After Darling and Vaccaro were indicted for sale and possession of controlled substances, both moved to suppress. They contended, in essence, that because the eavesdropping warrant specified (315) 422-2003 as the phone number to be tapped, the authorities were not permitted to tap (315) 422-0084 without submitting a new warrant application to a Judge. According to defendants, all evidence derived from the wiretap, including the cocaine, must be suppressed. The suppression court agreed, holding that the wiretap warrant was based on illegally intercepted communications and therefore lacked probable cause.[1]

The People appealed, arguing that under the circumstances of this case, the authorization to tap the original telephone number automatically attached to the new number assigned to the same line -- the only line to 1009 Carbon Street. Agreeing with the prosecution, the Appellate Division, in separate decisions (People v Darling, 263 AD2d 61 and People v Vaccaro, 272 AD2d 871), reversed the suppression court's order and held that the eavesdropping application satisfied the requirements of CPL 700.20(2) even though the telephone number was changed. We granted both defendants leave to appeal, and now affirm.

This Court has long recognized the importance of fidelity to the statutory directives that govern authorized eavesdropping. In fashioning the State's electronic surveillance law (CPL article 700),[2] the Legislature adopted standards in accordance with Congress' first comprehensive enactment regulating the field.[3] Congress codified the standards crafted by the United States Supreme Court in Berger v New York (388 US 41) and United States v Katz (389 US 347). Thus, in compliance with the Fourth Amendment mandates of Berger and Katz, CPL article 700 contains detailed requirements regulating every aspect of wiretapping, as well as a procedure to suppress evidence when those requirements are not met.

Electronic surveillance is an essential law enforcement tool. Indeed, without it some criminal activity -- often the most pernicious -- would go undetected and unpunished. There is, however, a corollary of equal importance. Because electronic surveillance is singularly invasive, law enforcement officials may intercept communications only when they scrupulously follow constitutional and statutory requirements (see generally, 1968 New York State Legislative Annual, p 472; S. Rep No. 90-1097, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1968, reprinted in 1968 USCCAN 2112).

In keeping with this corollary, this Court in People v Capolongo reiterated the "bedrock principle that there must be 'strict compliance with the provisions of New York's eavesdropping statute * * * and that the burden of establishing such compliance rests with the prosecution'" (85 2 151, 165 [quoting People v Schulz, , 67 NY2d 144, 148]) Capolongo is the most recent in a line of cases in which this Court ordered suppression of evidence when the authorities failed to comply strictly with constitutional and statutory requirements.[4]

Invoking this Court's strict compliance jurisprudence, defendants contend that the motion court correctly suppressed the wiretap evidence. At the outset, defendants have failed to establish that the application or warrant does not comply with CPL article 700's strictures. CPL 700.20(2) provides that a wiretap application must contain, among other things, "a particular description of the nature and location of the facilities from which or the place where the communication is to be intercepted." Similarly, CPL 700.30(3) requires that an eavesdropping warrant specify, among other things, "[t]he nature and location of the communications facilities as to which, or the place where, authority to intercept * * * is granted."

Here, the wiretap application and warrant conformed fully to the statutory requirements. The warrant listed the address of Vaccaro's grandfather, and stated that the wiretap was to be placed on the grandfather's telephone number -- the only number at that address. Thus, there is no question that the warrant particularly identified the number to be tapped. Whatever the reasons -- perhaps as the prosecution argues, because telephone numbers may be changed frequently to confound law enforcement authorities -- there is no requirement in CPL article 700 that a wiretap application or warrant designate a particular telephone number.[5]

Defendants further argue that because the telephone number was changed, the investigator, in executing the warrant, went beyond its explicit terms and therefore suppression is required. CPL 700.35(1) provides that "an eavesdropping * * * warrant must be executed according to its terms." Defendants rely on People v Basilicato (64 2 103, 114-115), a case in which the warrant authorized only wiretapping, but was used to obtain evidence through "bugging."[6] In suppressing the evidence, the Court held that the seizure of non-telephonic conversations pursuant to a warrant that authorizes only wiretapping exceeded the scope of the warrant. Basilicato does not support defendants' position.

In requiring particularity, CPL article 700 draws upon the Fourth Amendment itself, which provides that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." The particularity requirement reinforces the constitutional design by which the Judge and not the officer fixes the scope of the search. To minimize invasiveness, the Fourth Amendment requires that the Judge's directive be sufficiently specific as to leave no discretion to the executing officer (Andresen v Maryland, 427 US 463, 480; Marron v United States, 275 US 192, 196; People v Nieves, , 36 NY2d 396, 401). Accordingly, this Court in Basilicato recognized that the Fourth Amendment requirement of particularity prohibits "'the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another'" (64 2 at 114 [quoting Marron v United States, supra, 275 US, at 196]).

In Basilicato, the warrant was directed toward a distinct species of evidence -- telephonic communications -- but law enforcement officials without judicial approval or supporting probable cause unilaterally extended it to direct personal communications. This expansion invaded privacy interests not contemplated by the issuing Judge's warrant. No such thing happened here. Although the telephone number was changed, the investigator obeyed the issuing Judge's directive. No additional privacy interests or protections were affected by the installation of the wiretap to the changed telephone number.

"Strict compliance" does not entail hypertechnical or strained obedience, nor is common sense its enemy. The investigator installed the tap on the only telephone number assigned to the person and address the court specified. No confusion was created merely because the number changed. There was no possibility for misdirection. It is undisputed that the house had only one telephone number, and the investigator inexorably carried out the court's mandate by installing the wiretap on it. In the context of this case, the change in telephone number had no bearing on the established probable cause. In all, we conclude that the acquisition and execution of the warrant comports with our strict compliance doctrine. Defendants' remaining contentions are without merit.

Accordingly, in each case, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.