The respondents were an obstetrician/gynecologist and three reproductive health service clinics. They challenged a New Hampshire law that required minors to get parental consent before procuring an abortion on the grounds that the law did not provide an emergency health exception despite subjecting minors to significant health risks. The law only outlined an exception for the purpose of saving a minor’s life.
T.L.R. was an eighth-grader at the Texas School for the Deaf and was dating B.C., also an eighth-grader at the School. After about two months of dating, B.C. approached T.L.R. and told her he wanted to have sex with her; she responded “no” twice and tried to get away from him by entering the girls’ restroom. B.C. followed her into the restroom. T.L.R. told him “I don’t want this” but B.C. took her clothes off, took his clothes off, told her to lie down on the floor, and penetrated her. T.L.R.’s father sought and obtained a protective order against B.C. on behalf of his daughter. B.C.
In 1987, Fatmeh Badih (“Badih”), a recent immigrant from Sierra Leone, was hired by the medical offices of Dr. Leonard Myers (“Myers”) as a medical assistant. Almost three years later, Badih told Myers she was pregnant. He immediately fired her. According to Badih, when she told Myers the news he replied, “If you told me you were going to get married and have babies, I wouldn’t have hired you in the first place. I need an office girl when I need her, not a person that has responsibilities the way you do now. . . .
In Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99 (2008), three plaintiffs from Guinea who underwent female genital mutilation (“FGM”) appealed decisions from the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which had denied their claims for relief and withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture based on FGM.
The plaintiff-appellant, a transgender police officer, applied to be promoted to sergeant within the Cincinnati Police Department. The plaintiff passed the sergeants exam but failed a rigorous training program and was denied promotion. The plaintiff sued the City of Cincinnati, alleging that the denial of her promotion was due to sex-based discrimination and her failure to conform to male sex stereotypes, such as wearing makeup, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause.
The plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a sales manager. Another sales manager in her office sexually harassed her verbally and physically. He repeatedly made sexually explicit comments towards her and grabbed her buttocks on one occasion. The plaintiff sued in the Hamilton County Circuit Court, alleging sexual harassment and constructive discharge in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”).
In Beasley v. Alabama State University, 966 F. Supp. 1117 (M.D. Ala. 1997), the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama addressed systemic inequities in collegiate athletics under Title IX and the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Being v. Crum, transgender and nonbinary plaintiffs challenged Alaska’s Medicaid regulations that categorically excluded coverage for treatments related to gender affirming care, such as hormone therapy, surgical procedures, or additional therapies for gender dysphoria. The plaintiffs argued that these exclusions violated the Equal Protection Clause, Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act and Medicaid’s requirements for comparability and availability.
Physicians and clinics sued the Commissioner of Health sued, claiming that Texas Medical Assistance Program’s (“TMAP”) abortion funding restrictions for indigent women violated their constitutional rights under the Equal Rights Amendment and Equal Protection Clause of the Texas Constitution, and their rights to privacy. TMAP was prohibited from authorizing abortion services without matching federal funds. The relevant federal law, the Hyde Amendment, prevented TMAP from funding abortions unless the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest, or placed the woman in danger of death.
The plaintiff was the defendant’s employee. She applied for the position of store manager, but the promotion was given to a younger male employee with less experience. She sued her employer in the Hamilton County Chancery Court alleging sex discrimination and other tort claims. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of her employer, but the Court of Appeals of Tennessee reversed and remanded her sex discrimination claims, finding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the plaintiff was qualified for the store manager position.
