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Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

Free Enterprise Fund and Beckstead and Watts, LLP v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board

Issues

Whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act violates the Constitution’s separation of powers doctrine by stripping the President of authority to select or remove members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“Board”), and whether the Board members are properly categorized as “inferior officers”, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) is properly categorized as a “Department”, and the five commissioners are properly the “Head” of the SEC, so as to be consistent with the Constitution’s Appointments Clause.

 

In 2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in reaction to the perceived failures of the self-regulatory system for accounting procedures that led to the infamous Enron and WorldCom scandals. The Act established the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to supervise the audit of public companies. Although the Board is under the authority of the Securities and Exchange Commission, its members are not subject to direct removal or appointment by the President and it retains the power to set and raise its own budget. In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether the Act’s establishment of the Board is an unconstitutional violation of separation of power principles and whether the Board’s structure violates the Appointments Clause. Petitioners argue that the Act violates  separation  of powers by diminishing the President’s ability to control or supervise Board members. Respondents argue that the Act does not violate  separation  of powers because Congress can grant exclusive appointment and removal authority to the Heads of Departments. Petitioners additionally argue that the Board’s structure violates the Appointment Clause because Board members are Principal Officers and, even if they were to be construed as Inferior Officers, their appointment is still unconstitutional, because the SEC is not a “Department” and its Commissioners are not the SEC’s “Head,” as required by the Clause. In response, Respondents argue that Board members are inferior officers because they are controlled directly by the  SEC,  and that the SEC  is in fact  a “Department” over which the President can exercise broad control and the Commission is its “Head” because it exercises the SEC’s collective powers. The case will ultimately determine the permissibility of the scheme currently in place that regulates US financial markets.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 violates the Constitution's separation of powers by vesting members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB") with far-reaching executive power while completely stripping the President of all authority to appoint or remove those members or otherwise supervise or control their exercise of that power, or whether, as the court of appeals held, the Act is constitutional because Congress can restrict the President's removal authority in any way it "deems best for the public interest."

2. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that, under the Appointments Clause, PCAOB members are "inferior officers" directed and supervised by the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), where the SEC lacks any authority to supervise those members personally, to remove the members for any policy-related reason or to influence the members' key investigative functions, merely because the SEC may review some of the members' work product.

3. If PCAOB members are inferior officers, whether the Act's provision for their appointment by the SEC violates the Appointments Clause either because the SEC is not a "Department" under Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991), or because the five commissioners, acting collectively, are not the "Head" of the SEC.

The notorious financial accounting scandals involving Enron and Worldcom demonstrated the inadequacies of the self-regulatory reporting requirements governing many public companies. See Free Enterprise Fund v.

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Additional Resources

• Wex: Law about Securities

• Wex: Law about Separation of Powers

• Securities Prof Blog, Law Professor Blogs Network: Securities

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Lawson v. FMR, LLC

Issues

Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, which forbids publicly traded companies, mutual funds, and contractors or subcontractors of such companies from discriminating or retaliating against an employee because of certain protected conduct, protect an employee of a privately-held contractor or subcontractor of a public company?

Jonathan Zang and Jackie Hosang Lawson sued their respective Fidelity employers, alleging that the companies retaliated against them for reporting what they believed to be securities law violations. Section 1514A of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act protects employees of public companies from retaliation after the employee “blows the whistle” on the company. Zang and Lawson argue that § 1514A should also apply to employees of private contractors and subcontractors contracting with public companies, since these employees may be in the best position to report problems. FMR LLC argues that Congress only intended § 1514A to apply to public employees, and that extending coverage would result in an unmanageable amount of litigation. The First Circuit ruled that § 1514A protects only public employees, and that Congress must expand coverage if it wants to cover employees of private contractors. The Supreme Court will address whether and to what extent Sarbanes-Oxley provisions apply to private companies. The Court’s decision will impact employees of private companies that contract with public companies, and whether private employees will be protected from retaliation if they report securities violations to the Securities Exchange Commission.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Is an employee of a privately-held contractor or subcontractor of a public company protected from retaliation by § 1514A? 

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Facts

Petitioners Jonathan M. Zang and Jackie Hosang Lawson worked for private companies that provide advising or management services to the Fidelity family of mutual funds (“Fidelity funds”). See Lawson v. FMR LLC, 670 F.3d 61, 63 (1st Cir.

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Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC

Issues

Does a plaintiff bringing a claim for retaliation under §1514A of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 bear the burden of establishing the employer acted with retaliatory intent, or must the defendant employer demonstrate a lack of retaliatory intent as part of its defense?

This case asks the Supreme Court to clarify whistleblowers’ evidentiary burden when they allege retaliation for conduct protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Petitioner Trevor Murray argues that he does not need to prove retaliatory intent to establish a claim against his employer because the language of §1514A and the statutory and administrative precedent establish that the protected activity only needs to be a contributing factor in the adverse personnel action. Respondent UBS argues that employees should be required to prove that their employers acted with retaliatory intent in their initial complaints because the texts of the statute and statutory precedent reflect Congress’s intention to create an intent element. The outcome of this case will determine the amount of proof required for whistleblowers to prove retaliation for protected activities.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, following the burden-shifting framework that governs cases under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, a whistleblower must prove his employer acted with a “retaliatory intent” as part of his case in chief, or whether the lack of “retaliatory intent” is part of the affirmative defense on which the employer bears the burden of proof.

In 2011, Respondent UBS Securities, LLC hired Petitioner Trevor Murray as a strategist, a role that required him to certify that his reports “accurately reflected his own views” and that his compensation was not tied to his views. Murray v.

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