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Robert H. Chanin, for appellant.
Karl W. Kristoff, for respondent.
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc.; Buffalo Council of
Supervisors and Administrators; New York State United Teachers; New
York State School Boards
Association, Inc., amici curiae.
BELLACOSA, J.:
Defendant Buffalo
Teachers Federation, Inc., (Union) appeals from an order of the Appellate
Division. It affirmed a judgment of Supreme Court declaring that
plaintiff, Board of
Education for the City of Buffalo (Board), is not obligated to approve
or fund the collective bargaining agreement reached by the parties in September
1990. At the center of this
longstanding dispute are provisions in the Taylor Law (Civil Service
Law 201[12], 204-a[1]), as applied to the negotiated salary provisions
contained in the controverted agreement.
On or about
September 1, 1990, negotiating teams for the Union and Buffalo School District
reached a four-year agreement, which the union membership ratified on September
3,
1990. Prior to the Superintendent's execution of the proposed
agreement, it was considered by the Board, which by a 5-4 vote then refused
to give its approval on September 26, 1990. The Union filed an improper
practice charge with the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) in October
1990. The charge of failure to bargain in good faith stemmed from
allegations that the School District's Chief Negotiator sought from the
outset to undermine the agreement and that this tactic led to the Board's
ultimate narrow rejection of the pact. On September 23, 1991, PERB
sustained the improper practice charge, and ordered "that the District
execute, upon BTF's demand, a document embodying the agreements reached
by the parties" (24 PERB 3033, at 3068). PERB declined to order that the
Board implement the agreement, however, on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction
to direct that remedy.
The Board started
a judicial proceeding to nullify the PERB determination, but the Appellate
Division unanimously confirmed it (Matter of Board of Educ. for the City
School Dist.
of the City of Buffalo v Buffalo Teachers Fedn., Inc., 191 AD2d 985
[1993], lv denied 82 NY2d 656). The court "dismiss[ed] the action
for a declaratory judgment as premature," noting that "[t]here is no evidence
that [the Board] will not implement the provisions of the agreement upon
execution" and declined to order such relief in light of the fact that
"the record is not developed regarding the issue of legislative approval"
(id., at 986).
Thereafter,
on September 22, 1993, the Board passed a resolution that "the Superintendent
of Schools shall execute on behalf of this District, upon BTF's demand,
a document embodying the agreements reached." The Board also, nevertheless,
resolved that "pursuant to Civil Service Law Section 204-a.1 the Buffalo
Teachers Federation be notified that by the adoption of this Resolution,
this Board of Education does not legislatively approve the said agreements
and will not implement the said agreements by providing the additional
funds therefor."
The Board then
returned to court in the action now before us, seeking a declaration that
it was under no obligation to legislatively approve of, or provide for,
the funding
necessary for the increased salaries under the executed 1990 agreement.
The Union counterclaimed for a declaration that the Board was obligated
to implement the agreement, as duly executed by the parties in accordance
with the confirmed PERB directive, retroactive to July 1, 1990.
On cross motions
for summary judgment, Supreme Court granted the Board's motion and declared
that the Board had no obligation to "legislatively approve or implement
[the agreement] by funding;" it denied the Union's cross-motion and dismissed
the counterclaim. The Union appealed and the Appellate Division affirmed
(217 AD2d 366). The court held that the prior PERB order requiring
the District Superintendent to execute the agreement did not effect a legal
waiver of the Board's additionally reserved power to approve the agreement
(id., at 373). The court reasoned that although the Board cannot
levy taxes, it does possess the authority to allocate funds and such power
is legislative (id., at 374).
This Court granted
the Union leave to appeal and we now reverse the order of the Appellate
Division. We conclude that, in this case, the Buffalo Board has not
established a right to an additional legislative approval role within the
meaning of Civil Service Law 201(12) and 204-a(1). The Board directed
the execution of the 1990 agreement (after it litigated the PERB phase
of the matter) and has not shown that it is required to perform any further
legislative action. Thus, it possesses no residual statutory power
to frustrate the fulfillment of the
otherwise validly adopted agreement.
Resolution of
this purely statutory construction controversy turns essentially on whether
the Taylor Law prescribes a legal condition subsequent to an adopted contractual
obligation related to salary provisions embodied within this agreement.
