Eighth Amendment:

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause typically applies to a punishment rendered as a sentence for a criminal conviction. The Supreme Court has recognized violations of the Clause when a punishment is “grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime,” 1 which may include situations in which the government punishes an individual for their “status” rather than their overt actions.2 For example, in Robinson v. California, the Court struck down a state law that criminalized narcotic addiction as violating the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.3 Though the Court observed that the punishment imposed by the law—90 days’ imprisonment—was “not, in the abstract . . . either cruel or unusual,” the Court held that imposing such a punishment on an individual based on their status as one addicted to narcotics, rather than any overt act, would violate the Eighth Amendment.4

In Powell v. Texas, however, the Court held that a law criminalizing public drunkenness did not run afoul of the Court’s holding in Robinson when enforced against an individual with chronic alcoholism.5 Observing that the individual was convicted “not for being a chronic alcoholic, but for being in public while drunk on a particular occasion,” the Court did not find sufficient evidence in the record or “the current state of medical knowledge” to conclude that individuals suffering from chronic alcoholism would be “utterly unable” to avoid being publicly intoxicated.6

The Court further addressed the applicability of the Eighth Amendment in City of Grants Pass v. Johnson, where it held that city ordinances that impose fines, bans from public property, or prosecutions for criminal trespass on individuals who camp in public parks was not cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.7 The Court explained that the Eighth Amendment addresses the type of punishment that the government can impose on convicted criminals, not whether the government can criminalize certain activities.8 The Court then considered the nature of the ordinances’ punishments. The Court further held that, because they were not intended to inflict “terror, pain, or disgrace,” they were not cruel9 and, because “large numbers of cities and States across the country have long employed, and today employ, similar punishments for similar offenses,” they were not unusual.10 Examining whether the ordinances were inconsistent with Robinson, the Court held that Robinson was inapplicable because the ordinances did not target a status.11 Rather, they barred all people from public camping, including vacationers and protesters as well as the homeless.12 As such, the ordinances criminalized conduct—camping on public property—not the status of homelessness.13 The Court noted that, in Powell v. Texas, it had declined to extend Robinson to activities that result from allegedly involuntary conduct14 and instead had distinguished being convicted for alcoholism (status) with being convicted for being drunk in public (conduct).15

Footnotes

1

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 174 (1976). See generally .

2

Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).

3

Id.

4

Id.

5

392 U.S. 514, 532 (1968) (plurality opinion). Justice White concurred in the result but only because the record did not show that the defendant was unable to stay out of public. Id. at 553–54 (White, J., concurring). Justice White and four dissenting Justices appeared willing to hold that if addiction as a status may not be punished, then neither can the yielding to the compulsion of that addiction. Id. at 548; id. at 554, 567 (Fortas, J., dissenting).

6

Id. at 532, 534–35 (plurality opinion).

7

City of Grants Pass v. Johnson, No. 23-175, slip op. at 35 (U.S. June 28, 2024).

8

Id. at 15.

9

Id. at 17.

10

Id.

11

Id. at 20.

12

Id. at 17-21.

13

Id. at 21.

14

Id. at 22-23 (citing Powell, 392 U.S. at 532).

15

Id. at 23.