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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether Section 1930 of the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 2017, which increased filing fees in trustee districts but not in bankruptcy administrator districts, violates the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause. Petitioner Alfred H. Siegel argues that the disparity in fees is non-uniform because it applies to different geographic locations in the United States differently. As a result Siegel, contends that that the fee system is unconstitutional, and asks the Court to grant a full refund of the difference in fees. Respondent John P. Fitzgerald, III, counters that the disparity does not violate the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause, impacting trustee districts and administrator districts in a facially neutral way. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for the delegation of congressional power and the structure of bankruptcy courts.  

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether 18 U.S.C. Section 666—the statute for federal-funds bribery—also criminalizes gratuities. Snyder, a former mayor in Indiana, steered city contracts to a local company and then accepted from that company a fabricated consulting job worth $13,000. A jury convicted him of accepting an illegal gratuity under the statute. Snyder argues that the law only criminalizes bribes, however, because Congress has removed the language from the statute that used to refer to gratuities. The United States argues that the statute criminalizes gratuities through the word “rewarded,” while the word “influenced” refers to bribes. This case raises concerns about federal intrusion on state interests depending on how broadly courts will construe federal criminal statutes that seek to prohibit gratuities. It may also affect the outcome of how federal prosecutors will combat corruption at the state and local levels.

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Cori and Kerri Rigsby sued State Farm Fire & Casualty Company under the False Claims Act (“FCA”), alleging that State Farm defrauded the federal government while paying out claims related to the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina. The district court and the Fifth Circuit found that the Rigsbys’ attorney violated the FCA’s seal requirement by distributing documents to several news outlets, but declined to dismiss the Rigsbys’ suit after applying a three-part balancing test to evaluate whether dismissal was warranted. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split over what standard governs the decision to dismiss a relator’s claim for violation of the FCA’s seal requirement. The United States, on behalf of the Rigsbys, points to the FCA’s test, structure, legislative history, and purpose, to argue that only discretionary sanctions apply to a violation of the seal requirement. State Farm maintains that a violation of the seal requirement must result in mandatory dismissal of the suit, rather than a discretionary balancing test. This decision may affect the prevalence of qui tam FCA suits and the government’s ability to recover from defrauding parties.

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The Supreme Court will decide the extent to which the National Park Service (“NPS”) has the authority to regulate non-federal lands located within federal conservation system units (“CSUs”) under Section 103(c) of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (“ANILCA”). See Brief for the Petitioner, John Sturgeon at 17. Petitioner John Sturgeon argues that Section 103(c) of ANILCA extends regulatory power to NPS only over public lands within the boundaries of CSUs and that lands and waters owned by the State, a Native Corporation, or a private party will not be subjected to such regulations. See id. Conversely, Respondent Bert Frost maintains that the contested navigable waters do not fall in the carve-out identified by Section 103(c) and that NPS has the authority to regulate such territory in the pursuit of federal interests. See Brief for the Respondent, Bert Frost at 25. The Supreme Court’s decision will impact the extent of Alaska’s control over resources within the state. See Brief for the Petitioner at 17.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether, under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), individual federal employees can be sued for money damages. Petitioners Tanzin and other government agents argue that money damages against individuals in their personal capacities are unavailable unless Congress clearly indicates otherwise, which Congress has not done in RFRA. Tanzin also argues that RFRA authorizes relief “against a government,” which does not include individual officials. Tanzin further claims that money damages fall beyond RFRA’s authorization of “appropriate” relief. Respondents Tanvir and others counter that Congress need not expressly authorize money damages, but that rather, money damages are available unless Congress clearly says otherwise. Additionally, Tanvir claims that RFRA authorizes suits against officials, even separate from their official capacity, and that money damages are “appropriate” and even necessary to enforce RFRA. The outcome of this case could affect the separation of powers between the judicial and the executive branches, the financial and operational burdens on the federal government, and the interests of third parties, including religious minority groups.

