32 CFR 223.7 - Procedures-determination of DoD UCNI.
(a) Use of the Guidelines.
(1) The guidelines in this section are the basis for determining what unclassified information regarding the physical protection of DoD SNM, SNM equipment, SNM facilities, or nuclear weapons in DoD custody, in a given technical or programmatic subject area are to be designated as DoD UCNI.
(2) The decision to protect unclassified information as DoD UCNI shall be based on a determination that the unauthorized dissemination of such information could reasonably be expected to have an adverse effect on the health and safety of the public or the common defense and security by significantly increasing the likelihood of the illegal production of nuclear weapons or the theft, diversion, or sabotage of SNM, SNM equipment, SNM facilities, or nuclear weapons in DoD custody.
(b) General Guidance.
(1) Unclassified information relating to the physical protection of DoD SNM, SNM equipment, SNM facilities, or nuclear weapons in DoD custody is to be protected from public disclosure to prevent the adverse effects identified in paragraph (a)(2) of this section. Public availability of information that would not result in such adverse effects is not to be restricted.
(2) In controlling DoD SNM information, only the minimum restrictions needed to protect the health and safety of the public or the common defense and security shall be applied to prohibit the disclosure and dissemination of DoD UCNI.
(3) Any information that has been, or is, widely and irretrievably disseminated in the public domain and whose dissemination was not, or is not, under Government control is exempt from control under these guidelines. However, the fact that information is in the public domain is not a sufficient basis for determining that similar or updated Government-owned and -controlled information in another document or other material is not, or is no longer, DoD UCNI; case-by-case determinations are required.
(c) Topical Guidance. DoD Components shall consider the topics discussed in this section during the preparation of unclassified information that addresses the physical protection of DoD SNM or nuclear weapons in DoD custody to determine if it qualifies for control as DoD UCNI.
(1) Vulnerability Assessments.
(ii) The fact that DoD SNM or nuclear weapons facility security-related projects or upgrades are planned or in progress, if not observable from a public area.
(iii) Identification and description of security system components intended to mitigate the consequences of an accident or act of sabotage at a DoD SNM or nuclear weapons facility.
(2) Material Control and Accountability.
(i) Total quantity or categories of DoD SNM at a facility.
(ii) Control and accountability plans or procedures.
(iii) Receipts that, cumulatively, would reveal quantities and categories of DoD SNM of potential interest to an adversary.
(iv) Measured discards, decay losses, or losses due to fission and transmutation for a reporting period.
(v) Frequency and schedule of DoD SNM inventories.
(3) Facility Description.
(i) Maps, conceptual design, and construction drawings of a DoD SNM or nuclear weapons facility showing construction characteristics of building(s) and associated electrical systems, barriers, and back-up power systems not observable from a public area.
(ii) Maps, plans, photographs, or drawings of man-made or natural features in a DoD SNM or nuclear weapons facility not observable from a public area; e.g., tunnels, storm or waste sewers, water intake and discharge conduits, or other features having the potential for concealing surreptitious movement.
(iii) Communications and computer network configurations and capabilities.
(4) Intrusion Detection and Security Alarm Systems.
(iii) Performance characteristics of installed systems.
(5) Keys, Locks, Combinations, and Tamper-Indicating Devices.
(i) Types and models of keys, locks, and combinations of locks used in DoD SNM or nuclear weapons facilities and during shipment.
(ii) Method of application of tamper-indicating devices.
(iii) Vulnerability information available from unclassified vendor specifications.
(6) Threat Response Capability and Procedures.
(i) Information about arrangements with local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies of potential interest to an adversary.
(ii) Information in “non-hostile” contingency plans of potential value to an adversary to defeat a security measure, e.g., fire, safety, nuclear accident, radiological release, or other administrative plans.
(iii) Required response time of security forces.
(7) Physical Security Evaluations.
(i) Method of evaluating physical security measures not observable from public areas.
(ii) Procedures for inspecting and testing communications and security systems.
(8) In-Transit Security.
(i) Fact that a shipment is going to take place.
(ii) Specific means of protecting shipments.
(iii) Number and size of packages.
(iv) Mobile operating and communications procedures that an adversary could exploit.
(v) Information on mode, routing, protection, communications, and operations that must be shared with law enforcement or other civil agencies, but not visible to the public.
(vi) Description and specifications of transport vehicle compartments or security systems not visible to the public.
(9) Information on Nuclear Weapon Stockpile and Storage Requirements, Nuclear Weapon Destruction and Disablement Systems, and Nuclear Weapon Physical Characteristics. Refer to DOE CG-SS-4 for guidance about the physical protection of information on nuclear weapon stockpile and storage requirements, nuclear weapon destruction and disablement systems, and nuclear weapon physical characteristics that may, under certain circumstances, be unclassified. Such information meeting the adverse effects test shall be protected as DoD UCNI.