, a company issues stock to the public for the first time through an initial public offering (IPO).

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Smith v. Spizzirri

Issues

Does a district court violate Section Three of the Federal Arbitration Act when the court dismisses a claim subject to arbitration rather than stay the lawsuit?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether Section Three of the Federal Arbitration Act is violated when courts dismiss claims subject to arbitration agreements. Smith, and other delivery truck drivers, argue that the use of “shall” in Section Three compels courts to stay claims pending arbitration, promoting the underlying purposes of the Federal Arbitration Act. Spizzirri counters that the language in Section Three is ambiguous, and allowing courts to dismiss claims will actually promote the efficiency of arbitration agreements and protect these contracts from interference by courts. The outcome of this case has serious implications for the ability of plaintiffs to have courts oversee arbitration agreements and their ability to appeal.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act requires district courts to stay a lawsuit pending arbitration, or whether district courts have discretion to dismiss when all claims are subject to arbitration

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) was created to promote an alternative method of dispute resolution. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16. The FAA favors the enforcement of arbitration agreements over litigation “in order to realize… lower costs, and greater efficiency and speed. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.

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State Farm Fire and Casualty Company v. United States ex rel. Rigsby

Issues

What are the consequences of violating the False Claims Act’s seal requirement?

Cori and Kerri Rigsby sued State Farm Fire & Casualty Company under the False Claims Act (“FCA”), alleging that State Farm defrauded the federal government while paying out claims related to the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina. The district court and the Fifth Circuit found that the Rigsbys’ attorney violated the FCA’s seal requirement by distributing documents to several news outlets, but declined to dismiss the Rigsbys’ suit after applying a three-part balancing test to evaluate whether dismissal was warranted. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split over what standard governs the decision to dismiss a relator’s claim for violation of the FCA’s seal requirement. The United States, on behalf of the Rigsbys, points to the FCA’s test, structure, legislative history, and purpose, to argue that only discretionary sanctions apply to a violation of the seal requirement. State Farm maintains that a violation of the seal requirement must result in mandatory dismissal of the suit, rather than a discretionary balancing test. This decision may affect the prevalence of qui tam FCA suits and the government’s ability to recover from defrauding parties.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

What standard governs the decision whether to dismiss a relator’s claim for violation of the False Claims Act’s seal requirement, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2)?

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, State Farm Fire & Casualty Company (“State Farm”) participated in the National Flood Insurance Program’s “Write Your Own” Program. See United States ex rel. Rigsby v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, 794 F.3d 457, 463 (5th Cir. 2015). This program allows private insurance companies to offer government-backed flood insurance policies to geographic areas where it would otherwise not be economical to do so.

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United States v. Tsarnaev

Issues

Should Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s sentence be vacated because (1) the jury was not asked content related questions during voir dire about their exposure to pretrial media; and (2) Tsarnaev’s rights were violated when potentially mitigating evidence was excluded during the sentencing phase?

This case asks the Supreme Court whether the Court of Appeals can invoke a precedential supervisory rule to require specific voir dire questions to potential jurors in high media profile cases. The case further asks if the Eighth Amendment and the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 were violated by not including mitigating evidence that would usually be excluded by the Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 403. Petitioner United States argues that the voir dire process should be left to the district court’s discretion, and there is no requirement to ask content-based questions about media exposure during voir dire. The United States also argues that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain mitigating evidence because the probative value was outweighed by the potential confusion and prejudice. Respondent Dzhokhar Tsarnaev responds that First Circuit precedent requires district courts to ask content-based questions to potential jurors if requested by one of the parties. Further, Tsarnaev contends that the Eighth Amendment and Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 require mitigating evidence that would normally fall outside the scope of admittable evidence to be included in the sentencing phase. The decision in this case will affect the formation of juries, particularly in high profile cases, and the allowance of evidence in death-penalty cases.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit erred in concluding that Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s capital sentences must be vacated on the ground that the district court, during its 21-day voir dire, did not ask each prospective juror for a specific accounting of the pretrial media coverage that he or she had read, heard or seen about Tsarnaev’s case; and (2) whether the district court committed reversible error at the penalty phase of Tsarnaev’s trial by excluding evidence that Tsarnaev’s older brother was allegedly involved in different crimes two years before the offenses for which Tsarnaev was convicted.

