Canada

The Government of British Colombia established minimum physical fitness standards for fire fighters. The claimant, a woman, had previously performed her work satisfactorily but failed to meet the aerobic standard. The arbitrator found that the aerobic standard constituted adverse discrimination based on sex because men as a group have a higher aerobic capacity than women and therefore are more able to reach the standard. The Court of Appeal overturned the ruling.

The respondent’s group insurance plan provided weekly benefits for loss of pay due to accident or sickness. The plan covered pregnant women subject to an exclusion from coverage during the period commencing on the tenth week prior to the expected week of childbirth and extending to six weeks after it (even if the accident or sickness was unrelated to the pregnancy).

Three female Safeway employees filed a complaint with the Manitoba Human Rights Commission stating that the company plan discriminated based on sex and family status by denying benefits for loss of pay due to accident or sickness during a 17-week period during pregnancy (even if the accident or sickness at issue was unrelated to the pregnancy). The Commission’s adjudicator dismissed the claims, and this decision was upheld by the Court of the Queen’s Bench and the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court of Canada decided that Safeway’s plan did discriminate against pregnant women.

Three women challenged three Canadian Criminal Code provisions that indirectly restricted the practice of prostitution by criminalizing various related activities. Section 210, which prohibited the operation of common “bawdy-houses,” prevented prostitutes from offering their services out of fixed indoor locations such as brothels. Section 212, which prohibited “living off the avails” of prostitution, prevented anyone, including “pimps,” from profiting from another’s prostitution.

A Human Rights Tribunal constituted under s.39 of the Canadian Human Rights Act 1976-77 found that the recruitment, hiring, and promotion policies at Canadian National Railway Company (“CN”) prevented and discouraged women from working on blue collar jobs and as a result it imposed a special employment programme on CN. The programme required CN to increase to 13% the proportion of women working in non-traditional occupations and until that goal was achieved to hire at least one woman for every four non-traditional jobs filled in the future.

After having her first child in China in 1984, Cheung had three abortions and moved to a new province in 1986 to avoid problems with local authorities on the basis of China’s one-child policy. Cheung had another child in that province. Cheung moved to Canada, knowing that she would be sterilized if she returned to China. The Immigration and Refugee Board determined that Cheung and her daughter did not have the “well-founded fear of persecution” necessary for Convention refugee status, and Cheung appealed.

Ms. Chu is a citizen of China who was smuggled into Canada as a minor, arrested by Citizenship and Immigration Canada while she was being smuggled into the United States, and subsequently detained for eight months. Ms. Chu filed a refugee claim with the Immigration and Refugee Board, which was rejected. In rejecting her claim, however, the Board accepted that Ms. Chu was a member of a social group comprising rural young women from China, and that as such, Ms. Chu was a “very vulnerable member of society.” Ms.

Section 12 provides that everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. Section 15 ensures the equal protection and benefit of the law “without discrimination […] based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.” Section 28 guarantees that all rights covered in the Charter apply equally to men and women.

This case concerns a decision of the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board. In response to an application for protection by Ms. Corneau, who sought protection from domestic violence perpetrated by her partner in Saint Lucia, the Board held that authorities in Saint Lucia were “capable of providing the applicant with adequate protection.” The applicant sought review of this determination.

Section 268(1) provides that everyone commits an aggravated assault who wounds, maims, disfigures or endangers the life of the complainant. Section 268(3) clarifies that “wound” or “maim” includes to excise, infibulate, or mutilate, in whole or in part, the labia majora, labia minora, or clitoris of a person except where it is performed by a qualified medical practitioner for the benefit of the physical health of the person or the person is over 18 years of age and there is no resulting bodily harm.