TRADITIONAL EQUAL PROTECTION: ECONOMIC REGULATION AND RELATED EXERCISES OF THE POLICE POWER
Taxation

At the outset, the Court did not regard the Equal Protection Clause as having any bearing on taxation.1538 It soon, however, entertained cases assailing specific tax laws under this provision,1539 and in 1890 it cautiously conceded that “clear and hostile discriminations against particular persons and classes, especially such as are of an unusual character, unknown to the practice of our governments, might be obnoxious to the constitutional prohibition.”1540 The Court observed, however, that the Equal Protection Clause “was not intended to compel the State to adopt an iron rule of equal taxation” and propounded some conclusions that remain valid today.1541 In succeeding years the clause has been invoked but sparingly to invalidate state levies. In the field of property taxation, inequality has been condemned only in two classes of cases: (1) discrimination in assessments, and (2) discrimination against foreign corporations. In addition, there are a handful of cases invalidating, because of inequality, state laws imposing income, gross receipts, sales and license taxes.

Classification for Purpose of Taxation.

The power of the state to classify for purposes of taxation is “of wide range and flexibility.”1542 A state may adjust its taxing system in such a way as the state, Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412 (1937) (distinguishing Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933)). Electricity: municipal systems may be exempted, Puget Sound Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619 (1934); that portion of electricity produced which is used for pumping water for irrigating lands may be exempted, Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932). to favor certain industries or forms of industry1543 and may tax different types of taxpayers differently, despite the fact that they compete.1544 It does not follow, however, that because “some degree of inequality from the nature of things must be permitted, gross inequality must also be allowed.”1545 Classification may not be arbitrary. It must be based on a real and substantial difference1546 and the difference need not be great or conspicuous,1547 but there must be no discrimination in favor of one as against another of the same class.1548 Also, discriminations of an unusual character are scrutinized with special care.1549 A gross sales tax graduated at increasing rates with the volume of sales,1550 a heavier license tax on each unit in a chain of stores where the owner has stores located in more than one country,1551 and a gross receipts tax levied on corporations operating taxicabs, but not on individuals,1552 have been held to be a repugnant to the Equal Protection Clause. But it is not the function of the Court to consider the propriety or justness of the tax, to seek for the motives and criticize the public policy which prompted the adoption of the statute.1553 If the evident intent and general operation of the tax legislation is to adjust the burden with a fair and reasonable degree of equality, the constitutional requirement is satisfied.1554

One not within the class claimed to be discriminated against cannot challenge the constitutionality of a statute on the ground that it denies equal protection of the law.1555 If a tax applies to a class that may be separately taxed, those within the class may not complain because the class might have been more aptly defined or because others, not of the class, are taxed improperly.1556

Foreign Corporations and Nonresidents.

The Equal Pro-tection Clause does not require identical taxes upon all foreign and domestic corporations in every case.1557 In 1886, a Pennsylvania corporation previously licensed to do business in New York challenged an increased annual license tax imposed by that state in retaliation for a like tax levied by Pennsylvania against New York corporations. This tax was held valid on the ground that the state, having power to exclude entirely, could change the conditions of admission for the future and could demand the payment of a new or further tax as a license fee.1558 Later cases whittled down this rule considerably. The Court decided that “after its admission, the foreign corporation stands equal and is to be classified with domestic corporations of the same kind,”1559 and that where it has acquired property of a fixed and permanent nature in a state, it cannot be subjected to a more onerous tax for the privilege of doing business than is imposed on domestic corporations.1560 A state statute taxing foreign corporations writing fire, marine, inland navigation and casualty insurance on net receipts, including receipts from casualty business, was held invalid under the Equal Protection Clause where foreign companies writing only casualty insurance were not subject to a similar tax.1561 Later, the doctrine of Philadelphia Fire Association v. New York was revived to sustain an increased tax on gross premiums which was exacted as an annual license fee from foreign but not from domestic corporations.1562 Even though the right of a foreign corporation to do business in a state rests on a license, the Equal Protection Clause is held to insure it equality of treatment, at least so far as ad valorem taxation is concerned.1563 The Court, in WHYY Inc. v. Glassboro,1564 held that a foreign nonprofit corporation licensed to do business in the taxing state is denied equal protection of the law where an exemption from state property taxes granted to domestic corporations is denied to a foreign corporation solely because it was organized under the laws of a sister state and where there is no greater administrative burden in evaluating a foreign corporation than a domestic corporation in the taxing state.

State taxation of insurance companies, insulated from Commerce Clause attack by the McCarran-Ferguson Act, must pass similar hurdles under the Equal Protection Clause. In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward,1565 the Court concluded that taxation favoring domestic over foreign corporations “constitutes the very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to prevent.” Rejecting the assertion that it was merely imposing “Commerce Clause rhetoric in equal protection clothing,” the Court explained that the emphasis is different even though the result in some cases will be the same: the Commerce Clause measures the effects which otherwise valid state enactments have on interstate commerce, while the Equal Protection Clause merely requires a rational relation to a valid state purpose.1566 However, the Court’s holding that the discriminatory purpose was invalid under equal protection analysis would also be a basis for invalidation under a different strand of Commerce Clause analysis.1567

Income Taxes.

A state law that taxes the entire income of do-mestic corporations that do business in the state, including that derived within the state, while exempting entirely the income received outside the state by domestic corporations that do no local business, is arbitrary and invalid.1568 In taxing the income of a non-resident, there is no denial of equal protection in limiting the deduction of losses to those sustained within the state, although residents are permitted to deduct all losses, wherever incurred.1569 A retroactive statute imposing a graduated tax at rates different from those in the general income tax law, on dividends received in a prior year that were deductible from gross income under the law in effect when they were received, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.1570

Inheritance Taxes.

