I

Defendant's primary point, raised for the first time before the Appellate Term, is that the District Court information charging him with criminal contempt was jurisdictionally defective in three respects: (1) the Temporary Order of Protection was not attached to the information, and the accusatory instrument did not otherwise allege that the order was in effect on the date the contempt was committed; (2) the Temporary Order of Protection itself was, by its terms, not in effect on that date; and (3) the information did not contain non- hearsay allegations of defendant's knowledge of the order. The Appellate Term held that the failure to annex the Temporary Order of Protection to the information "render[ed] it defective as an information because of its hearsay nature" (181 Misc 2d , at 745 [emphasis supplied]). Nevertheless, the court held that since the instrument would have "qualifie[d] as a misdemeanor complaint," defendant, by waiving the reading of his procedural rights and proceeding to trial, also waived the right to be prosecuted by information (id. [citing People v Connor, , 63 NY2d 11]; see, CPL 170.10[4][d]).

While we hold that defendant's challenge to the information does not warrant reversal, we cannot agree with the Appellate Term's rationale for that result. The record suggests that defendant waived only a reading of the information (previously furnished to his attorney), not a reading of his procedural right to be prosecuted by information. Thus, there is an insufficient evidentiary basis for any finding of a knowing and intelligent (albeit implied) waiver of the right to be prosecuted upon an information (see, People v Weinberg, , 34 NY2d 429, 431; cf., People v Connor, supra).

Moreover, as the Appellate Term acknowledged, the accusatory instrument here was denominated, and purported to be, a misdemeanor information with a supporting deposition, not a misdemeanor complaint. That the instrument would have qualified as a misdemeanor complaint did not make it one. Since the accusatory instrument here was in fact a local criminal court information, and not a misdemeanor complaint, the District Court would not have had the statutory obligation to inform defendant that he "may not be prosecuted [on a misdemeanor complaint] * * * unless he consents" (CPL 170.10[4][d]). Therefore, in contrast to People v Connor, no waiver of the right to be tried upon a statutorily valid information can be implied from defendant's silence and proceeding to trial.

Nonetheless, defendant's contentions regarding the defectiveness of the information do not require reversal. Although annexing the Temporary Order of Protection to the information would have been the far better practice, and would have largely obviated defendant's procedural challenge here, the failure to annex it does not require reversal under the particular circumstances of this case. The procedural requirements for the factual portion of a local criminal court information are, simply: that it state "facts of an evidentiary character supporting or tending to support the charges" (CPL 100.15[3]; see, CPL 100.40[1][a]); that the "allegations of the factual part * * * together with those of any supporting depositions * * * provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged" (CPL 100.40[1][b]); and that the "[n]on-hearsay allegations [of the information and supporting depositions] establish, if true, every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof" (CPL 100.40[1][c]; see, CPL 100.15[3]).

So long as the factual allegations of an information give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense, they should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading (see, People v Jacoby, 304 NY 33, 38-40; People v Knapp, 152 Misc 368, 370 affd 242 App Div 811; People v Shea 68 Misc 2d 271, 272; see also, People v Allen, , 92 NY2d 378, 385; People v Miles, , 64 NY2d 731, 732-733). As to defendant's objection that, without attachment of the Temporary Order of Protection, the accusatory instrument here failed to include any non-hearsay allegation that the Temporary Order of Protection was outstanding and in effect on the December 2 date of the alleged offense, the complainant's supporting deposition states clearly and succinctly that a Temporary Order of Protection had been issued, prohibiting defendant from engaging in harassing or criminal conduct against her. She also averred that she personally observed specifically described conduct of the defendant on December 2 that violated the order. At the very least, the fair implication of these averments established her firsthand knowledge that the order had been granted, was in effect and was violated by defendant's harassing or criminal conduct on the date of the offense. Any challenge to those allegations, including whether the order was in effect on the date of the contumacious conduct, was a matter to be raised as an evidentiary defense to the contempt charge, not by insistence that this information was jurisdictionally defective without annexation of the order to that accusatory instrument. Defendant's failure to raise an issue before the District Court as to whether the order was in effect when the offense allegedly occurred thus precludes its consideration here.

