The People &c., Respondent, v. James Quackenbush,
Appellant.
88 N.Y.2d 534, 670 N.E.2d 434, 647 N.Y.S.2d 150 (1996).
July 9, 1996
AppT No. 175 [1996 NY Int. 161]
Decided July 9, 1996
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication
in the New York Reports.
John P. Courtney, for appellant.
Mary-Ellen Harkin, for respondent.
TITONE, J.:
Defendant has been charged with the offense
of operating a motor vehicle with inadequate brakes (Vehicle and Traffic
Law (VTL) 375[1]). He seeks to suppress evidence of the defective
condition of his brakes which was obtained by police when his vehicle was
impounded and inspected after being involved in a fatal accident.
Defendant claims that the police lacked the authority to impound his vehicle
and that the warrantless inspection of his brakes that yielded evidence
of their defective condition constituted an illegal search and seizure
in violation of the 4th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution
and Article 1, 12 of the New York State Constitution. We conclude
that the police possessed the authority to impound the vehicle in order
to comply with the investigatory and reporting duties imposed by VTL
603. We also hold that the warrantless inspection, which was limited
to the vehicle's safety equipment that is normally subject to extensive
government regulation and which was related in scope to the duty to investigate
the facts surrounding an accident involving a death, did not offend the
constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures.
I.
Defendant's vehicle was involved in a fatal accident
with a bicyclist on August 23, 1993. At the accident scene, defendant
was informed that the police were impounding the vehicle for a safety inspection.
A mechanic employed by the Town of East Hampton inspected the vehicle on
August 25, 1995 and completed a standard form Motor Vehicle Examination
Report, in which he was asked to report, in a sworn statement, the condition
of the following equipment on defendant's vehicle: the horn, windshield,
wipers, brake pedal, headlights, tires, brakes, and steering. Significantly,
the mechanic stated that he found "metal to metal contact" on the right
rear brakes. Defendant was charged with the misdemeanor of Operating
a Motor Vehicle With Inadequate Brakes in violation of VTL 375(1) based
on the results of that safety inspection.1
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that
the Vehicle and Traffic Law does not explicitly authorize the police
to impound a vehicle to conduct a safety inspection after an accident involving
personal injury. Defendant also claimed that the inspection of the
vehicle without a warrant, probable cause or exigent circumstances constituted
an illegal search in violation of the 4th and 14th Amendments to the United
States Constitution and of Article 1, 12 of the New York State Constitution.
At a Mapp hearing, Detective Reich testified
that the damage to the vehicle and defendant's admission that he had collided
with the bicycle led him to conclude that defendant's vehicle was the instrumentality
that caused the victim's death and that the car should be impounded and
held for an inspection to enable the police to comply with their accident
investigating duties and reporting obligations dictated by VTL 603.
Detective Reich testified that the impoundment was also necessary to avoid
the potential destruction of evidence, given that defendant was known to
be a mechanic, and that police department policy required impoundment in
all automobile accidents that resulted in serious physical injury or death.
Justice Court suppressed the evidence obtained
as a result of the safety inspection. The court held that evidence
obtained pursuant to the investigation and reporting responsibility
mandated by VTL 603 -- an "administrative inspection" -- could not
be utilized for purposes of a criminal prosecution. The court also
ruled that the police failure to fully inform the
defendant of his right to withhold his consent to the inspection effectively
eradicated an otherwise valid consent and that the "exigent circumstances"
exception to the warrant requirement could not be asserted after the impoundment
of the vehicle. Finally, the court held that the car could not be seized
based on a threshold probable cause showing because the police did not
have reasonable cause to believe that defendant had committed a crime at
the time of the accident.
On the People's appeal, a divided Appellate
Term reversed the order granting the motion to suppress and denied the
motion. The court ruled that the impoundment and inspection of the vehicle
was properly performed pursuant to the mandates of VTL 603, that the
examination of the brakes was not a "search" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, and that defendant had consented to the impoundment and
inspection of his vehicle. The court further concluded that defendant
had not met his burden of proving that he had a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the vehicle, especially where a death had resulted.
Under such circumstances, the majority concluded that "it could be readily
understood why a 'safety inspection' looking for anything that might constitute
a malfunction on any part of the pickup truck was mandatory * * * to avoid
the possibility of a repetition thereof."