There is no denial of equal protection in prescribing different treatment for lineal relations, collateral kindred and unrelated persons, or in increasing the proportionate burden of the tax progressively as the amount of the benefit increases.1571 A tax on life estates where the remainder passes to lineal heirs is valid despite the exemption of life estates where the remainder passes to collateral heirs.1572 There is no arbitrary classification in taxing the transmission of property to a brother or sister, while exempting that to a son-in-law or daughter-in-law.1573 Vested and contingent remainders may be treated differently.1574 The exemption of property bequeathed to charitable or educational institutions may be limited to those within the state.1575 In computing the tax collectible from a nonresident decedent’s property within the state, a state may apply the pertinent rates to the whole estate wherever located and take that proportion thereof which the property within the state bears to the total; the fact that a greater tax may result than would be assessed on an equal amount of property if owned by a resident, does not invalidate the result.1576

Motor Vehicle Taxes.

In demanding compensation for the use of highways, a state may exempt certain types of vehicles, according to the purpose for which they are used, from a mileage tax on carriers.1577 A state maintenance tax act, which taxes vehicle property carriers for hire at greater rates than it taxes similar vehicles carrying property not for hire, is reasonable, because the use of roads by one hauling not for hire generally is limited to transportation of his own property as an incident to his occupation and is substantially less extensive than that of one engaged in business as a common carrier.1578 A property tax on motor vehicles used in operating a stage line that makes constant and unusual use of the highways may be measured by gross receipts and be assessed at a higher rate than are taxes on property not so employed.1579 Common motor carriers of freight operating over regular routes between fixed termini may be taxed at higher rates than other carriers, common and private.1580 A fee for the privilege of transporting motor vehicles on their own wheels over the highways of the state for purpose of sale does not violate the Equal Protection Clause as applied to cars moving in caravans.1581 The exemption from a tax for a permit to bring cars into the state in caravans of cars moved for sale between zones in the state is not an unconstitutional discrimination where it appears that the traffic subject to the tax places a much more serious burden on the highways than that which is exempt from the tax.1582 Also sustained as valid have been exemptions of vehicles weighing less than 3,000 pounds from graduated registration fees imposed on carriers for hire, notwithstanding that the exempt vehicles, when loaded, may outweigh those taxed;1583 and exemptions from vehicle registration and license fees levied on private carriers operating a motor vehicle in the business of transporting persons or property for hire, the exemptions including one for vehicles hauling people and farm products exclusively between points not having railroad facilities and not passing through or beyond municipalities having railroad facilities.1584

Property Taxes.

The state’s latitude of discretion is notably wide in the classification of property for purposes of taxation and the granting of partial or total exemption on the grounds of policy,1585 whether the exemption results from the terms of the statute itself or the conduct of a state official implementing state policy.1586 A provision for the forfeiture of land for nonpayment of taxes is not invalid because the conditions to which it applies exist only in a part of the state.1587 Also, differences in the basis of assessment are not invalid where the person or property affected might properly be placed in a separate class for purposes of taxation.1588

Early cases drew the distinction between intentional and systematic discriminatory action by state officials in undervaluing some property while taxing at full value other property in the same class—an action that could be invalidated under the Equal Protection Clause—and mere errors in judgment resulting in unequal valuation or undervaluation—actions that did not support a claim of discrimination.1589 Subsequently, however, the Court in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster County Comm’n,1590 found a denial of equal protection to property owners whose assessments, based on recent purchase prices, ranged from 8 to 35 times higher than comparable neighboring property for which the assessor failed over a 10-year period to readjust appraisals.

Then, only a few years later, the Court upheld a California ballot initiative that imposed a quite similar result: property that is sold is appraised at purchase price, whereas assessments on property that has stayed in the same hands since 1976 may rise no more that 2% per year.1591 Allegheny Pittsburgh was distinguished, the disparity in assessments being said to result from administrative failure to implement state policy rather than from implementation of a coherent state policy.1592 California’s acquisition-value system favoring those who hold on to property over those who purchase and sell property was viewed as furthering rational state interests in promoting “local neighborhood preservation, continuity, and stability,” and in protecting reasonable reliance interests of existing homeowners.1593

Allegheny Pittsburgh was similarly distinguished in Armour v. City of Indianapolis,1594 where the Court held that Indianapolis, which had abandoned one method of assessing payments against affected lots for sewer projects for another, could forgive outstanding assessments payments without refunding assessments already paid. In Armour, owners of affected lots had been given the option of paying in one lump sum, or of paying in 10, 20 or 30-year installment plan. Despite arguments that the forgiveness of the assessment resulted in a significant disparity in the assessment paid by similarly-situated homeowners, the Court found that avoiding the administrative burden of continuing to collect the outstanding fees was a rational basis for the City’s decision.1595

An owner aggrieved by discrimination is entitled to have his assessment reduced to the common level.1596 Equal protection is denied if a state does not itself remove the discrimination; it cannot impose upon the person against whom the discrimination is directed the burden of seeking an upward revision of the assessment of other members of the class.1597 A corporation whose valuations were accepted by the assessing commission cannot complain that it was taxed disproportionately, as compared with others, if the commission did not act fraudulently.1598

Special Assessment.

A special assessment is not discrimina-tory because apportioned on an ad valorem basis, nor does its validity depend upon the receipt of some special benefit as distinguished from the general benefit to the community.1599 Railroad property may not be burdened for local improvements upon a basis so wholly different from that used for ascertaining the contribution demanded of individual owners as necessarily to produce manifest inequality.1600 A special highway assessment against railroads based on real property, rolling stock, and other personal property is unjustly discriminatory when other assessments for the same improvement are based on real property alone.1601 A law requiring the franchise of a railroad to be considered in valuing its property for apportionment of a special assessment is not invalid where the franchises were not added as a separate personal property value to the assessment of the real property.1602 In taxing railroads within a levee district on a mileage basis, it is not necessarily arbitrary to fix a lower rate per mile for those having fewer than 25 miles of main line within the district than for those having more.1603

Police Power Regulation
Classification.

Justice Holmes’ characterization of the Equal Protection Clause as the “usual last refuge of constitutional arguments”1604 was no doubt made with the practice in mind of contestants tacking on an equal protection argument to a due process challenge of state economic regulation. Few police regulations have been held unconstitutional on this ground.

