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This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether a private company can exercise the federal government’s eminent-domain power and also considers the scope of a federal court’s jurisdiction. Once the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity, the Natural Gas Act authorizes private parties to exercise the federal government’s eminent-domain power to secure rights-of-way and compensation to the landowner. Petitioner PennEast Pipeline Company, LLC argues that the Natural Gas Act’s delegation is necessary and ministerial, and there is no insult to state sovereignty in suits such as this. By contrast, Respondent New Jersey et al. contends that this delegation violates the Eleventh Amendment’s guarantee of sovereign immunity to the States. Both PennEast and New Jersey argue that the Third Circuit properly exercised its jurisdiction over the case. The outcome of this case has implications for siting new natural gas pipelines, eminent domain, and states’ rights.

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b) requires a federal court to dismiss a civil action if an unavailable party is indispensable, that is, if the court could not in good conscience proceed without that party. Foreign sovereigns can make themselves unavailable by asserting their sovereign immunity from suit. The Supreme Court will consider the interaction between these two doctrines in this interpleader action to resolve the ownership of property claimed by the Republic of the Philippines ("Philippines") and by Mariano Pimentel ("Pimentel"). The Philippines successfully asserted its sovereign immunity, and now argues that the action cannot proceed in its absence. Pimentel responds that foreign sovereigns cannot stop an interpleader action merely by claiming an interest in the property at issue and then asserting sovereign immunity. The Court's decision in this case will impact courts' ability to adjudicate title to assets claimed by foreign sovereigns. This issue is likely to become increasingly important as sovereigns make ever-greater investments in private sector assets.

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This case asks the Court to determine whether the expropriation exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is satisfied when a claimant’s assets were seized and liquidated into funds that were “commingled” with the nation’s general assets, and the nation’s general assets were then used for commercial purposes within the United States. Hungary argues that commingled assets do not satisfy the expropriation exception because there is insufficient evidence to establish that the funds from the liquidated assets were directly used in a commercial capacity in the present day. The Simon survivors counter that commingled assets do satisfy the expropriation exception and that there is sufficient evidence that the funds from their seized property were later used for commercial purposes within the United States. This case touches on important questions regarding the role of American courts in international disputes, the Holocaust’s legacy, and human rights violations.

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The issue in the case is whether 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) provides a freestanding exception to attachment immunity or only eliminates Bancec’s presumption of separate status for a foreign state and its instrumentalities, without altering the criteria for overcoming immunity contained in other provisions of § 1610. Section 1610(g) is part of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, under which foreign sovereigns are presumed immune from suits and attachment. Jenny Rubin, a U.S. citizen injured in a Hamas suicide bombing in Jerusalem, argues that § 1610(g) provides a freestanding exception to attachment immunity because an interpretation subjecting § 1610(g) to the other provisions of § 1610 creates unresolvable inconsistencies within the statute and significantly limits the reach of subsection (g). Iran counters that § 1610(g) does not provide a freestanding exception to attachment immunity because subsection (g) can still be given its intended effect even when subjecting it to § 1610’s other provisions. Iran further argues that the clearest interpretation of subsection (g) is that it merely eliminates the Bancec presumption. From a policy perspective, this case is significant because it could improve the ability of terror victim judgment-creditors to collect judgments from a terror-sponsoring sovereign that is refusing to pay, and it will affect uniformity between U.S. and many other nations regarding attachment immunity laws.

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Harvey Leroy Sossamon, III is an inmate at a Texas state prison. The prison warden refused to allow cell-restricted inmates to attend religious services and denied all inmates use of the prison chapel for religious purposes. In 2006, Sossamon filed suit against the State of Texas and various state and prison officials, alleging that the Texas prison violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"). Sossamon sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Texas, holding that Texas has sovereign immunity under the 11th Amendment and is not liable for damages. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Sossamon argues here that the words “appropriate relief,” as provided by RLUIPA, unambiguously waives the state's immunity from damages. Texas counters that “appropriate relief” does not amount to clear notice which is required before a state may waive its sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will determine the protection afforded to states under RLUIPA and may deter states from implementing policies which violate the Act.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine the scope of a federal agency’s sovereign immunity to private lawsuits. The Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”), while attempting to raise a submerged power line in the river, injured Gary Thacker, who was participating in a fishing tournament. In their lawsuit against the TVA, Gary Thacker and his wife, Venida Thacker, contend that the TVA is not immune to their negligence claim because the TVA is not entitled to a discretionary-function exception—which immunizes a federal agency from private claims that arise from any of its discretionary governmental functions—and, therefore, the TVA may be sued under its statute’s sue-or-to-be-sued clause. The TVA counters that, pursuant to separation-of-powers principles, the TVA Act in fact implies a discretionary-function exception, and, even if it does not, the Suits in Admiralty Act, which indisputably has a discretionary-function exception, would apply and thus immunize the TVA from the Thackers’ suit. At stake here is the balance between a private citizen’s right to sue and the extent that sovereign immunity covers discretionary decisions of administrators and legislators.

