End-of-life notice: American Legal Ethics Library
As of March 1, 2013, the Legal Information Institute is no longer maintaining the information in the American Legal Ethics Library. It is no longer possible for us to maintain it at a level of completeness and accuracy given its staffing needs. It is very possible that we will revive it at a future time. At this point, it is in need of a complete technological renovation and reworking of the "correspondent firm" model which successfully sustained it for many years.
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Colorado Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct
Comment - Rule 3.4
 The procedure of the adversary system contemplates that the evidence in a case is to be marshalled competitively by the contending parties. Fair competition in the adversary system is secured by prohibitions against destruction or concealment of evidence, improperly influencing witnesses, obstructive tactics in discovery procedure, and the like.
 Documents and other items of evidence are often essential to establish a claim or defense. Subject to evidentiary privileges, the right of an opposing party, including the government, to obtain evidence through discovery or subpoena is an important procedural right. The exercise of that right can be frustrated if relevant material is altered, concealed or destroyed. Applicable law in many jurisdictions makes it an offense to destroy material for purpose of impairing its availability in a pending proceeding or one whose commencement can be foreseen. Falsifying evidence is also generally a criminal offense. Paragraph (a) applies to evidentiary material generally, including computerized information.
 With regard to paragraph (b), it is not improper to pay a witness's expenses or to compensate an expert witness on terms permitted by law. The common law rule in most jurisdictions is that it is improper to pay an occurrence witness any fee for testifying and that it is improper to pay an expert witness a contingent fee.
 In order to bring about just and informed decisions, evidentiary and procedural rules have been established by tribunals to permit the inclusion of relevant evidence and argument and the exclusion of all other considerations. The expression by a lawyer of the lawyer's personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, as to the credibility of a witness, as to the culpability of a civil litigant, or as to the guilt or innocence of an accused is not a proper subject for argument to the triers of fact. It is improper as to factual matters because admissible evidence possessed by a lawyer should be presented only as sworn testimony. It is improper as to all other matters because, were the rule otherwise, the silence of a lawyer on a given occasion could be construed unfavorably to the client. However, a lawyer may argue based on the lawyer's own analysis of the evidence, for any position or conclusion with respect to any of the foregoing matters.
 Paragraph (f) permits a lawyer to advise employees of a client to refrain from giving information to another party, for the employees may identify their interests with those of the client. See also Rule 4.2.
 Many of the provisions of Rule 3.4 are similar to provisions in the Code. The main differences occur in subsections (d) and (f). Subsection (d) has no Code analog but the Committee felt that (d) was a sound addition because abuse of discovery is a serious problem with our system of justice. Subsection (f) is a little broader than DR 7-106(c)(5) in that it allows a lawyer to give advice in certain circumstances to relatives or employees of a client. The Committee felt it was appropriate to broaden the Code provision to allow a lawyer to request that a relative or employee of a client not volunteer information to another party because in many such situations the relative or employee will identify with the interests of the client.
 Some language from EC 7-24 was added to the Comment section because the Committee felt that this language was helpful in explaining the reasons why the conduct elaborated in subsection (e) is proscribed.