In 2013, Respondent Dzhokhar Tsarnaev and his brother, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, set off two bombs at the Boston Marathon. United States v. Tsarnaev at 36. The bombs killed three people and injured hundreds of others. Id. That night, after Tamerlan and Dzhokhar escaped, the brothers drove Tamerlan’s car past Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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United States v. Zubaydah

Issues

When applying the state secrets privilege, should a court defer to the government’s assessment of the national security risks involved or conduct an independent judicial review?

This case asks the Supreme Court to weigh national security concerns against the need for transparency and accountability when applying the state secrets privilege, a common-law privilege permitting classified information to be protected from discovery. Petitioner the United States argues that the utmost deference is owed to government officials in matters of national security. Respondent Zubaydah argues, however, that courts should review the evidence independently to separate state secrets from non-privileged information. The outcome of this case carries significant implications for judicial transparency, the separation of powers, and civil liberties.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit erred when it rejected the United States’ assertion of the state secrets privilege based on the court’s own assessment of potential harms to the national security, and required discovery to proceed further under 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) against former Central Intelligence Agency contractors on matters concerning alleged clandestine CIA activities.

Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) sought to obtain intelligence on terrorist activities by developing a secret network of overseas black sites where detainees of the War on Terror were subjected to “enhanced interrogation techniques.” Husayn v. Mitchell at 1125–1127.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Joseph Margulies for his guidance and insights into this case.

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Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l

Issues

How should a court determine whether a foreign state has taken property in violation of international law? Is the pleading standard for establishing jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s expropriation clause more restrictive than the pleading standard for federal question jurisdiction?

This case will address what pleading standard a plaintiff attempting to use the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s (FSIA) expropriation exception is required to meet to establish jurisdiction. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Petroleos de Venezuela and PDVSA Petroleo (“Venezuela”) argue that, in order for private American corporations like Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co. and Helmerich & Payne Venezuela (“H&P”) to bring a claim against a foreign sovereign in U.S. courts, plaintiffs must meet the usual standards of subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA. In contrast, H&P argues that the approach taken by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which only denies jurisdiction to “wholly insubstantial or frivolous” claims, is the appropriate standard under the expropriation exception. This case will impact the viability of future claims of expropriation against foreign sovereigns, especially within the context of private corporations seeking redress against foreign governments. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) provides that "a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter." 28 U.S.C. § 1604. Under the Act's expropriation exception, in pertinent part, "[a] foreign state shall not be immune * * * in any case* * * in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue." Id. § 1605(a)(3).

The three questions presented in this petition concern the requirements for pleading jurisdiction under the expropriation exception. They are:

  1. Whether, for purposes of determining if a plaintiff has pleaded that a foreign state has taken property "in violation of international law," the FSIA recognizes a discrimination exception to the domestic-takings rule, which holds that a foreign sovereign's taking of the property of its own national is not a violation of international law.
  2. Whether, for purposes of determining if a plaintiff has pleaded that "rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue," the FSIA allows a shareholder to claim property rights in the assets of a still-existing corporation.
  3. Whether the pleading standard for alleging that a case falls within the FSIA's expropriation exception is more demanding than the standard for pleading jurisdiction under the federal question statute, which allows a jurisdictional dismissal only if the federal claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.

Helmerich & Payne, an Oklahoma-based American company, had successfully operated an oil-drilling business in Venezuela through a series of Venezuelan subsidiaries (such as Helmerich & Payne, Venezuela (H&P-V)) from 1975 until 2010. See Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co. and Helmeric & Payne Venezuela C.A. v.

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