One Justice dissented on the ground that the
safety inspection and examination of defendant's brakes was a "search"
of a "hidden area" of a motor vehicle in which defendant enjoyed a reasonable
expectation of privacy under the New York State Constitution. Thus,
the dissent concluded that the warrantless search of the brakes was unjustified.
A Judge of this Court granted defendant's application for leave to appeal,
and we now affirm.
II.
The initial question for this Court is whether
the police had the authority to impound defendant's vehicle for a safety
inspection after it was involved in the fatal accident. We
conclude that VTL 603 implicitly grants the police the authority
to impound vehicles for a safety inspection in order to fulfill their investigatory
and reporting duties under the
statute.
Vehicle and Traffic Law 603 requires that
whenever an accident resulting in injury to a person has been reported
to the police within 5 days of its occurrence, the police "shall
immediately investigate the facts, or cause the same to be investigated,
and report the matter to the commissioner [of motor vehicles] forthwith"
(VTL 603[1]) on a form prepared by the Commissioner (id., 604).
The information transmitted from the police to the Commissioner must include,
among other data, a description of the accident, the damage to the vehicles
and their undercarriages, and a report on whether the vehicle operators
were ticketed, arrested or charged with any violations (see, Department
of Motor Vehicles Form MV-104A).2 The officer's determination of
whether the vehicle was suffering from a safety defect at the time of the
accident has obvious relevance in preparing the accident description and
in reporting whether violations were issued to drivers of vehicles involved.3
The police reports are designed to serve several administrative functions,
such as aiding the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles in promulgating regulations
to enhance the safety of our roads (see, L. 1973, c. 634, Bill Jacket,
Letter from Chairman of Committee on Transportation dated 5-27-73), and
assisting in the prompt resolution of personal injury and property damage
claims against automobile owners and insurers arising from automobile collisions
(see, Bill Jacket, L. 1969, c. 517).
Section 603 does not expressly authorize the
police to remove the vehicle from the accident scene and impound it in
order to complete the requisite investigation and report.
However, that legislation "impose[s] a duty of investigation" (Bill
Jacket, L. 1969, c. 517, Letter of Motor Vehicle Commissioner Tofany to
Governor's Counsel [dated 5-5-69]), and in
turn, a proper investigation may require an inspection of the mechanical
areas of the vehicle. As a practical matter, an inspection of a vehicle
to determine whether any defects in its
safety equipment constituted a contributing cause of the accident cannot
reasonably be undertaken on the roadway where licensed mechanics and proper
facilities and equipment are unavailable. Thus, we conclude that section
603 implicitly grants the police the authority to impound a vehicle in
furtherance of their administrative mandate to fully investigate the cause
of a fatal automobile accident, as well as to ensure the safety of those
conducting the accident investigation (see, South Dakota v Opperman, 428
US 364, 368-369).
Having concluded that the police had implicit
authority to impound the vehicle for a safety inspection, we turn our attention
to a determination of whether the impoundment and
inspection procedure, undertaken without the issuance of a warrant,
violated the constitutional proscriptions against unreasonable searches
and seizures (see, U.S. Const, 4th
Amendment; Article 1, section 12 of the NY Const). We agree with
defendant that any exigency normally associated with the mobility of a
vehicle (see, e.g. People v Belton, 55 NY2d 49, 54) was removed by its
impoundment and thus could not justify the warrantless intrusion.
Nonetheless, we conclude that the warrantless inspection was justified
by other factors providing assurances that the initiation and scope of
the search were reasonable.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article 1, 12 of our State Constitution protect individuals
"from unreasonable government intrusions into their legitimate expectations
of privacy" (People v Class, 63 NY2d 491, 494, quoting United States v
Chadwick, 433 US 1, 7). In determining whether a seizure and search
is unreasonable, we must be satisfied that the governmental intrusion "was
justified at its inception" and "was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place" (Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 19).
The requirement that the police, "whenever
practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures
through the warrant procedure" (Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 20) serves to ensure
that a determination of the reasonableness of the search results from a
neutral balancing of the need for the intrusion on the one hand and the
severity of the invasion on an individual's legitimate expectation of privacy
on the other (id., at 19). The warrant requirement, traditionally
applied "to searches undertaken to procure evidence of criminality" (People
v Scott, 79 NY2d 493) also extends to searches of private property undertaken
by state agents in the furtherance of administrative or regulatory schemes
(id., 79 NY2d 493; see also, Michigan v Tyler, 436 US 499, 505).