Our analysis focuses on the interpretation of the 1969 amendments (L 1969,
ch 24). Certain provisions of public
sector collective bargaining agreements require legislative action
for their implementation and are effective only when the appropriate legislative
entity discretely votes to approve them.
Notably, an "agreement" is defined as "the result of the exchange of
mutual promises between the chief executive officer of a public employer
and an employee organization which becomes a binding contract, for the
period set forth therein, except as to any provisions therein which require
approval by a legislative body, and as to those provisions, shall become
binding when the appropriate legislative body gives its approval" (Civil
Service Law 201[12] [emphasis added]). "[L]egislative body of the
government" is defined as including a board of education (Civil Service
Law 201[11]), and "'chief executive officer' in the case of school districts"
is defined as the superintendent of schools (Civil Service Law 201[10]).
Pertinently,
the Taylor Law requires that agreements between public employers and unions
contain a clause stating in part that "any provision of this agreement
requiring legislative action to permit its implementation by amendment
of law or by providing the additional funds therefor, shall not become
effective until the appropriate legislative body has given approval" (Civil
Service Law 204-a[1] [emphasis added]). The agreement in this case
contains this statutorily mandated clause and also includes a provision,
not independently relied on by the Board here, that it was "subject to
formal adoption by the Board at a meeting of the Board to be held as soon
as possible."
The enactment
history behind the 1969 Taylor Law amendments indicates that the approval
mechanism was added to "obviate confusion as to the effect of an agreement
between an employer and employee organization by making clear (through
a change in the definition of 'agreement' and by requiring notice to all
employees) that legislative action is needed before the agreement becomes
effective as to those provisions requiring legislative approval such as,
for example, the appropriation of funds for salaries" (Mem of Senate Rules
Committee, 1969 McKinney's Session Laws of NY, at 2365 [emphasis added]).
The Legislature's aim has been plainly undermined in this case, as confusion
has long lingered over the question whether the Board has identified a
legally supportable basis for its claim that the salary provisions of this
1990 collective bargaining agreement -- whose four-year term ironically
already ended two years ago -- require explicit, additional, post-pact
approval to gain efficacy.
The Board contends
-- to the satisfaction of the courts below -- that the allocation of salary
levels and salaries of its teachers is inherently and always legislative
in nature. The
Union, on the other hand, contends that in allocating funds for teacher
salaries, this fiscally dependent Board is exercising an executive rather
than legislative power. We believe this
controversy may be resolved on pure statutory interpretation grounds
without choosing between the contentions of the parties on the larger classification
ground. The Buffalo Board's
delegated and discrete range of authority with respect to this matter
was exhausted after it explicitly directed due execution of the agreed-upon
collectively-bargained pact.
The Board, nevertheless,
specifically argues that the compensation features of the 1990 agreement
are subject to an explicit, additional statutory approval step, which it
seeks to
characterize as purely legislative, simply because they involve the
expenditure of additional salary amounts. This doctrinaire labelling
exercise cannot override plainly expressed law
governing the binding effect of the Superintendent's Board- authorized
execution of the agreement. Such an approach does not withstand particularized
analysis and does not facilitate the proper resolution of this case.
The Board concedes
that its authority to expend education funds flows directly from the Legislature's
delegation. The power the Board enjoys over its budget is that of spending
and allocating money, not one of appropriation. That unique power
is possessed solely by the Common Council of the City of Buffalo.
The Board's
theory for the post-pact "re-approval" step, taken to its logical limits,
would encumber all contracts bearing any varying budgetary impact terms
with specific, formal,
follow-up steps, even when the Board has otherwise generally accepted
by operation of law and specifically directed the execution of the particular
collective bargaining agreement, as
occurred here.
In our view,
Civil Service Law 201(12) and 204-a(1) neither require nor contemplate
such legal disingenuity or superfluity. We are satisfied that the
Taylor Law does not by
its terms "vary or extend the instances in which legislative approval
is necessary and does not create a necessity for action by a legislative
body where it does not otherwise exist" (John E. Creedon Police Benevolent
Assn., Inc. of Utica v City of Utica, 44 AD2d 890 [emphasis added]).