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In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) precludes judicial review of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s (“the Board”) decision to grant an inter partes review after determining that an effective statute of limitations under Section 315(b) does not apply. Thryv, Inc., contends that the plain language of Sections 314(d) and 315(b) and relevant Supreme Court precedent renders such decisions nonappealable. Click-To-Call Technologies counters that the plain language of Section 314(d) contains nothing to indicate that judicial review of the Board’s interpretation of Section 315(b) is prohibited, and that Supreme Court precedent has confirmed this understanding. The outcome of this case will have important implications on the scope of administrative power, incentives for product innovation, and the integrity of the patent system.

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The Supreme Court will consider whether a state offense that is “described in” a federal criminal statute must meet all elements of the statute, including jurisdictional requirements, to constitute an aggravated felony. See Brief for Petitioner, Jorge Luna Torres at 2. Petitioner Jorge Luna Torres argues that under the plain meaning of the aggravated felony definition, the New York offense of arson is not described in the federal arson offense because it does not satisfy the federal statute’s interstate commerce requirement. See id. But U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch contends that it is reasonable to interpret that a state offense may constitute an aggravated felony under the relevant federal offense, even if the conduct does not meet a jurisdictional element. See Brief for Respondent, Loretta E. Lynch at 17. The Court’s ruling will clarify the definition of “aggravated felony,” and impact the relationship between immigration law and criminal law, particularly with respect to immigrants facing deportation. See Brief of Amici Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. (“NACDL”), in Support of the Petitioner at 1.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine the precise meaning of the “knowledge” standard in the Copyright Act. Section 411 of the Copyright Act provides that a copyright registration is inadequate when it includes information that was included with “knowledge that it was inaccurate.” Petitioner Unicolors, Inc. (“Unicolors”) argues that Section 411’s “knowledge” requirement excludes mistakes that are made in good faith and without fraudulent intent. Respondent H&M (“H&M”) counters that the plain meaning of the word “knowledge” indicates that so long as a copyright registrant is aware of the inaccuracy of the information, it is immaterial whether they intended to defraud. This case has significant implications for principles of statutory interpretation, copyright law, and the direction of future copyright infringement litigation.

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In 1996, Congress passed what is now Section 922(g)(9) of Title 18, which criminalizes the possession of firearms by certain individuals. Section 922(g)(9) makes it a federal crime for a person convicted in state court of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” to possess a firearm if the misdemeanor involved the use or attempted use of physical force. In 2001, James Alvin Castleman was convicted in Tennessee of misdemeanor domestic assault, which requires proof of causing bodily injury to another. Seven years later, Castleman was indicted for possessing a firearm in violation of Section 922(g)(9). The Supreme Court will address whether Castleman’s conviction qualifies as a predicate offense for Section 922(g)(9) and whether the language “physical force” in Section 922(g)(9) requires violent contact. The Court’s ruling will affect the scope of limitations on domestic violence offenders’ possession of firearms, and may serve as precedent for other misdemeanor offenses which contain the language “physical force.”  

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine the meaning of the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B), which defines Hobbs Act robbery, and whether the statute is constitutional. In 2015, Davis and Glover were convicted of several robberies under the Hobbs Act robbery statute. The two appealed their convictions to the Supreme Court after the Court in Sessions v. Dimaya held that the similarly worded “crime of violence” definition in the Immigration and Nationality Act was unconstitutional because the text was too vague. The United States government argues that the “crime of violence” language is constitutionally valid because the most appropriate reading of the statute implies analyzing an individual’s case and particularized facts, and not a “categorical approach” which looks at the ordinary expectations of the crime. The government further asserts that constitutional avoidance implies a categorical approach in conformity with congressional intent and the Constitution. Davis and Glover counter that the correct reading of Section 924(c)(3)(B) is a categorical approach as suggested by the text and placement within the statute. They further maintain that upholding the subsection under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance would upset the rule of lenity. The outcome of this case will determine the scope of the judiciary’s power to construe statute construction based on constitutionality and the occurrence of possible conviction reconsiderations for currently incarcerated individuals.

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