“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.”1605 The Court has made it clear that only the totally irrational classification in the economic field will be struck down,1606 and it has held that legislative classifications that impact severely upon some businesses and quite favorably upon others may be saved through stringent deference to legislative judgment.1607 So deferential is the classification that it denies the challenging party any right to offer evidence to seek to prove that the legislature is wrong in its conclusion that its classification will serve the purpose it has in mind, so long as the question is at least debatable and the legislature “could rationally have decided” that its classification would foster its goal.1608 The Court has condence that a distinction is wholly irrational. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153–54 (1938). Classifications under police regulations have been held valid as follows: Advertising: discrimination between billboard and newspaper advertising of cigarettes, Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932); prohibition of advertising signs on motor vehicles, except when used in the usual business of the owner and not used mainly for advertising, Fifth Ave. Coach Co. v. New York, 221 U.S. 467 (1911); prohibition of advertising on motor vehicles except notices or advertising of products of the owner, Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); prohibition against sale of articles on which there is a representation of the flag for ad- 251 (1936); oleomargarine colored to resemble butter may be prohibited, Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio, 183 U.S. 238 (1902); table syrups may be required to be so labeled and disclose identity and proportion of ingredients, Corn Products Ref. Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427 (1919) Geographical discriminations: legislation limited in application to a particular geographical or political subdivision of a state, Ft. Smith Co. v. Paving Dist., 274 U.S. 387, 391 (1927); ordinance prohibiting a particular business in certain sections of a municipality, Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); statute authorizing a municipal commission to limit the height of buildings in commercial districts to demned a variety of statutory classifications as failing the rational v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374 (1932); prohibition against operation of uncertified carriers, Bradley v. Public Utility Comm’n, 289 U.S. 92 (1933); exemption from regulations affecting carriers for hire, of persons whose chief business is farming and dairying, but who occasionally haul farm and dairy products for compensation, Hicklin v. Coney, 290 U.S. 169 (1933); exemption of private vehicles, street cars and omnibuses from insurance requirements applicable to taxicabs, Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140 (1924). Peddlers and solicitors: a state may classify and regulate itinerant vendors and peddlers, Emert v. Missouri, 156 U.S. 296 (1895); may forbid the sale by them of basis test, although some of the cases are of doubtful vitality today and some have been questioned. Thus, the Court invalidated a statute that forbade stock insurance companies to act through agents who were their salaried employees but permitted mutual companies to operate in this manner.1609 A law that required private motor vehicle carriers to obtain certificates of convenience and necessity and to furnish security for the protection of the public was held invalid because of the exemption of carriers of fish, farm, and dairy products.1610 The same result befell a statute that permitted mill dealers without well-advertised trade names the benefit of a price differential but that restricted this benefit to such dealers entering the business before a certain date.1611 In a decision since overruled, the Court struck down a law that exempted by name the American Express Company from the terms pertaining to the licensing, bonding, regulation, and inspection of “currency exchanges” engaged in the sale of money orders.1612

Other Business and Employment Relations
Labor Relations.

Objections to labor legislation on the ground that the limitation of particular regulations to specified industries was obnoxious to the Equal Protection Clause have been consistently overruled.1613 Statutes limiting hours of labor for employees in mines, smelters,1614 mills, factories,1615 or on public works1616 have been sustained. And a statute forbidding persons engaged in mining and manufacturing to issue orders for payment of labor unless redeemable at face value in cash was similarly held unobjectionable.1617 The exemption of mines employing fewer than ten persons from a law pertaining to measurement of coal to determine a miner’s wages is not unreasonable.1618 All corporations1619 or public service corporations1620 may be required to issue to employees who leave their service letters stating the nature of the service and the cause of leaving even though other employers are not so required.

Industries may be classified in a workers’ compensation act according to the respective hazards of each,1621 and the exemption of farm laborers and domestic servants does not render such an act invalid.1622 A statute providing that no person shall be denied opportunity for employment because he is not a member of a labor union does not offend the Equal Protection Clause.1623 At a time when protective labor legislation generally was falling under “liberty of contract” applications of the Due Process Clause, the Court generally approved protective legislation directed solely to women workers,1624 and this solicitude continued into present times in the approval of laws that were more questionable,1625 but passage of the sex discrimination provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has generally called into question all such protective legislation addressed solely to women.1626

Monopolies and Unfair Trade Practices.

On the principle that the law may hit the evil where it is most felt, state antitrust laws applicable to corporations but not to individuals,1627 or to vendors of commodities but not to vendors of labor,1628 have been upheld. Contrary to its earlier view, the Court now holds that an antitrust act that exempts agricultural products in the hands of the producer is valid.1629 Diversity with respect to penalties also has been sustained. Corporations violating the law may be proceeded against by bill in equity, while individuals are indicted and tried.1630 A provision, superimposed upon the general antitrust law, for revocation of the licenses of fire insurance companies that enter into illegal combinations, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.1631 A grant of monopoly privileges, if otherwise an appropriate exercise of the police power, is immune to attack under that clause.1632 Likewise, enforcement of an unfair sales act, under which merchants are privileged to give trading stamps, worth two and one-half percent of the price, with goods sold at or near statutory cost, while a competing merchant, not issuing stamps, is precluded from making an equivalent price reduction, effects no discrimination. There is a reasonable basis for concluding that destructive, deceptive competition results from selective loss-leader selling whereas such abuses do not attend issuance of trading stamps “across the board,” as a discount for payment in cash.1633

Administrative Discretion.

A municipal ordinance that vests in supervisory authorities a naked and arbitrary power to grant or withhold consent to the operation of laundries in wooden buildings, without consideration of the circumstances of individual cases, constitutes a denial of equal protection of the law when consent is withheld from certain persons solely on the basis of nationality.1634 But a city council may reserve to itself the power to make exceptions from a ban on the operation of a dairy within the city,1635 or from building line restrictions.1636 Written permission of the mayor or president of the city council may be required before any person shall move a building on a street.1637 The mayor may be empowered to determine whether an applicant has a good character and reputation and is a suitable person to receive a license for the sale of cigarettes.1638 In a later case,1639 the Court held that the unfettered discretion of river pilots to select their apprentices, which was almost invariably exercised in favor of their relatives and friends, was not a denial of equal protection to persons not selected despite the fact that such apprenticeship was requisite for appointment as a pilot.

Social Welfare.