Warrantless administrative searces may be
upheld in the limited category of cases where the activity or premises
sought to be inspected is subject to a long tradition of pervasive
government regulation and the regulatory statute authorizing the search
prescribes specific rules to govern the manner in which the search is conducted
(People v Scott, 79 NY2d 474, 499 supra). As a practical matter, a person
involved in a closely-regulated business or activity generally has a diminished
expectation of privacy in the conduct of that business because of the degree
of governmental regulation. Because of the minimal expectation of
privacy in a closely-regulated business, warrantless searches of such conduct
are considered "more necessary and less intrusive than such inspections
would be if conducted on less heavily regulated businesses" (Ringel, Searches
& Seizures Arrests and Confessions, Vol. 2, [2d ed.], at 14-20).
"Pervasive regulation" will only be found where the operations of an industry
or activity are regulated by detailed governmental standards (People v
Scott, 79 NY2d, at 499, supra). The requisite close regulation will
not be found where governmental regulations impose "relatively nonintrusive
obligations" on businesses or activities, such as the requirements that
participants pay fees, register or report to governmental agencies (id.).
The additional requirement that the administrative
search of a pervasively regulated activity be governed by specific rules
designed "to guarantee the certainty and regularity of
application" (id. at 499) serves to "provide either a meaningful limitation
on the otherwise unlimited discretion the statute affords or a satisfactory
means to minimize the risk of arbitrary
and/or abusive enforcement" (id. at 500). Together, these dual
components of the "pervasively regulated business" exception to the administrative
warrant requirement constitute "a
constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant" because they ensure
that there is a compelling need for the governmental intrusion and that
the search is limited in scope to that
necessary to meet the interest that legitimized the search in the first
place (Terry v Ohio, 392 U.S., at 19, supra; see also Michigan v Tyler,
436 U.S., at 297, supra).
III.
The justifications for dispensing with the warrant
requirements in closely regulated businesses provide a useful analytical
framework for our resolution of this case. The
inspection scheme at issue here, designed to further the compelling
safety interest of the government in regulating the use of motor vehicles
on the state's public highways (People v
Ingle, 36 NY2d 413, 419), provides similar assurances that the inspection
will be reasonable. The mechanical areas of automobiles are subject
to extensive and longstanding safety
regulation analogous to that which has served to except pervasively
regulated businesses from the administrative warrant requirement.
New York drivers must subject their vehicles to
annual inspections of their safety equipment by licensed mechanics
before being granted the privilege of driving on our roadways (see, VTL
301; 15 NYCRR Part 79).
Because of this extensive regulation of vehicular
safety equipment, there is only a diminished expectation of privacy in
the mechanical areas of a vehicle.4 When a fatal accident
involving an automobile has occurred, that minimal privacy expectation
necessarily yields to the State's legitimate public safety interests in
determining all of the circumstances
surrounding the death and the cause of the accident (People v Ingle,
36 NY2d 413, supra) and in ensuring that the vehicle is not returned to
the roadway in an unsafe condition. As one
jurisdiction has noted in reaching a similar conclusion, "[s]ociety
places great importance on learning all the circumstances of any motor
vehicle accident resulting in death
and would not recognize as objectively reasonable an expectation of
privacy in the braking mechanism of a motor vehicle that had come into
police possession following the death of a motorist on the highway" (Commonwealth
v Mamacos, 409 Mass 635, 638).
The rules governing the inspection at issue
here also comport with 4th amendment principles because they remove the
possibility that the inspection will be undertaken in an
arbitrary manner.5 The safety inspection authorized by VTL
603 is only conducted in response to a particular event -- an automobile
accident resulting in personal injury or death -- that calls into question
the safe mechanical functioning of the vehicle. Uncontroverted hearing
testimony also established that it is the standard policy of the East Hampton
police department to uniformly conduct this mechanical inspection on every
vehicle involved in an accident resulting in either serious physical injury
or death. Thus, vehicles are not randomly or arbitrarily selected
from the flow of traffic for enforcement of the inspection scheme at issue
here (cf. People v Ingle, 36 NY2d 413; People v Miller, 52 AD2d 425, 431,
affd 43 NY2d 789).
