United States

The plaintiff, the manager of the Tennessee Department of Correction’s Murfreesboro probation office, was fired after an anonymous letter was sent to the department alleging that the office was rife with sexual harassment, creating a hostile work environment. An administrative law judge reviewed the plaintiff’s termination and found it to be warranted. The plaintiff appealed the administrative law judge’s decision to the Davidson County Chancery Court, which affirmed the order.

Appellants, two minor children, appealed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Supreme Court of Wyoming reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact precluded the grant of summary judgment on the claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress stemmed from a domestic violence incident, which involved appellee beating, kicking, punching, dragging by the hair and choking the mother of two children while screaming that he wanted to kill her.

The plaintiff, a newspaper editor, was convicted under a Virginia law making it illegal for "any person, by publication, lecture, advertisement, or by the sale or circulation of any publication, or in any other manner, [from encouraging] or [prompting] the procuring of abortion or miscarriage." The plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of this law and argued that it violated rights protected by the First Amendment.

A federal statute established in 1873 prohibited the mailing of unsolicited pamphlets regarding contraceptives. Filing a friend-of-the-court brief, the ACLU challenged the constitutionality of this statute, alleging that it violated the First Amendment’s protection of commercial speech. Applying the test regarding commercial speech established in Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v.

In Bonner v. State, 740 So. 2d 439 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998), the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals considered whether expert testimony on battered woman syndrome was admissible to support a self-defense claim.

The plaintiff, a gay man, participated in a gay recreational softball league. Subsequently, he received criticism at his job as a welfare services coordinator for Clayton Country, Georgia, for his sexual orientation and participating in the league. Previously he had received positive professional evaluations.

Defendant appealed a judgment of the District Court, convicting him of one count of assault and battery on a household member. Defendant argued, among other things, that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the testimony of a convenience store clerk concerning statements the victim made to the clerk under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. Defendant had gone to a bar with his friends and returned around 2:00 a.m.

Ohio House Bill 531 (2025), known as Braden’s Law, criminalizes sexual extortion, defined as threatening to release or distribute private images, as a third-degree felony, subject to enhancement to a first-degree felony under certain aggravating circumstances. The law also requires courts to consider parental requests for access to the phones of deceased minors.

Myra Bradwell petitioned to be admitted to the bar and to be allowed to practice law, but was denied by the Supreme Court of Illinois. The United States Supreme Court upheld this decision, noting that a woman’s freedom to pursue the occupation of a lawyer was not a “privilege and immunity” of Untied States citizenship that was protected from state restriction by the 14th amendment to the United States Constitution. Thus the court found that excluding women from the bar did not violate the U.S. Constitution.

In Breest v. Haggis (1st Dep’t 2019), the plaintiff brought civil claims under the New York City Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Act (VGMVPA), asserting that a well-known filmmaker sexually assaulted her and that the assault constituted “a crime of violence motivated by gender.” The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the complaint did not adequately allege that gender bias was a motivating factor.