The traditional “reasonable basis” standard of equal protection adjudication developed in the main in cases involving state regulation of business and industry. “The administration of public welfare assistance, by contrast, involves the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings. We recognize the dramatically real factual difference between the cited cases and this one, but we can find no basis for applying a different constitutional standard.”1640 Thus, a formula for dispensing aid to dependent children that imposed an upper limit on the amount one family could receive, regardless of the number of children in the family, so that the more children in a family the less money per child was received, was found to be rationally related to the legitimate state interest in encouraging employment and in maintaining an equitable balance between welfare families and the families of the working poor.1641 Similarly, a state welfare assistance formula that, after calculation of individual need, provided less of the determined amount to families with dependent children than to those persons in the aged and infirm categories did not violate equal protection because a state could reasonably believe that the aged and infirm are the least able to bear the hardships of an inadequate standard of living, and that the apportionment of limited funds was therefore rational.1642 Although reiterating that this standard of review is “not a toothless one,” the Court has nonetheless sustained a variety of distinctions on the basis that Congress could rationally have believed them justified,1643 acting to invalidate a provision only once, and then on the premise that Congress was actuated by an improper purpose.1644

Similarly, the Court has rejected the contention that access to housing, despite its great importance, is of any fundamental interest that would place a bar upon the legislature’s giving landlords a much more favorable and summary process of judicially controlled eviction actions than was available in other kinds of litigation.1645

However, a statute that prohibited the dispensing of contraceptive devices to single persons for birth control but not for disease prevention purposes and that contained no limitation on dispensation to married persons was held to violate the Equal Protection Clause on several grounds. On the basis of the right infringed by the limitation, the Court saw no rational basis for the state to distinguish between married and unmarried persons. Similarly, the exemption from the prohibition for purposes of disease prevention nullified the argument that the rational basis for the law was the deterrence of fornication, the rationality of which the Court doubted in any case.1646 Also denying equal protection was a law affording married parents, divorced parents, and unmarried mothers an opportunity to be heard with regard to the issue of their fitness to continue or to take custody of their children, an opportunity the Court decided was mandated by due process, but presuming the unfitness of the unmarried father and giving him no hearing.1647

Punishment of Crime.

Equality of protection under the law implies that in the administration of criminal justice no person shall be subject to any greater or different punishment than another in similar circumstances.1648 Comparative gravity of criminal offenses is, however, largely a matter of state discretion, and the fact that some offenses are punished with less severity than others does not deny equal protection.1649 Heavier penalties may be imposed upon habitual criminals for like offenses,1650 even after a pardon for an earlier offense,1651 and such persons may be made ineligible for parole.1652 A state law doubling the sentence on prisoners attempting to escape does not deny equal protection by subjecting prisoners who attempt to escape together to different sentences depending on their original sentences.1653

A statute denying state prisoners good-time credit for pre-sentence incarceration, but permitting those prisoners who obtain bail or other release immediately to receive good-time credit for the entire period that they ultimately spend in custody, good time counting toward the date of eligibility for parole, does not deny the prisoners incarcerated in local jails equal protection. The distinction is rationally justified by the fact that good-time credit is designed to encourage prisoners to engage in rehabilitation courses and activities that exist only in state prisons and not in local jails.1654

The Equal Protection Clause does, however, render invalid a statute requiring the sterilization of persons convicted of various offenses when the statute draws a line between like offenses, such as between larceny by fraud and embezzlement.1655 A statute that provided that convicted defendants sentenced to imprisonment must reimburse the state for the furnishing of free transcripts of their trial by having amounts deducted from prison pay denied such persons equal protection when it did not require reimbursement of those fined, given suspended sentences, or placed on probation.1656 Similarly, a statute enabling the state to recover the costs of such transcripts and other legal defense fees by a civil action violated equal protection because indigent defendants against whom judgment was entered under the statute did not have the benefit of exemptions and benefits afforded other civil judgment debtors.1657 But a bail reform statute that provided for liberalized forms of release and that imposed the costs of operating the system upon one category of released defendants, generally those most indigent, was not invalid because the classification was rational and because the measure was in any event a substantial improvement upon the old bail system.1658 The Court has applied the clause strictly to prohibit numerous de jure and de facto distinctions based on wealth or indigency.1659