II

Defendant's final objection to the sufficiency of the information is that it is jurisdictionally defective under CPL 100.40(1)(c) in failing to set forth any non-hearsay allegation of defendant's knowledge of the Temporary Order of Protection. Whether the allegation of an element of an offense is hearsay, rendering the information defective, is to be determined on a facial reading of the accusatory instrument (see, Matter of Edward B., , 80 NY2d 458, 462-464 [construing Family Court Act § 311.2(3), the virtually identical juvenile delinquency counterpart to CPL 100.40.(1)(c)][citing Preiser, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 11A, CPL 100.40, at 255]).

Moreover, a non-hearsay requirement is met so long as the allegation would be admissible under some hearsay rule exception (see, Marks, et al., NY Pretrial Criminal Procedure § 3.7, at 109 [7 West's NY Prac Series 1996]; see also, People v Belcher, 302 NY 529, 534-535).

Here, the detective averred in the factual portion of the information that he was "advised by the complainant" that defendant had violated the Temporary Order of Protection, and specifically described the conduct constituting the offense, referring to the complainant's supporting deposition. The information then alleges "[t]he defendant was advised and served a copy of the Order of Protection in court on 8-15-96." It is not clear from a facial examination of the information whether that allegation relating to defendant's knowledge of the order was based only upon the complainant's advice (she did not aver this in the supporting deposition, however), or whether it was based upon the detective's direct knowledge or some exception to the hearsay rule, either of which would have satisfied CPL 100.40(1)(c). Thus, because it cannot be determined upon the face of the information whether the pleading is in compliance with CPL 100.40(1)(c), the information is subject to a motion to dismiss (see, Matter of Rodney J., , 83 NY2d 503, 507). Had the motion been made, however, we know from the record of the suppression hearing and trial that the defect was readily curable.

The detective's allegation that defendant was served with the order of protection was admissible under at least two hearsay rule exceptions. First, the complainant had shown him a certified copy of the order, containing defendant's signed acknowledgment of receipt of service, which the clerk of the court was required to effect (see, CPL 530.13[6] supra). That certified copy of the order would have been admissible to prove service on defendant under the statutory or common-law public documents (or official entry) exception to the hearsay rule (see, CPL 60.10; CPLR 4520 ; Broun v Equitable Life, , 69 NY2d 675; People v Nisonoff, 293 NY 597, 602; Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 8- 1101, at 688-690 [Farrell 11th ed]; Fisch on NY Evidence § 953, at 549-552 [2d ed]). Also, defendant admitted to the detective, in their initial conversation over the telephone, that he had been served with the order. That, too, provided a hearsay rule exception for the admissibility of the allegation of service of the order on defendant (see, Prince, Richardson on Evidence, supra, § 8-202, 8-204, at 510-511).

The issue thus comes down to whether defendant's failure to raise the absence of an unequivocal non-hearsay allegation of defendant's physical receipt of the Temporary Order of Protection by a timely pretrial motion precludes consideration of that defect for the first time on appeal. This in turn requires us to revisit our decision in People v Alejandro (, 70 NY2d 133). Defendant urges that Alejandro requires reversal here despite the absence of pretrial objection to any pleading deficiency. Defendant points out that in Alejandro we did not differentiate for "jurisdictional" purposes between the two "prima facie" requirements of CPL 100.40(1)(c) -- that first, there must be factual allegations establishing every element of the offense and second, those allegations must be "non-hearsay" (see, id., 70 NY2d, at 137).

The Alejandro case itself, however, actually involved a failure to satisfy the first requirement of CPL 100.40(1)(c), in that there was a total absence of pleading of one of the elements of the crime of Resisting Arrest, i.e., that the defendant had resisted an "authorized" arrest (Penal Law § 205.30 [emphasis supplied]; People v Alejandro, supra, at 135-136). Therefore, Alejandro's suggestion that the second, non-hearsay requirement of CPL 100.40(1)(c) was "jurisdictional" and, thus, non-waivable and reviewable on appeal without preservation was not essential to the Court's holding.

