Doe v. University of Illinois, 138 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 1998)

Jane Doe attended University High School in Urbana, Illinois. Although University High School was a public school, it was affiliated with the University of Illinois, which was responsible for the school’s administrative oversight. From January 1993 through May 1994, while a student at University High School, Jane was a victim of an ongoing campaign of verbal and physical sexual harassment perpetrated by a group of male students at the school. Doe and her parents complained on numerous occasions to officials of both the high school and the University of Illinois. The school officials suspended a few of the students and transferred one out of Doe’s biology class, but did nothing else to prevent further instances of sexual harassment. Some administrators even suggested that it was Doe’s fault. In 1995, Doe and her parents filed suit against the University of Illinois and other individual officials of University High and the University of Illinois, alleging a violation of, among other things, Title IX. The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois dismissed Doe’s Title IX claim. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit remanded the case, holding that Jane Doe alleged a valid claim under Title IX, and that a Title IX recipient may be held liable for its failure to take prompt, appropriate action in response to student-on-student 13, as was the case here. The Court reasoned that Title IX prohibits discriminatory government conduct on the basis of sex when it occurs in the context of State-run, federally funded educational programs and institutions. In particular, Title IX provides that no person in the U.S. shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. See: Doe v. University of Illinois, 138 F.3d 653 (1998).

Prior to this case, it was well settled that sexual harassment of students in a federally funded educational program or activity, if perpetrated by a teacher or other employee of the funding recipient, can render the funding recipient liable for damages under Title IX. What was less clear was whether a school can be liable for failing to take prompt, appropriate action to remedy known sexual harassment of one student by other students. Although inconsistent with three other circuits, the Court ultimately held that a Title IX funding recipient may be held liable for its failure to take prompt, appropriate action in response to student-on-student sexual harassment that takes place while students are involved in school activities or otherwise under the supervision of school employees, provided the recipient’s responsible officials actually knew that the harassment was taking place. The failure to promptly take appropriate steps in response to known sexual harassment is itself intentional discrimination on the basis of sex. Since Jane Doe alleged such a failure, she properly alleged the sort of intentional discrimination against which Title IX protects. Doe’s case was then remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the Court’s opinion. The University petitioned for an en banc rehearing on March 30, 1998, which was denied on April 14, 1998.

This case was ultimately appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court in Board of Trustees v. Doe, 526 U.S. 1142 (1999), where certiorari was granted and the judgment was vacated and remanded back to the Circuit Court for further review in consideration of the Supreme Court’s prior decision in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629 (1999). In Davis, it was decided that peer-to-peer sexual harassment is grounds for a private cause of action under Title IX, but only when the funding recipient is aware of the harassment and is deliberately indifferent to the harassment, and that harassment is so severe and pervasive that the victim loses access to educational opportunities.

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  • 1998

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