Analyses
(5) Analyses. Each holder of an operating license for a boiling water reactor with a Mark III type of containment or for a pressurized water reactor with an ice condenser type of containment, shall perform an analysis that: (i) Provides an evaluation of the consequences of large amounts of hydrogen generated after the start of an accident (hydrogen resulting from the metal-water reaction of up to and including 75 percent of the fuel cladding surrounding the active fuel region, excluding the cladding surrounding the plenum volume) and include consideration of hydrogen control measures as appropriate; (ii) Includes the period of recovery from the degraded condition; (iii) Uses accident scenarios that are accepted by the NRC staff. These scenarios must be accompanied by sufficient supporting justification to show that they describe the behavior of the reactor system during and following an accident resulting in a degraded core. (iv) Supports the design of the hydrogen control system selected to meet the requirements of this section; and, (v) Demonstrates, for those reactors that do not rely upon an inerted atmosphere to comply with paragraph (b)(2)(ii) of this section, that: (A) Containment structural integrity is maintained. Containment structural integrity must be demonstrated by use of an analytical technique that is accepted by the NRC staff in accordance with 50.90. This demonstration must include sufficient supporting justification to show that the technique describes the containment response to the structural loads involved. This method could include the use of actual material properties with suitable margins to account for uncertainties in modeling, in material properties, in construction tolerances, and so on; and (B) Systems and components necessary to establish and maintain safe shutdown and to maintain containment integrity will be capable of performing their functions during and after exposure to the environmental conditions created by the burning of hydrogen, including local detonations, unless such detonations can be shown unlikely to occur.