The scope of the intrusion was also strictly
tailored to a determination of whether any safety violations existing on
the vehicle at the time of the accident could have contributed to its
cause -- the initial justification for the intrusion. This safety
inspection, which included an examination of the brakes, wipers, windshield,
and headlights was less extensive than that
required to be conducted annually on all cars in this State (see, VTL
301; 15 NYCRR 79.3). The police and licensed mechanics are accorded
no discretion in selecting the areas subject to examination and the mechanics
must examine the vehicle according to standard protocol. The inspection
is limited to mechanical parts of the vehicle and does not extend to the
private areas of the car where personal effects would be expected to be
contained and to which "different and more stringent rules apply" (People
v Ingle, 36 NY2d 413, 421; see also, People v Class, 63 NY2d 491, 495).
The fact that the length of the intrusion
here -- a two-day impoundment -- is greater than the temporary detainment
of automobiles normally associated with a stop for a routine traffic
check (see, VTL 390; People v Ingle, 36 NY2d 413) does not change
the result. The immediate and more extended seizure of the vehicle
without a warrant in this case was justified to
ensure that the police report to the commissioner accurately reflected
the condition of the safety equipment on the vehicle at the time of the
accident. Indeed, the officers at the scene
would have been remiss in their duties had they prematurely released
the vehicle to defendant, an auto mechanic, prior to a full determination
of the cause of the accident. The impoundment served to secure the
accident condition of the vehicle from changes due to subsequent road use
or even intentional tampering. Given that the police must employ licensed
mechanics to conduct the safety inspection on the vehicle, the two-day
delay in conducting the inspection -- which for safety and reliability
reasons could not be conducted at the scene -- was not unreasonable as
a matter of law.
On these facts, we are satisfied that the
inspection of the braking mechanism on defendant's vehicle after its involvement
in a fatal collision did not constitute an unreasonable search in the constitutional
sense. Given our conclusion that this search was reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment, the evidence obtained through that inspection was
properly held admissible by Appellate Term in this criminal prosecution
(People v Scott, 79 NY2d at 501, n.5).
Accordingly, the order of Appellate Term should
be affirmed.
F O O T N O T E S
1. Defendant was not charged with any offense in connection with
the bicyclist's death.
2. The following safety violations are delineated
in the Vehicle and Traffic Law: Bad brakes (VTL 375[1]); Unsafe Tires
(id. 375.35[c]); Cracked or obstructed windshield (id.
375.30), Inadequate Muffler (375.31) and Improper Headlights ( 375[2]).
3. A 1993 statistical report prepared by the Department of Motor
Vehicles contained in the Respondent's Appendix indicates that information
on the "apparent accident contributing factors" is compiled solely from
statewide police reports submitted to the commissioner and that "defective
brakes" is one among a number of mechanical defects on a vehicle that may
be listed on a police accident report as a contributing cause of the accident.
4. Although constitutional protections against unreasonable
government intrusions extend to searches of automobiles and seizures of
their contents (People v Class, supra; Terry v Ohio), there is generally
"only a diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile" (People v Scott,
63 NY2d 518, 525, citing United States v Martinez-Fuerte, 428 US 543, 561).
Drawing on precedent of the United States Supreme Court, this Court has
explained that the reduced expectation of privacy in a vehicle is occasioned
by the facts that "automobiles 'operate on public streets; * * * are serviced
in public places; * * * their interiors are highly visible and they are
subject to extensive regulation and inspection'" (People v Belton, 55 NY2d
49, 53, quoting Rakas v Illinois, 439 US 128, 154).
5. In People v Ingle (36 NY2d 413), this Court discussed
the reasonableness of "routine safety checks" undertaken by the State police
pursuant to VTL 390 in which the police temporarily detained vehicles
to determine whether they were "being operated in compliance with the Vehicle
and Traffic Law" (id. at 415). The Court explained that the reasonableness
of the stop must be measured by a balancing of the State's "vital and compelling
interest in safety on the public highways" against the motorist's "general
right to be free from arbitrary State intrusion on his freedom of movement
even in an automobile" (id. at 419). Noting that such stops are "limited
seizures within the meaning of constitutional limitations" (id. at 419),
the Court explained that the police must have "some valid reason, however
slight" to single out a particular vehicle for an inspection to determine
whether any equipment violations are present" (id., at 416). While the
Court determined that random traffic checks on the highways are also permissible,
the Court concluded that those stops must be undertaken by "some system
or uniform procedure and not gratuitously or by individually discriminatory
selection" (id.) to be reasonable in the constitutional sense.
* * * * *
* * * * * *
* * * * * *
Order affirmed. Opinion by Judge Titone. Chief Judge Kaye
and Judges Simons, Bellacosa, Smith, Levine and Ciparick concur.
Decided July 9, 1996
