Australia and Oceania

This Act overturned Division 12 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), which criminalised obtaining, performing, or otherwise assisting an abortion. Abortion is now legal in New South Wales until 22 weeks of pregnancy. To procure an abortion after 22 weeks, the procedure must be performed in a hospital by a specialist practitioner in consultation with a second practitioner. Medical providers who have conscientious objections to abortion must provide patients with information about where they can receive an abortion. 

The Abortion Law Reform Act allows a registered medical practitioner to terminate a pregnancy (perform an abortion) on a woman who is not more than 24 weeks pregnant. After 24 weeks, an abortion may still be performed if the medical practitioner believes it is appropriate in all the circumstances, and has consulted at least one other registered medical practitioner who reasonably agrees.  It also permits the supply or administration of drugs to perform and abortion by a pharmacist or registered nurse in similar situations.

Appellant Ah-Chong was convicted of assault with intent to commit sexual violation by rape.  As a defense, Ah-Chong claimed that the victim consented to the sexual activity.  The trial judge gave the jury instructions that they had to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had no reasonable grounds to believe that consent existed.  The appellant argued that the jury instructions were wrong, claiming that there were two separate mens rea elements: one for the assault and one for intention to rape.

The Crimes Act is the principal Victorian criminal legislation setting out a range of criminal offences and penalties.  In relation to gender justice, the Act prohibits sexual violence and rape, stalking, sexual assault, rape, abortion (as amended by the Abortion Law Reform Act 2008) and female genital mutilation.  The Act also prohibits attempts and conspiracies to commit these offenses, and sets forth applicable procedures and defenses.  The Act previously contained a defense of “defensive homicide,” which was intended to, among other things, assist women who killed an abus

The plaintiff worked at a motel. She alleged that her manager made offensive comments to her and spread rumors about her in the community. The court found that the plaintiff suffered a detriment in the course of her employment under the Human Rights Act.

Section 22A, Part 2A of the Act provides that a person sexually harasses another person if “the person makes an unwelcome sexual advance, or an unwelcome request for sexual favours, to the other person, or the person engages in other unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature in relation to the other person, in circumstances in which a reasonable person, having regard to all the circumstances, would have anticipated that the other person would be offended, humiliated or intimidated.”  Part 2A sets out various prohibitions against the harassment of employees, commission agents, contract worke

The Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 makes it unlawful to directly or indirectly discriminate on the basis of certain grounds (“attributes”) in connection to public life; including employment, education and training, and provision of facilities, goods and services.

The Anti-Discrimination Act prohibits discrimination in certain settings on the grounds of any designated attribute, including sex, sexuality, marital status, pregnancy, parenthood, and breastfeeding.  Unlike in other Australian jurisdictions, “gender identity” and “sex characteristics” are not included as designated attributes in the Northern Territory.

The appellants, both homosexual male citizens of Bangladesh, arrived in Australia and applied for protection visas. To be recognized as refugees, the appellants had to show that they had a well-founded fear of being persecuted due to their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. The appellants argued that they belonged to a “particular social group” that was subject to discrimination and harm in Bangladesh by virtue of their homosexuality.

The respondent was convicted of two charges of defilement of a 13-year-old girl and sentenced to four years and six months of imprisonment even though the maximum punishment for each charge was life imprisonment. The Attorney General of Kiribati appealed this sentence as “manifestly inadequate.” The Court of Appeal of Kiribati allowed the appeal and delineated the proper framework for sentencing in the context of this offense.