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freedom of expression

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493

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582 (2010)

In 2006 and 2009 the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) denied the Ang Ladlad LGBT Party’s request to register as a political party in the Philippines. The petitioner, Ang Ladlad, is an organization of individuals who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender. COMELEC denied their request under “moral” reasons, arguing that the organization is contrary to Christian and Muslim beliefs and thereby conflicts with the secularity of public morality.

Bouton c. France, requête n° 22636/19, CEDH, 2023. Bouton v. France Application No. 22636/19 (on freedom of political expression)

In the case of Bouton v. France, the applicant, a feminist activist who was a member of Femen, was convicted and given a one-month suspended prison sentence (i.e. with probation) for staging a topless protest in a church in December 2013, exposing her breasts with slogans daubed over them, as part of an international action against the Catholic Church’s position on abortion. She was also ordered to pay the parish representative 2,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damages and to pay EUR 1,500 towards the other party’s costs.

Dogru v. France

The Muslim applicant, aged eleven at the material time, was enrolled in the first year of a state secondary school and wore a headscarf to school. On seven occasions in January 1999 the applicant went to physical education and sports classes wearing her headscarf and refused to take it off despite repeated requests to do so by her teacher, who explained that wearing a headscarf was incompatible with physical education classes.

In re: Disturbing Social Media Posts of Lawyers/Law Professors, A.M. No. 21-06-20-SC (2023)

In 2021, an administrative complaint was filed regarding Filipino lawyers’ Facebook posts. The Facebook messages exchanged between the lawyers consisted of homophobic language and boasts about the prosecution and conviction of a member of the LGBTIQ+ community. The messages also disparaged an “effeminate” judge. The lawyers claimed that, because they restricted the posts to those they are “friends” with on Facebook, their actions should be shielded by the right to privacy.

M v. M

This case concerns the Domestic Violence Act of 1995. Appellant sent emails, faxes, and oral communications to politicians and others, claiming that the respondent, her brother, raped her when she was 11. In Family Court, the judge concluded that the allegation of rape was unfounded and that appellant’s purpose for the communications was to shame the respondent and ruin his reputation, amounting to harassment or psychological abuse. The judge issued a protection order pursuant to the Domestic Violence Act of 1995, prohibiting appellant from further communications alleging the rape.

Muhammad Juzaili bin Mohd Khamis & Ors v State Government of Negeri Sembilan & Ors

In the case Muhammad Juzaili bin Mohd Khamis & Ors v State Government of Negeri Sembilan & Ors, three transgender women sought judicial review in the Seremban High Court to contest the validity of section 66 of the Syariah Criminal (Negeri Sembilan) Enactment 1992, which criminalizes "men" who wear women’s clothing or present as women in public. They argued that the provision infringed their constitutional guarantees of liberty, equality, dignity, and expression.

New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990

The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (the "Bill of Rights") entrenches a variety of civil and political rights and liberties into New Zealand legislation. Its objectives are to affirm, protect and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms in New Zealand, and to affirm its commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Bill of Rights applies to acts done by the legislative, executive or judicial branches of the New Zealand government or by any person or body in the performance of a public function.

Quincy McEwan et al v. Attorney General of Guyana (Caribbean Court of Justice, 2018)

The petitioner, along with three other transgender individuals, were charged for violating section 153(1) of the Summary Jurisdiction (Offences) Act: “cross-dressing in public for an ‘improper purpose.’” The petitioner brought action, alleging that section 153(1)(xlvii) was too vague to be enforceable. The petitioners argued that a prohibition on cross-dressing criminalizes gender expression and identity, in violation of Article 149D of the Constitution.

S.A.S. v. France

S.A.S, a 23 year old French citizen, filed an application against France to challenge the ban on the full face veil. She argued that as a woman wearing a face veil, the ban constituted a violation of her right to private life, freedom of religion, freedom of expression and her right not to be discriminated against. The French Government recognised that the ban may represent a limitation on Article 9 of the Convention i.e.

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