Footnotes

1538
Davidson v. City of New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 106 (1878). [Back to text]
1539
Philadelphia Fire Ass’n v. New York, 119 U.S. 110 (1886); Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). [Back to text]
1540
Bell’s Gap R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 237 (1890). [Back to text]
1541
The state “may, if it chooses, exempt certain classes of property from any taxation at all, such as churches, libraries and the property of charitable institutions. It may impose different specific taxes upon different trades and professions, and may vary the rates of excise upon various products; it may tax real estate and personal property in a different manner; it may tax visible property only, and not tax securities for payment of money; it may allow deductions for indebtedness, or not allow them. All such regulations, and those of like character, so long as they proceed within reasonable limits and general usage, are within the discretion of the state legislature, or the people of the State in framing their Constitution.” 134 U.S. at 237. See Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); and City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369 (1974). [Back to text]
1542
Louisville Gas Co. v. Coleman, 227 U.S. 32, 37 (1928). Classifications for purpose of taxation have been held valid in the following situations: Banks: a heavier tax on banks which make loans mainly from money of depositors than on other financial institutions which make loans mainly from money supplied otherwise than by deposits. First Nat’l Bank v. Tax Comm’n, 289 U.S. 60 (1933). Bank deposits: a tax of 50 cents per $100 on deposits in banks outside a state in contrast with a rate of 10 cents per $100 on deposits in the state. Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940). Coal: a tax of 2 ½ percent on anthracite but not on bituminous coal. Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922). Gasoline: a graduated severance tax on oils sold primarily for their gasoline content, measured by resort to Baume gravity. Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U.S. 146 (1930); Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983) (prohibition on pass-through to consumers of oil and gas severance tax). Chain stores: a privilege tax graduated according to the number of stores maintained, Tax Comm’rs v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 (1931); Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87 (1935); a license tax based on the number of stores both within and without Gambling: slot machines on excursion riverboats are taxed at a maximum rate of 20 percent, while slot machines at a racetrack are taxed at a maximum rate of 36 percent. Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Central Iowa, 539 U.S. 103 (2003). Insurance companies: license tax measured by gross receipts upon domestic life insurance companies from which fraternal societies having lodge organizations and insuring lives of members only are exempt, and similar foreign corporations are subject to a fixed and comparatively slight fee for the privilege of doing local business of the same kind. Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 247 U.S. 132 (1918). Oleomargarine: classified separately from butter. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934). Peddlers: classified separately from other vendors. Caskey Baking Co. v. Virginia, 313 U.S. 117 (1941). Public utilities: a gross receipts tax at a higher rate for railroads than for other public utilities, Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U.S. 576 (1914); a gasoline storage tax which places a heavier burden upon railroads than upon common carriers by bus, Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933); a tax on railroads measured by gross earnings from local operations, as applied to a railroad which received a larger net income than others from the local activity of renting, and borrowing cars, Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157 (1940); a gross receipts tax applicable only to public utilities, including carriers, the proceeds of which are used for relieving the unemployed, New York Rapid Transit Corp. v. New York, 303 U.S. 573 (1938). Wine: exemption of wine from grapes grown in the State while in the hands of the producer, Cox v. Texas, 202 U.S. 446 (1906). Laws imposing miscellaneous license fees have been upheld as follows: Cigarette dealers: taxing retailers and not wholesalers. Cook v. Marshall County, 196 U.S. 261 (1905). Commission merchants: requirements that dealers in farm products on commission procure a license, Payne v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 112 (1918). Elevators and warehouses: license limited to certain elevators and warehouses on right-of-way of railroad, Cargill Co. v. Minnesota, 180 U.S. 452 (1901); a license tax applicable only to commercial warehouses where no other commercial warehousing facilities in township subject to tax, Independent Warehouses v. Scheele, 331 U.S. 70 (1947). Laundries: exemption from license tax of steam laundries and women engaged in the laundry business where not more than two women are employed. Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59 (1912). Merchants: exemption from license tax measured by amount of purchases, of manufacturers within the state selling their own product. Armour & Co. v. Virginia, 246 U.S. 1 (1918). Sugar refineries: exemption from license applicable to refiners of sugar and molasses of planters and farmers grinding and refining their own sugar and molasses. American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89 (1900). Theaters: license graded according to price of admission. Metropolis Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 228 U.S. 61 (1913). Wholesalers of oil: occupation tax on wholesalers in oil not applicable to wholesalers in other products. Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U.S. 114 (1910). [Back to text]
1543
Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59, 62 (1912). See also Hammond Packing Co. v. Montana, 233 U.S. 331 (1914); Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959); Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Central Iowa, 539 U.S. 103 (2003). [Back to text]
1544
Puget Sound Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619, 625 (1934). See City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369 (1974). [Back to text]
1545
Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 422 (1935). [Back to text]
1546
Southern Ry. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400, 417 (1910); Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389, 400 (1928). [Back to text]
1547
Keeney v. New York, 222 U.S. 525, 536 (1912); Tax Comm’rs v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 538 (1931). [Back to text]
1548
Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U.S. 657, 662 (1893). [Back to text]
1549
Louisville Gas Co. v. Coleman, 227 U.S. 32, 37 (1928). See also Bell’s Gap R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 237 (1890). [Back to text]
1550
Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550 (1935). See also Valentine v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 299 U.S. 32 (1936). [Back to text]
1551
Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933). [Back to text]
1552
Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389 (1928). This case was formally overruled in Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973). [Back to text]
1553
Tax Comm’rs v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 537 (1931). [Back to text]
1554
Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 422 (1935). [Back to text]
1555
Darnell v. Indiana, 226 U.S. 390, 398 (1912); Farmers Bank v. Minnesota, 232 U.S. 516, 531 (1914). [Back to text]
1556
Morf v. Bingaman, 298 U.S. 407, 413 (1936). [Back to text]
1557
Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U.S. 68, 88 (1913). See also Cheney Brothers Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 147, 157 (1918). [Back to text]
1558
Philadelphia Fire Ass’n v. New York, 119 U.S. 110, 119 (1886). [Back to text]
1559
Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494, 511 (1926). [Back to text]
1560
Southern Ry. v. Green, 216 U.S. 400, 418 (1910). [Back to text]
1561
Concordia Ins. Co. v. Illinois, 292 U.S. 535 (1934). [Back to text]
1562
Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U.S. 673 (1945). This decision was described as “an anachronism” in Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. Of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 667 (1981), the Court reaffirming the rule that taxes discriminating against foreign corporations must bear a rational relation to a legitimate state purpose. [Back to text]
1563
Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 571, 572 (1949). [Back to text]
1564
393 U.S. 117 (1968). [Back to text]
1565
470 U.S. 869, 878 (1985). The vote was 5–4, with Justice Powell’s opinion for the Court joined by Chief Justice Burger and by Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens. Justice O’Connor’s dissent was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Rehnquist. [Back to text]