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In December 2001, Argentina defaulted on its external debt payments. As a result, several bondholders agreed to debt restructurings with the country. However, NML Capital opted to file eleven different actions against Argentina in the Southern District of New York, with the district court ruling for NML in each action. Argentina has not satisfied any of the judgments, forcing NML to pursue Argentinian property located in the United States and abroad to try to attach and execute that property. NML subpoenaed two banks that are not parties to the litigation, seeking information about assets related to Argentina held at those banks. After the banks filed motions against the subpoenas, the district court ordered compliance with them and the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the court directed the subpoenas at third-party banks seeking only discovery, not attachment or execution, and thus did not impinge on Argentina’s sovereignty. Argentina claims that these subpoenas violate long-standing protections of sovereign immunity. NML counters that the court ordered the subpoenas against non-litigating banks that fall outside sovereign immunity protection. The Supreme Court will now consider whether a court can compel discovery of all assets, regardless of location, of a sovereign state in a post-judgment proceeding that would help enforce the judgment against that state. This decision could affect diplomatic relations between the United States and countries that give reciprocal treatment of judicial decisions.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether an act of Congress which allows veterans to sue states in their state court violates Article I of the Constitution. Leroy Torres, a veteran who served in Iraq, filed an employment discrimination case in Texas state court against his former state employer after it failed to provide relief for military injuries. The Texas courts found that Torres could not draw the state into a lawsuit using Texas courts. Torres argues that the text, history, and precedent of the Constitution’s war powers require Texas to participate in the suit. The state employer counters that if a private party were to subject Texas to its own judicial system, it would violate principles of sovereign immunity. This case has important implications for injured veterans’ ability to obtain relief from unlawful discrimination and can potentially radically reshape the balance of power between federal and state courts in deciding war powers questions.

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Respondent James Bormes used the U.S. government’s online pay system to pay for a lawsuit that he had filed electronically. Following the transaction, the website displayed the last four digits of his credit card and the card’s expiration date. Bormes then sued the government, alleging that it had violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") by displaying the expiration date. The United States argued that it had sovereign immunity with respect to claims under the FCRA because the Act did not explicitly apply to the U.S. government. When Bormes countered that he could sue the government under the Little Tucker Act, which provides a remedy for those with claims against the government of less than $10,000, the government contended that the Little Tucker Act applied only in situations where parties could not otherwise recover. In deciding this case, the Supreme Court must first determine the scope of the Tucker Acts' waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity regarding claims brought under the Little Tucker Act for suits based on violations of the FCRA. As the country’s largest employer, creditor, and lender, the U.S. government could see a massive increase in litigation and potential liability as a result of this decision. Additionally, the Supreme Court may address how explicit Congress must act in order to exempt the federal government from liability.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether § 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a trustee to avoid a transfer to the government when the government could not have been directly sued under nonbankruptcy law. Section 106 abrogates sovereign immunity in certain bankruptcy claims, including § 544(b). Section 544 states that a trustee “may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor… that is voidable under applicable law,” which typically invokes state laws that fall outside of the purview of bankruptcy law. The Government argues that § 106 should be read narrowly, and that sovereign immunity is not waived when the actual creditor could not pursue an avoidance claim under the applicable state law due to sovereign immunity. Miller counters that the waiver of sovereign immunity in § 106 extends to the applicable law referenced in § 544. The outcome of this case has serious implications for the powers of trustees in bankruptcy cases and the power of the United States to waive sovereign immunity.  

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