The defendant was convicted of multiple sexual offenses against two minor girls who were living in his household. On appeal, he argued that the trial judge improperly excluded evidence of one complainant’s prior allegations of sexual abuse by a third party under the Massachusetts rape shield statute (G. L. c.
The accused was charged with first degree murder of an Indigenous woman who was sex worker. The deceased was found in his hotel room. The cause of death was found to be loss of blood due to an 11cm wound in the victim’s vagina. In its opening address, the prosecution referred to the deceased as a “prostitute” and discussed how she and the accused had struck up a working relationship the night before her death.
The accused was charged with sexual assault of a woman he had once dated. The complainant claimed that on the night in question, she had called to the accused’s house for drinks and that he snapped, dragged her to his bedroom, hit her, and forced her to have sex with him. At trial, the accused requested that evidence of a “friends with benefits” relationship be admitted to the jury as it was important context for the jury to know. The trial judge allowed what he called the “benign” evidence to be admitted.
The Supreme Court of Canada upheld a recently enacted rape shield law. Mills, a defendant in a rape case, challenged the law, arguing it violated sections 7 and 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Supreme Court found that the law gave sufficient discrepancy to judges to ensure that the rights of a defendant in a rape case were not violated.
Under Rhode Island General Laws § 11-37-13, if a defendant charged with sexual assault intends to introduce evidence at trial that the victim has engaged in sexual activities with other persons, they must give prior notice to the court of the intention to introduce such evidence. The notice must be given orally and out of earshot of any other spectators or jurors. Upon receiving such notice, the court must order the defendant to make a specific offer of the proof that they intend to introduce, and the court will rule on the admissibility of the evidence before it can be offered at trial.
The Sexual Offences Act (as amended), consolidates Guyana’s laws on sexual violence and establishes the legal structure consent, rape, sexual assault, and child protection. Part I defines consent as a freely given agreement expressed through words or overt action. Silence, passivity, or physiological responses cannot imply consent. When a defendant claims belief in consent, the belief must be objectively “reasonable.” Part II sets out the core offenses. Sexual assault involves non-consensual sexual touching and carries a sentence of five to ten years in prison.
In State v. Cuni, 159 N.J. 584 (1999), the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed the question of how the State’s rape-shield law applies when the central issue is the victim’s capacity to give consent, rather than mere prior sexual history. A delivery worker was convicted of sexual assault against a woman with a mental disability.
A public bus driver was convicted of sexually assaulting three developmentally disabled women, two of whom were passengers on the defendant’s bus route. On appeal, the defendant challenged his conviction on several grounds, one of which was that the trial court erred in precluding him from questioning the victim’s mother about a previous incident that suggested the victim was promiscuous.
Vizzi, an assistant public defender, was defending his client charged with sexual battery, kidnapping, and false imprisonment and referred to the victim as “a woman who’s trash, gutter filth.” After being admonished by the court, Vizzi proceeded to call the victim “a whore, a two-bit whore.” The prosecutor petitioned the court to instruct Vizzi not to call the victim a prostitute again and the trial court ruled, based on Florida’s Rape Victim Shield Statutes, that Vizzi was not permitted to attack the