1566
470 U.S. at 880. [Back to text]
1567
The first level of the Court’s “two-tiered” analysis of state statutes affecting commerce tests for virtual per se invalidity. “When a state statute directly regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests, we have generally struck down the statute without further inquiry.” Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986). [Back to text]
1568
F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920). See also Walters v. City of St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231 (1954), sustaining a municipal income tax imposed on gross wages of employed persons but only on net profits of the self-employed, of corporations, and of business enterprises. [Back to text]
1569
Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 56, 57 (1920); Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 75, 76 (1920). [Back to text]
1570
Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 (1938). [Back to text]
1571
Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 288, 300 (1898). [Back to text]
1572
Billings v. Illinois, 188 U.S. 97 (1903). [Back to text]
1573
Campbell v. California, 200 U.S. 87 (1906). [Back to text]
1574
Salomon v. State Tax Comm’n, 278 U.S. 484 (1929). [Back to text]
1575
Board of Educ. v. Illinois, 203 U.S. 553 (1906). [Back to text]
1576
Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525 (1919). [Back to text]
1577
Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352 (1932). [Back to text]
1578
Dixie Ohio Express Co. v. State Revenue Comm’n, 306 U.S. 72, 78 (1939). [Back to text]
1579
Alward v. Johnson, 282 U.S. 509 (1931). [Back to text]
1580
Bekins Van Lines v. Riley, 280 U.S. 80 (1929). [Back to text]
1581
Morf v. Bingaman, 298 U.S. 407 (1936). [Back to text]
1582
Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939). [Back to text]
1583
Carley & Hamilton v. Snook, 281 U.S. 66 (1930). [Back to text]
1584
Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 295 U.S. 285 (1935). [Back to text]
1585
F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). [Back to text]
1586
Missouri v. Dockery, 191 U.S. 165 (1903). [Back to text]
1587
Kentucky Union Co. v. Kentucky, 219 U.S. 140, 161 (1911). [Back to text]
1588
Charleston Fed. S. & L. Ass’n v. Alderson, 324 U.S. 182 (1945); Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940). [Back to text]
1589
Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350 (1918); Raymond v. Chicago Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20, 35, 37 (1907); Coutler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 196 U.S. 599 (1905). See also Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585 (1907). [Back to text]
1590
488 U.S. 336 (1989). [Back to text]
1591
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992). [Back to text]
1592
505 U.S. at 14–15. [Back to text]
1593
505 U.S. at 12–13. [Back to text]
1594
566 U.S. ___, No. 11–161, slip op. (2012). [Back to text]
1595
566 U.S. ___, No. 11–161, slip op. at 7–10. [Back to text]
1596
Sioux City Bridge v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 446 (1923). [Back to text]
1597
Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 623 (1946); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster County Comm’n, 488 U.S. 336 (1989). [Back to text]
1598
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry v. Middlekamp, 256 U.S. 226, 230 (1921). [Back to text]
1599
Memphis & Charleston Ry. v. Pace, 282 U.S. 241 (1931). [Back to text]
1600
Kansas City So. Ry. v. Road Improv. Dist. No. 6, 256 U.S. 658 (1921); Thomas v. Kansas City So. Ry., 261 U.S. 481 (1923). [Back to text]
1601
Road Improv. Dist. v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 274 U.S. 188 (1927). [Back to text]
1602
Branson v. Bush, 251 U.S. 182 (1919). [Back to text]
1603
Columbus & Greenville Ry. v. Miller, 283 U.S. 96 (1931). [Back to text]
1604
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). [Back to text]
1605
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1961). [Back to text]
1606
City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976). Upholding an ordinance that banned all pushcart vendors from the French Quarter, except those in continuous operation for more than eight years, the Court summarized its method of decision here. “When local economic regulation is challenged solely as violating the Equal Protection Clause, this Court consistently defers to legislative determinations as to the desirability of particular statutory discriminations. . . . Unless a classification trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage, our decisions presume the constitutionality of the statutory discriminations and require only that the classification challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude. Legislatures may implement their program step-by-step . . . in such economic areas, adopting regulations that only partially ameliorate a perceived evil and deferring complete elimination of the evil to future regulations. . . . In short, the judiciary may not sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or undesirability of legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines . . . ; in the local economic sphere, it is only the invidious discrimination, the wholly arbitrary act, which cannot stand consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 303–04. [Back to text]
1607
The “grandfather” clause upheld in Dukes preserved the operations of two concerns that had operated in the Quarter for 20 years. The classification was sustained on the basis of (1) the City Council proceeding step-by-step and eliminating vendors of more recent vintage, (2) the Council deciding that newer businesses were less likely to have built up substantial reliance interests in continued operation in the Quarter, and (3) the Council believing that both “grandfathered” vending interests had themselves become part of the distinctive character and charm of the Quarter. 427 U.S. at 305–06. See also Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1979); United States v. Maryland Savings-Share Ins. Corp., 400 U.S. 4, 6 (1970). [Back to text]
1608
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461–70 (1981). The quoted phrase is at 466 (emphasis by Court). Purporting to promote the purposes of resource conservation, easing solid waste disposal problems, and conserving energy, the legislature had banned plastic nonreturnable milk cartons but permitted all other nonplastic nonreturnable containers, such as paperboard cartons. The state court had thought the distinction irrational, but the Supreme Court thought the legislature could have believed a basis for the distinction existed. Courts will receive evivertising purposes, except newspapers, periodicals and books, Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907). Amusement: prohibition against keeping billiard halls for hire, except in case of hotels having twenty-five or more rooms for use of regular guests. Murphy v. California, 225 U.S. 623 (1912). Attorneys: Kansas law and court regulations requiring resident of Kansas, licensed to practice in Kansas and Missouri and maintaining law offices in both States, but who practices regularly in Missouri, to obtain local associate counsel as a condition of appearing in a Kansas court. Martin v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25 (1961). Two dissenters, Justices Douglas and Black, would sustain the requirement, if limited in application to an attorney who practiced only in Missouri. Cable Television: exemption from regulation under the Cable Communications Policy Act of facilities that serve only dwelling units under common ownership. FCC v. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. 307 (1993). Regulatory efficiency is served by exempting those systems for which the costs of regulation exceed the benefits to consumers, and potential for monopoly power is lessened when a cable system operator is negotiating with a single-owner. Cattle: a classification of sheep, as distinguished from cattle, in a regulation restricting the use of public lands for grazing. Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311 (1907). See also Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343 (1918). Cotton gins: in a State where cotton gins are held to be public utilities and their rates regulated, the granting of a license to a cooperative association distributing profits ratably to members and nonmembers does not deny other persons operating gins equal protection when there is nothing in the laws to forbid them to distribute their net earnings among their patrons. Corporation Comm’n v. Lowe, 281 U.S. 431 (1930). Debt adjustment business: operation only as incident to legitimate practice of law. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). Eye glasses: law exempting sellers of ready-to-wear glasses from regulations forbidding opticians to fit or replace lenses without prescriptions from ophthalmologist or optometrist and from restrictions on solicitation of sale of eye glasses by use of advertising matter. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). Fish processing: stricter regulation of reduction of fish to flour or meal than of canning. Bayside Fish Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422 (1936). Food: bread sold in loaves must be of prescribed standard sizes, Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226 U.S. 578 (1913); food preservatives containing boric acid may not be sold, Price v. Illinois, 238 U.S. 446 (1915); lard not sold in bulk must be put up in containers holding one, three or five pounds or some whole multiple thereof, Armour & Co. v. North Dakota, 240 U.S. 510 (1916); milk industry may be placed in a special class for regulation, Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552 (1906); vendors producing milk outside city may be classified separately, Adams v. Milwaukee, 228 U.S. 572 (1913); producing and nonproducing vendors may be distinguished in milk regulations, St. John v. New York, 201 U.S. 633 (1906); different minimum and maximum milk prices may be fixed for distributors and storekeepers, Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); price differential may be granted for sellers of milk not having a well advertised trade name, Borden’s Farm Products Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 125 feet and in other districts to 80 to 100 feet, Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909); ordinance prescribing limits in city outside of which no woman of lewd character shall dwell, L’Hote v. New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587, 595 (1900). See also North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 338 (1976).Geographic distinctions in regulatory laws Hotels: requirement that keepers of hotels having over fifty guests employ night watchmen. Miller v. Strahl, 239 U.S. 426 (1915). Insurance companies: regulation of fire insurance rates with exemption for farmers mutuals, German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U.S. 389 (1914); different requirements imposed upon reciprocal insurance associations than upon mutual companies, Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1943); prohibition against life insurance companies or agents engaging in undertaking business, Daniel v. Family Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949). Intoxicating liquors: exception of druggist or manufacturers from regulation. Lloyd v. Dollison, 194 U.S. 445 (1904); Eberle v. Michigan, 232 U.S. 700 (1914). Landlord-tenant: requiring trial no later than six days after service of complaint and limiting triable issues to the tenant’s default, provisions applicable in no other legal action, under procedure allowing landlord to sue to evict tenants for non-payment of rent, inasmuch as prompt and peaceful resolution of the dispute is proper objective and tenants have other means to pursue other relief. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972). Lodging houses: requirement that sprinkler systems be installed in buildings of nonfireproof construction is valid as applied to such a building which is safeguarded by a fire alarm system, constant watchman service and other safety arrangements. Queenside Hills Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80 (1946). Markets: prohibition against operation of private market within six squares of public market. Natal v. Louisiana, 139 U.S. 621 (1891). Medicine: a uniform standard of professional attainment and conduct for all physicians, Hurwitz v. North, 271 U.S. 40 (1926); reasonable exemptions from medical registration law. Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173 (1910); exemption of persons who heal by prayer from regulations applicable to drugless physicians, Crane v. Johnson, 242 U.S. 339 (1917); exclusion of osteopathic physicians from public hospitals, Hayman v. Galveston, 273 U.S. 414 (1927); requirement that persons who treat eyes without use of drugs be licensed as optometrists with exception for persons treating eyes by use of drugs, who are regulated under a different statute, McNaughton v. Johnson, 242 U.S. 344 (1917); a prohibition against advertising by dentists, not applicable to other professions, Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935). Motor vehicles: guest passenger regulation applicable to automobiles but not to other classes of vehicles, Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929); exemption of vehicles from other states from registration requirement, Storaasli v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 57 (1931); classification of driverless automobiles for hire as public vehicles, which are required to procure a license and to carry liability insurance, Hodge Co. v. Cincinnati, 284 U.S. 335 (1932); exemption from limitations on hours of labor for drivers of motor vehicles of carriers of property for hire, of those not principally engaged in transport of property for hire, and carriers operating wholly in metropolitan areas, Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79 (1939); exemption of busses and temporary movements of farm implements and machinery and trucks making short hauls from common carriers from limitations in net load and length of trucks, Sproles drugs and medicines, Baccus v. Louisiana, 232 U.S. 334 (1914); prohibit drumming or soliciting on trains for business for hotels, medical practitioners, and the like, Williams v. Arkansas, 217 U.S. 79 (1910); or solicitation of employment to prosecute or collect claims, McCloskey v. Tobin, 252 U.S. 107 (1920). And a municipality may prohibit canvassers or peddlers from calling at private residences unless requested or invited by the occupant to do so. Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951). Property destruction: destruction of cedar trees to protect apple orchards from cedar rust, Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928). Railroads: prohibition on operation on a certain street, Railroad Co. v. Richmond, 96 U.S. 521 (1878); requirement that fences and cattle guards and allow recovery of multiple damages for failure to comply, Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512 (1885); Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889); Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. Emmons, 149 U.S. 364 (1893); assessing railroads with entire expense of altering a grade crossing, New York & N.E. R.R. v. Bristol, 151 U.S. 556 (1894); liability for fire communicated by locomotive engines, St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. Mathews, 165 U.S. 1 (1897); required weed cutting; Missouri, Kan., & Tex. Ry. v. May, 194 U.S. 267 (1904); presumption against a railroad failing to give prescribed warning signals, Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Ford, 287 U.S. 502 (1933); required use of locomotive headlights of a specified form and power, Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Georgia, 234 U.S. 280 (1914); presumption that railroads are liable for damage caused by operation of their locomotives, Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Watson, 287 U.S. 86 (1932); required sprinkling of streets between tracks to lay the dust, Pacific Gas Co. v. Police Court, 251 U.S. 22 (1919). State “full-crew” laws do not violate the Equal Protection Clause by singling out the railroads for regulation and by making no provision for minimum crews on any other segment of the transportation industry, Firemen v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. 393 U.S. 129 (1968). Sales in bulk: requirement of notice of bulk sales applicable only to retail dealers. Lemieux v. Young, 211 U.S. 489 (1909). Secret societies: regulations applied only to one class of oath-bound associations, having a membership of 20 or more persons, where the class regulated has a tendency to make the secrecy of its purpose and membership a cloak for conduct inimical to the personal rights of others and to the public welfare. New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928). Securities: a prohibition on the sale of capital stock on margin or for future delivery which is not applicable to other objects of speculation, e.g., cotton, grain. Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606 (1903). Sunday closing law: notwithstanding that they prohibit the sale of certain commodities and services while permitting the vending of others not markedly different, and, even as to the latter, frequently restrict their distribution to small retailers as distinguished from large establishments handling salable as well as nonsalable items, such laws have been upheld. Despite the desirability of having a required day of rest, a certain measure of mercantile activity must necessarily continue on that day and in terms of requiring the smallest number of employees to forego their day of rest and minimizing traffic congestion, it is preferable to limit this activity to retailers employing the smallest number of workers; also, it curbs evasion to refuse to permit stores dealing in both salable and nonsalable items to be open at all. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961). See also Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703 (1885); Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U.S. 164 (1900). Telegraph companies: a statute prohibiting stipulation against liability for negligence in the delivery of interstate messages, which did not forbid express companies and other common carriers to limit their liability by contract. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Milling Co., 218 U.S. 406 (1910). [Back to text]
