HEALTH

Becerra v. San Carlos Apache Tribe

Issues

Is requiring the Indian Health Service (“IHS") to pay contract support costs to cover the administrative costs of Indian tribal healthcare expenditures, which are funded by revenue earned from third-party Medicaid, Medicare, and private insurance companies instead of directly funded by the IHS, consistent with the Indian Self-Determination Act?

In this case, the Supreme Court must decide whether the Indian Health Service (“IHS”) is required to pay contract support costs to cover the administrative burden of tribal healthcare expenditures of income the tribes earned from Medicaid, Medicare, and private insurance companies. Secretary of Health and Human Services Xavier Becerra argues that the text and structure of the Indian Self-Determination Act (“ISDA”) unambiguously requires IHS to only pay contract support costs for activities the IHS directly funds, and to do otherwise would be overly burdensome. The San Carlos Apache Tribe and Northern Arapaho Tribe claim that the ISDA’s text mandates contract support payments for third-party revenue expenditures, and that the Indian canon, which states that any statutory ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the Indian party in a case, mandates that the Court must rule for them if they can show their interpretation of the ISDA is at least plausible enough to render it ambiguous. This case could have implications for the ability of tribes to fund tribal healthcare, as well as the funding of the IHS and its allocation of internal funds.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Indian Health Service must pay “contract support costs” not only to support IHS-funded activities, but also to support the tribe’s expenditure of income collected from third parties.

The Indian Health Service (“IHS”) is a federal agency that administers healthcare programs for Indian tribes. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Xavier Becerra, et al. at 2. Most IHS funding comes from the federal government, but it also bills insurance companies and Medicare and Medicaid for its services. Id.

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Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C.

Issues

Are damages for emotional distress available under the Rehabilitation Act and the Affordable Care Act?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether compensatory damages are available for emotional distress in victims of discrimination cases. Jane Cummings (“Cummings”) is deaf and legally blind, and she requested an ASL interpreter for physical therapy sessions. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C. (“Premier”) denied Cummings’ request for an ASL interpreter. Petitioner Cummings argues that under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the statutes that incorporate its remedies for victims of discrimination, such as the Rehabilitation Act and the Affordable Care Act, compensatory damages are available for emotional distress. Respondent Premier counters that emotional distress damages are not appropriate remedies under the Rehabilitation Act and Affordable Care Act. The outcome of this case has important implications for victims of discrimination as well as for federal funding recipients.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the compensatory damages available under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the statutes that incorporate its remedies for victims of discrimination, such as the Rehabilitation Act and the Affordable Care Act, include compensation for emotional distress.

In October 2016, Petitioner Jane Cummings contacted Respondent Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C. (“Premier”) seeking physical therapy services. Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C. at 674. Cummings was born deaf and legally blind, and she primarily communicates through American Sign Language (“ASL”) due to her difficulties speaking, reading, and writing in English.

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Food and Drug Administration v. Wages and White Lion Investments, L.L.C.

Issues

Was the Food and Drug Administration’s denial of White Lion’s application to market flavored e-cigarette products arbitrary and capricious?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the Food and Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) denial of Wages and White Lion Investments, L.L.C.’s (“White Lion”) application to market flavored e-cigarette products was arbitrary and capricious. White Lion submitted an application to the FDA to sell their flavored nicotine liquid, used in e-cigarettes, on the market. The FDA denied their application, claiming that White Lion did not include sufficient scientific study support in their application for the FDA to conclude that the benefits of the flavored nicotine liquid outweighed the risk of use by youth. White Lion claims that the FDA erroneously rejected their application for approval of their flavored nicotine liquid because they lacked a longitudinal comparative study, a requirement that White Lion claims was not communicated to the public. The FDA counters by claiming that longitudinal studies are not required and that White Lion’s application was rejected because they could not show that e-cigarette use reduced smoking. The outcome of this case has significant implications for youth e-cigarette use, public health, state budget stability, and product investment and innovation in the e-cigarette industry.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the court of appeals erred in setting aside the Food and Drug Administration’s orders denying respondents’ applications for authorization to market new e-cigarette products as arbitrary and capricious.