III

Now squarely confronted with the issue whether a hearsay pleading violation of CPL 100.40(1)(c) is jurisdictional and non-waivable, we conclude that it is not. That conclusion is based on three grounds. First, such a holding would be at variance with our settled pre-CPL accusatory instrument jurisprudence. Pre-CPL case law also required non-hearsay criminal pleadings but any hearsay defect was waived by a failure to raise the issue in a pre-trial motion. Second, there is no evidence of any legislative purpose -- in enacting the pleading provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law in general, or specifically in enacting CPL 100.40(1)(c) -- to change and make more restrictive the criminal pleading requirements established in our earlier decisions. Actually, the opposite purpose is evident. Third, deeming hearsay allegation defects in local criminal court informations jurisdictional and nonwaivable would be inconsistent with the general principles governing the narrow instances where this Court has departed from the requirement that errors in criminal proceedings have to be preserved at the trial court in order to be reviewable as an issue of law.

A.

Well before enactment of the Criminal Procedure Law, this Court had incrementally developed a clear set of rules governing both criminal pleading requirements and whether violation of those requirements required preservation.

We earlier held that "a fundamental * * * basic principle of justice and fair dealing" (People v Zambounis, 251 NY 94, 97) requires that an accusatory instrument factually describe the elements of the crime and the particular acts of the defendant constituting its commission. That was deemed necessary to give an accused fair notice and prevent double jeopardy (see, id., at 96). We also determined that this requirement, of constitutional dimension, is not waivable (see, People v Scott, , 3 NY2d 148, 152 ["However, objections to the jurisdiction of the court are not waived nor is the objection that the information does not state a crime"][emphasis supplied]).

Additionally, well before the enactment of the Criminal Procedure Law, this Court developed rules that criminal informations should be based upon non-hearsay allegations, just as now required under CPL 100.40(1)(c) (see, People v Bertram, 302 NY 526 [when the information forms basis for a warrant of arrest]; People v James (, 4 NY2d 482 [also when the information is used solely as a pleading]; see also, People v Jacoby, 304 NY 33; People v Brous, 296 NY 1028). We did so for the very same reasons expressed in People v Alejandro (supra, 70 NY2d, at 139), that is, to protect a defendant "against groundless criminal proceedings" by providing "reasonable guarantees against baseless prosecutions not predicated on probable cause" (People v James, supra, at 485-486).

Of greatest relevance to the present case, however, is that we had repeatedly held that a hearsay objection had to be preserved by timely pretrial motion or it was waived, likening the matter more to a defect in form than fundamental substance. Thus, in People v Scott, in which, as discussed above, the Court noted that an objection that the information did not state a crime was not waivable (see, People v Scott, supra, 3 NY2d, at 152 [citing e.g., People v Koffroth, , 2 NY2d 807]), the Court also stated the "well settled" rule that a defendant, by pleading guilty, waives any "objection to the form of the information, or where it is based on information and belief without disclosing the source thereof" (People v Scott, supra, at 152; see also, People v Jacoby, supra, 304 NY, at 39 [discussing People v Brous, supra]).

This Court's decision in People v Belcher (302 NY 529) made an important contribution to our pre-CPL accusatory instrument jurisprudence. In Belcher, a drunken driving case, we held that the non-hearsay allegation requirement would be met if the allegation itself would be admissible at trial under an exception to the hearsay rule (there, the intoxicated defendant's admission to operating his vehicle) (see, id., at 535).

Also significant for the case at hand, this Court in Belcher held that although, as later revealed, the source of the officer's straightforward averment that the defendant operated his vehicle was an admission, the officer's basis of knowledge need not have been pleaded:

"Since, then, the information was based upon requisite 'legal evidence', pointing the commission of the crime and defendant's probable guilt, no further deposition was called for and the officer was not required to particularize the evidence on which he relied or to indicate that one item consisted of an admission from defendant" (id. [emphasis supplied] [citation omitted]).

To summarize, our pre-CPL accusatory instrument jurisprudence was settled in several respects. First, a failure to allege an element of the crime in an information was deemed a nonwaivable jurisdictional defect that was reviewable on appeal even in the absence of a timely objection. Second, criminal informations had to be based upon non-hearsay factual allegations in order to be legally sufficient. Third, hearsay allegations were considered akin to defects in form, and were therefore waived absent challenge before trial. Finally, an informant could directly allege a necessary element of an offense if the allegation would have been admissible under a hearsay rule exception, but was not required to plead the informant's basis of knowledge. B.