1609
Hartford Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 459 (1937). [Back to text]
1610
Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931). [Back to text]
1611
Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266 (1936). See United States v. Maryland Savings-Share Ins. Corp., 400 U.S. 4, 7 n.2 (1970) (reserving question of case’s validity, but interpreting it as standing for the proposition that no showing of a valid legislative purpose had been made). [Back to text]
1612
Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), overruled by City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976), where the exemption of one concern had been by precise description rather than by name. [Back to text]
1613
Central State Univ. v. American Ass’n of Univ. Professors, 526 U.S. 124 (1999) (upholding limitation on the authority of public university professors to bargain over instructional workloads). [Back to text]
1614
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1988). [Back to text]
1615
Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917). [Back to text]
1616
Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207 (1903). [Back to text]
1617
Keokee Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U.S. 224 (1914). See also Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U.S. 13 (1901). [Back to text]
1618
McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539 (1909). [Back to text]
1619
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530 (1922). [Back to text]
1620
Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Perry, 259 U.S. 548 (1922). [Back to text]
1621
Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917). [Back to text]
1622
New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917); Middletown v. Texas Power & Light Co., 249 U.S. 152 (1919); Ward & Gow v. Krinsky, 259 U.S. 503 (1922). [Back to text]
1623
Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949). Nor is it a denial of equal protection for a city to refuse to withhold from its employees’ paychecks dues owing their union, although it withholds for taxes, retirement-insurance programs, saving programs, and certain charities, because its offered justification that its practice of allowing withholding only when it benefits all city or department employees is a legitimate method to avoid the burden of withholding money for all persons or organizations that request a checkoff. City of Charlotte v. Firefighters, 426 U.S. 283 (1976). [Back to text]
1624
E.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). [Back to text]
1625
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). [Back to text]
1626
Title VII, 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. On sex discrimination generally, see “Classifications Meriting Close Scrutiny—Sex,” supra. [Back to text]
1627
Mallinckrodt Works v. St. Louis, 238 U.S. 41 (1915). [Back to text]
1628
International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U.S. 199 (1914). [Back to text]
1629
Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940) (overruling Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902)). [Back to text]
1630
Standard Oil Co. v. Tennessee, 217 U.S. 413 (1910). [Back to text]
1631
Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U.S. 401 (1905). [Back to text]
1632
Pacific States Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935); see also Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873): Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 529 (1934). [Back to text]
1633
Safeway Stores v. Oklahoma Grocers, 360 U.S. 334, 339–41 (1959). [Back to text]
1634
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). [Back to text]
1635
Fischer v. St. Louis, 194 U.S. 361 (1904). [Back to text]
1636
Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927). [Back to text]
1637
Wilson v. Eureka City, 173 U.S. 32 (1899). [Back to text]
1638
Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183 (1900). [Back to text]
1639
Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947). [Back to text]
1640
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). Decisions respecting the rights of the indigent in the criminal process and dicta in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969), had raised the prospect that because of the importance of “food, shelter, and other necessities of life,” classifications with an adverse or perhaps severe impact on the poor and needy would be subjected to a higher scrutiny. Dandridge was a rejection of this approach, which was more fully elaborated in another context in San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18–29 (1973). [Back to text]
1641
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 483–87 (1970). [Back to text]
1642
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972). See also Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971) (sustaining Social Security provision reducing disability benefits by amount received from worker’s compensation but not that received from private insurance). [Back to text]
1643
E.g., Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181 (1976) (provision giving benefits to married woman under 62 with dependent children in her care whose husband retires or becomes disabled but denying benefits to divorced woman under 62 with dependents represents rational judgment with respect to likely dependency of married but not divorced women); Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979) (limitation of benefits to widows and divorced wives of wage earners does not deny equal protection to mother of illegitimate child of wage earner who was never married to wage earner). [Back to text]
1644
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (also questioning rationality). [Back to text]
1645
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972). The Court did invalidate one provision of the law requiring tenants against whom an eviction judgment had been entered after a trial to post a bond in double the amount of rent to become due by the determination of the appeal, because it bore no reasonable relationship to any valid state objective and arbitrarily distinguished between defendants in eviction actions and defendants in other actions. Id. at 74–79. [Back to text]
1646
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). [Back to text]
1647
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972). [Back to text]
1648
Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883). See Salzburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954), sustaining law rendering illegally seized evidence inadmissible in prosecutions in state courts for misdemeanors but permitting use of such evidence in one county in prosecutions for certain gambling misdemeanors. Distinctions based on county areas were deemed reasonable. In North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328 (1976), the Court sustained the provision of law-trained judges for some police courts and lay judges for others, depending upon the state constitutional classification of cities according to population, since as long as all people within each classified area are treated equally, the different classifications within the court system are justifiable. [Back to text]
1649
Collins v. Johnston, 237 U.S. 502, 510 (1915); Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51 (1937). [Back to text]
1650
McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311 (1901); Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673 (1895); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912). [Back to text]
1651
Carlesi v. New York, 233 U.S. 51 (1914). [Back to text]
1652
Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U.S. 481 (1908). [Back to text]
1653
Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51 (1937). [Back to text]
1654
McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973). Cf. Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578 (1973). [Back to text]
1655
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). [Back to text]
1656
Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966). But see Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974) (imposition of reimbursement obligation for state-provided defense assistance upon convicted defendants but not upon those acquitted or whose convictions are reversed is objectively rational). [Back to text]
1657
James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972). [Back to text]
1658
Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971). [Back to text]
1659
See “Poverty and Fundamental Interests: The Intersection of Due Process and Equal Protection—Generally,” supra. [Back to text]