In 2009, the federal government passed the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (“Tobacco Control Act”) which required manufacturers of tobacco products, including nicotine liquid for e-cigarettes, to receive Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) authorization before selling such products.  Food and Drug Administration v.

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Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County, Indiana v. Talevski

Issues

Does the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act, a statute enacted under the Spending Clause, create a private right of action for individuals to vindicate federal statutory rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983?

This case asks the court to analyze both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act (“FNHRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1396r et seq., to decide whether FNHRA, a Spending Clause statute, creates enforceable private rights of action under § 1983. Petitioners Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County, Indiana (“HHC”) argue that contrary to the Supreme Court’s holding in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, § 1983 does not imply a private right of action for Spending Clause legislation unless the legislation expressly includes a private right of action. HHC further contends that even if Spending Clause legislation can imply a private right of action, there is no private right of action under FNHRA because its language does not grant statutory rights to patients and because it contains an individualized enforcement mechanism which precludes § 1983 enforcement. Respondent Ivanka Talevski counters that the plain text of § 1983 unambiguously creates a private right of action whenever Congress uses Spending Clause legislation to protect a federal right and argues that overturning Wilder would contradict decades of judicial and legislative precedent. Talevski further argues that FNHRA’s language clearly establishes statutory federal rights. This case touches on important questions regarding healthcare administration, the protection of nursing home residents, federalism, and the separation of powers. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether, in light of compelling historical evidence to the contrary, the Supreme Court should reexamine its holding that spending clause legislation gives rise to privately enforceable rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (2) whether, assuming spending clause statutes ever give rise to private rights enforceable via Section 1983, the Federal Nursing Home Amendments Act of 1987’s transfer and medication rules do so. 

In January 2016, Respondent Ivanka Talevski placed her husband, Gorgi Talevski, an elderly man living with dementia, in the care of Valparaiso Care and Rehabilitation (“VCR”), an institution owned by Petitioner Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County (“HHC”). Talevski v. Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County at 715. VCR is a state-run nursing facility near the Talevskis’ home in Indiana.

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United States Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc.

Issues

Under the First Amendment can the government require the foreign affiliates of domestic nongovernmental organizations to implement policies that explicitly oppose prostitution and sex trafficking in order for those organizations to receive government funds to fight HIV/AIDS abroad?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the government violates the First Amendment when it requires the foreign affiliates of U.S.-based nongovernmental organizations to adopt policies explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking in order to receive federal funding. The United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (the “Leadership Act”) authorizes federal funding for nongovernmental organizations to assist their worldwide campaigns against HIV/AIDS and other diseases. But the Act requires fund recipients to adopt a policy that explicitly opposes prostitution and sex trafficking (the “Policy Requirement”). The United States Agency for International Development (“USAID”) administers the Leadership Act and contends that requiring foreign affiliates to comply with the Policy Requirement does not violate the First Amendment rights of these domestic organizations. It explains that First Amendment rights do not extend to the foreign affiliates because foreign entities are not entitled to any First Amendment rights and are legally distinct from their domestic counterparts. The Alliance for Open Society International, Inc. (“AOSI”) counters that the Policy Requirement infringes on its First Amendment rights because it compels speech that is likely to be attributed to AOSI. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for the international network of welfare workers, as well as the government’s control on federal funding.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether—when in Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International Inc., the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment bars enforcement of Congress’ directive, which required respondents, United States-based organizations that receive federal funds to fight HIV/AIDS abroad, to “have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking” as a condition of accepting those funds—the First Amendment further bars enforcement of that directive with respect to legally distinct foreign entities operating overseas that are affiliated with respondents.

In 2003, Congress passed the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (the “Leadership Act”), codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7601, which authorized funding for nongovernmental organizations that fight HIV/AIDS and other diseases worldwide. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc. v.

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