In 1978, the court of first instance ruled in favor of Graciela Ato del Avellanal on a claim for overdue rent owed to her by tenants of two apartment buildings she owned in Lima. The Superior Court reversed the judgment in 1980 because article 168 of the Peruvian Civil Code stated that when a woman is married, only the husband is entitled to represent matrimonial property before the Courts; therefore, Avellanal did not herself have standing to sue.
Bosanac v. Commissioner of Taxation, decided by the High Court of Australia, concerned the ownership of a residential property in Perth, Western Australia. The husband and wife lived in the property from 2006 until 2015, despite separating in 2012–2013. Although the property was paid for using funds from a joint loan account and secured against properties owned separately by the couple, it was registered solely in the wife's name.
Mr. Powell (“petitioner”) and Mrs. Powell (“respondent”) were lawfully married in April of 2003. In May 2016, the petitioner was granted an order of dissolution of marriage. In July 2004, the petitioner purchased a piece of land (“property”).
The Civil Code of the Dominican Republic establishes that married women have all the same rights as unmarried women and vice versa. A woman has the right to work without the permission of her husband. A woman also has the right to mortgage or sell her property without the consent of her husband. A married woman has the right to manage and dispose of her earnings. A woman has the right to enter into debt without the permission of her husband.
The Venezuelan Civil Code (1982) sets forth rules on divorce, marriage, property, and succession. Article 185 lists the grounds for divorce, including adultery, physical or psychological abuse, abandonment, and marital rape. It also recognizes as serious grounds conspiracy by a spouse to corrupt or prostitute the other or the children, as well as collusion in such conduct. Article 185-A allows either spouse to petition for divorce after a de facto separation of more than five years, without proving fault or a specific cause.
The appellant appealed the ruling by the Primary and High Courts that she was not entitled to any share of the matrimonial assets amassed by her former husband during their marriage. She contended that her domestic services counted as a contribution to the acquisition of matrimonial assets. The Court noted the two schools of thought over whether household work could count as part of the joint effort in the acquisition of funds.
The appellant had lived with the deceased as husband and wife for nine years and given birth to two of his children. At his death, she asked that the estate not be distributed in accordance with Islamic law, which would have prevented her from receiving a share of the estate. The brother of the deceased challenged this, contending that she was a concubine who had no right to a share of the estate she had contributed nothing to amassing. The trial court registered a decision in favor of the appellant.
The appellant appealed the order of a lower court that he pay maintenance Tshs. 10 000 per month to his former wife. He based his appeal on the claims that his adultery was unfairly held responsible for the dissolution of the marriage and that his income could not sustain the maintenance payments dictated by the lower court. He also argued that his former wife had earned no income during the course of the marriage and thus should not be entitled to a share of the matrimonial assets. The Court dismissed the appeal.
