Discussion

All government records are presumptively open for public inspection unless specifically exempted from disclosure as provided in the Public Officers Law (Public Officers Law § 87[2]; Gould v NYC Police Dept., , 89 NY2d 267). In Gould, the FOIL petitioners, one of whom was convicted of a sex crime, sought to obtain complaint follow-up reports (DD-5's) and other records for which the police claimed a blanket "intra-agency" exemption. We rejected the claim and remitted the cases for a particularized showing as to whether any exemption applied, noting that exemptions must be narrowly construed and the burden rests on the government agency to show that requested material qualifies for exemption (Gould, supra, 89 NY2d, at 275).

As relevant here, Public Officers Law § 87(2)(a) limits disclosure of documents specifically exempted by state or federal statute. Respondent police departments rely on the following statutory exemption contained in Civil Rights Law § 1):

"[t]he identity of any victim of a sex offense * * * shall be confidential. No report, paper, picture, photograph, court file or other documents, * * * which identifies such a victim shall be made available for public inspection. No such public officer or employee shall disclose any portion of any police report, court file, or other document, which tends to identify such a victim except as provided in subdivision two of this section."

Petitioners, by contrast, rely on subdivision two, which states that:

"The provisions of subdivision one of this section shall not be construed to prohibit disclosure to:

"a. Any person charged with commission of an offense * * * against the same victim * * *."

Petitioners assert that they are entitled to disclosure of the requested materials under Civil Rights Law § 50-b(2)(a) in order to prepare for collateral review of their convictions to the same extent as a defendant facing trial. In each of these cases, the Appellate Division agreed, stating that the petitioners were similarly situated to a person charged with a crime and seeking documents to mount a defense. The use of the term "charged", however, in the exception at Civil Rights Law § 50-b(2)(a), puts the petitioners, already convicted, outside the scope of the statute.

Statutory interpretation requires that words be given their natural and obvious meaning. The exception in Civil Rights Law § 50-b(2)(a) applies to a person "charged" with a crime. A person charged with a crime is distinctly different from one who has already been convicted. A person charged with a crime, unlike a convicted person, enjoys a presumption of innocence, the right to counsel, the right to a jury trial and, significantly in the present context, the right to confront one's accuser. A person charged with a crime thus cannot be equated with a convicted person for purposes of Civil Rights Law § 50-b.

Nor does the legislative history support petitioners' interpretation of the statute. While it is true that the sponsor's Memorandum in Support at one point refers to the individual to whom the exception applies as a "defendant," the same sentence states that the defendant in question is one involved at the "investigation and prosecution" stage of a sex crime (see, Mem of Senator Stafford, 1979 NY Legis Ann, at 383). The memorandum does not address the statute's application in a post-conviction setting. In any event, given that a CPL 440 movant is sometimes referred to as a defendant whereas a habeas corpus petitioner typically is not, it is far from clear that the term "defendant" would adequately cover all convicted persons seeking documents for collateral review of their convictions.

Reading the sponsor's memorandum further, the sole justification given for providing the exception in section 50- b(2)(a) is to "[protect] the rights of the accused to confront witnesses against him" (id.). Because the constitutionally guaranteed right of confrontation was the sole reason given by the Legislature for access under section 50-b(2)(a), we may not now read that provision to provide identical rights in the context of CPL 440 motions and federal habeas corpus review, which are not of constitutional dimension (see, People v Gersewitz, 294 NY 163; 28 USC § 2254). While post-conviction litigants might consider their need for documents as compelling as those of defendants facing trial, such a fundamental change to the scope of the statute lies within the purview of the Legislature (Raritan Development Corp. v Silva, , 91 NY2d 98, 107).

Nor does the fact that petitioners already know the identity of their victims provide a basis for disclosure. The original goal of Civil Rights Law § 50-b, which is to protect the privacy of sex crime victims, cannot be negated by a litigant's assertion that he knows the identity of the victim (see, John P. v Whalen, , 52 NY2d 89; Newsday Inc. v Sise, , 71 NY2d 146). As we stated in Matter of John P., "the status of one who seeks access to records under the Freedom of Information Law is as a member of the public" (52 2 89, 99). Thus, we conclude that the petitioners do not fit within the exception for persons charged in Civil Rights Law § 50-b(2)(a) and must be treated in the same manner as any other person seeking access to these records.[1]

Notwithstanding our holding, we conclude that respondent police departments did not meet their burden of showing that the statutory privilege of Civil Rights Law § 50-b applies to all of the records that petitioners seek (Gould v NYC Police Dept., , 89 NY2d 267). Although Civil Rights Law § 50-b shields documents containing information that tends to identify the victim of a sex crime, the police departments here made no attempt to show that each requested document contained identifying information. While Civil Rights Law § 50-c mandates caution by imposing civil liability upon governmental entities that disclose the identity of a sex crime victim in violation of section 50-b, that fact does not justify a blanket denial of a request for any documents relating to a sex crime. If a requested document does not contain information that tends to identify the victim of a sex crime, and the FOIL request is otherwise valid, the document must be disclosed. In those cases where there is a legitimate dispute as to whether the information contained in any given document tends to identify the victim, the police still bear the burden of making a particularized showing as to why it should not be disclosed (see, Fink v Lefkowitz, , 47 NY2d 567, 571).

Finally, Cesar Stapleton's petition should be dismissed. In an affirmation Stapleton conceded that he had received "most" of the documents he requested from the New York City Police Department by means of another, contemporaneous FOIL request to the District Attorney's Office. In his CPLR article 78 proceeding, Stapleton sought primarily to compel disclosure of "serial numbers" or "lot numbers" of photographs introduced into evidence at his criminal trial. However, Stapleton did not request either serial numbers or lot numbers of photographs in his FOIL request to the NYPD. Stapleton received the documents requested in the subject NYPD FOIL request from the District Attorney's Office. Thus, the relief sought here is academic. The lot numbers requested are not here discoverable since they were not originally requested from the police (Moore v Santucci, 151 AD2d 677).

Accordingly, in Stapleton, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, without costs, and the petition dismissed. In Fappiano and Doyen, the orders of the Appellate Division should be reversed, without costs, and the matters remitted to Supreme Court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. In Fappiano, the certified question need not be answered as it is unnecessary, and in Doyen, it should be answered in the affirmative.