Because the Board has not identified any further legislative action that
it must perform under the pertinent statutes with respect to the salary
provisions of the agreement -- the only argument it attempts to make here
-- further approval by it is not needed for
implementation of this agreement.
Notably, one
of the described inducements for enactment of the Taylor Law was to ameliorate
the potentiality or tendency of public employers to impose unilateral conditions
upon public employees. The evident arbitrariness of such uneven bargaining
positions was sufficient to "give rise to employee reactions which impair
the quality of service rendered and otherwise infringe upon the public
interests" (Governor's Committee on Public Employee Relations, Final Report
[Taylor Committee Report], Mar. 31, 1966 [Reprinted in 1966 Public Papers
of Governor Rockefeller, at 889-890]).
We are, therefore,
unpersuaded by the Board's interpretation of Civil Service Law 201(12)
that would give this public employer Board a bait-and-switch escape hatch
from
negotiated, agreed-upon contract terms. Teachers, as in this
case, following their ratification of the contract, were bound to all the
contracted terms, including "give backs" and good faith disclosure of their
entire negotiating position on all terms and conditions of their employment.
The Board's statutory construction would create a "sandbag" disincentive
against
employee organizations agreeing "to be bound for several years by compensation
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement that did not also bind
the employer" (Association of Surrogates and Supreme Court Reporters within
the City of New York v State of New York (78 NY2d 143, 155). To allow
this Board a unilateral and inherently contradictory avoidance of its "closed,
initialed and executed deal" would leave these teachers at the mercy of
a profoundly flawed and unfair collective bargaining procedure. The Legislature
could not have intended this, and we conclude it did not. Such a
tilted field of management-labor relations would plainly conflict with
the pervasive policy and other explicit terms of the Taylor Law that are
designed to secure amicable, negotiated, long-term agreements.
Further support
for our ultimate resolution of this case may be garnered from an examination
of the past practices of these parties. Courts may inform their judgments
by reference to a course of dealing which places employees on notice of
the need for further legislative action (see, Association of Surrogates
and Supreme Court Reporters within the City of New York v State of New
York, supra, at 155). In this case, the Board does not dispute or
challenge that its customary practice has been to formally adopt labor
contracts in a unitary action. Indeed, despite some generalized assertions,
the Board acknowledges with pertinent specificity that it has never before
taken or claimed a post-pact "legislative approval" power as to discrete
contractual provisions containing additional funding components.
Thus, the Board's past practices -- providing such notice and predictability
as may be properly and usefully derived therefrom -- indicate that it did
not assert or exercise an additional role as to contractual salary provisions
of the type at issue here as subject to Civil Service Law 204-a(1) --
before this procedurally intractable controversy. To be sure, Association
of Surrogates and Supreme Court Reporters within the City of New York v
State of New York (supra), is distinguishable in certain other respects,
but its rationale is apt and compelling with respect to the additional-step
requirement urged by the Board under the statute at issue.
In sum, PERB
held that it did not have the authority to make the Board either adopt
or legislatively approve the agreement. PERB did, however, direct
within its clear authority
pursuant to the terms of Civil Service Law 201(12) and 205(5)(d)
the execution of the agreement which had already been reached by the parties
(Matter of Board of Educ. for the City
School Dist. of the City of Buffalo v Buffalo Teachers Fedn., Inc.,
191 AD2d 985, supra, lv denied 82 NY2d 656). Thus, under these circumstances,
the Board's direction to the Superintendent to execute the agreement must
have legal meaning and be given cognizable and appropriate effect.
We have considered
all the other arguments of the parties and conclude that they either need
not be addressed for the disposition of this case or lack merit.
Accordingly,
the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment denied, defendant's cross motion for summary
judgment granted and judgment granted declaring that the Board of Education
for the City School District of Buffalo is required to implement the September
1, 1990, agreement retroactive to July 1, 1990.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Order reversed, with costs, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment
denied, defendant's cross motion for summary judgment granted and judgment
granted declaring that the Board of
Education is required to implement the September 1, 1990 agreement
retroactive to July 1, 1990. Opinion by Judge Bellacosa. Chief
Judge Kaye and Judges Simons, Titone, Smith,
Levine and Ciparick concur.
Decided December 19, 1996