In Brown, State and local law enforcement officials investigating a reported knifepoint attack allegedly engaged in racially motivated interrogations, citywide, of nonwhite males in violation of their State constitutional rights; none of the plaintiffs was charged with a crime. As we noted in Brown, implying a damage remedy was not only consistent with the purposes of the Search and Seizure and Equal Protection Clauses that had allegedly been violated but also, in that case, "necessary and appropriate to ensure the full realization of the rights they state" (id., at 189; see generally, Gail Donoghue & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Life After Brown: The Future of State Constitutional Tort Actions in New York, 42 NYL Sch L Rev 447 [1998]).

The remedy recognized in Brown addresses two interests: the private interest that citizens harmed by constitutional violations have an avenue of redress, and the public interest that future violations be deterred. In Brown itself, neither declaratory nor injunctive relief was available to the plaintiffs, nor -- without a prosecution -- could there be suppression of illegally obtained evidence. For those plaintiffs it was damages or nothing. We made clear, however, that the tort remedy is not boundless. Claimants must establish grounds that entitle them to a damages remedy, in addition to proving that their constitutional rights have been violated.

Recognition of a constitutional tort claim here is neither necessary to effectuate the purposes of the State constitutional protections plaintiff invokes, nor appropriate to ensure full realization of her rights. Without question, the cost to society of exclusion of evidence and consequent reversal of plaintiff's conviction notwithstanding proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt will serve the public interest of promoting greater care in seeking search warrants. Unlike in Brown, the deterrence objective can be satisfied here by exclusion of the constitutionally challenged evidence.

Moreover, plaintiff fails to demonstrate how money damages are appropriate to ensure full realization of her asserted constitutional rights. Even after years of discovery, plaintiff has not distinguished her case from that of any criminal defendant who has been granted suppression, or reversal of a conviction, based on technical error at the trial level. Plaintiff has shown no grounds that would entitle her to a damage remedy in addition to the substantial benefit she already has received from dismissal of the indictment and release from incarceration.

Having concluded that plaintiff does not assert a cognizable tort claim, and that summary judgment was correctly granted dismissing this claim, we need not separately consider whether individual police officers, or a city, may be protected by qualified or absolute immunity from such claims.

The courts below also correctly awarded summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's malicious prosecution cause of action.

To obtain recovery for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must establish that a criminal proceeding was commenced, that it was terminated in favor of the accused, that it lacked probable cause, and that the proceeding was brought out of actual malice (Broughton v State of New York, , 37 NY2d 451, 457, cert denied sub nom. Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929 [1975]). Without reaching the remaining grounds, plaintiff's cause of action must fail if only because the criminal proceeding was not terminated in her favor.

A criminal defendant has not obtained a favorable termination of a criminal proceeding where the outcome is inconsistent with the innocence of the accused. While a plaintiff need not prove actual innocence in order to satisfy the favorable termination prong of a malicious prosecution action (Smith-Hunter v Harvey, , 95 NY2d 191, 199 [2000]), the absence of a conviction is not itself a favorable termination. A termination is not favorable, for example, where a prosecution ends because of a compromise with the accused, or where the accused's own misconduct frustrates the prosecution's ability to proceed with the case (see, e.g., Cantalino v Danner, , 96 NY2d 391, 395 [2001]). Plaintiff's felony conviction was reversed not because of her lack of culpability -- indeed, her guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt -- but because the evidence that formed the basis for her conviction was obtained pursuant to a faulty search warrant. There is plainly no favorable termination here for purposes of malicious prosecution.

Finally, we agree with the courts below that plaintiff's false imprisonment claim cannot survive summary judgment. A plaintiff asserting a common-law claim for false imprisonment must establish that the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff, that the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement and did not consent to the confinement, and that the confinement was not otherwise privileged. The existence of probable cause serves as a legal justification for the arrest and an affirmative defense to the claim (Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d, at 458).[2] Here, the officers' prior identification of the searched premises as a suspected drug distribution point, the cocaine obtained from the informant, the informant's recorded telephone call to plaintiff, discovery of cocaine and mail addressed to plaintiff at the searched premises, and plaintiff's admission during the search that she lived at that address provided probable cause for her arrest. The facts of this case do not compel recognition of a false imprisonment claim notwithstanding the ample showing of probable cause for the arrest.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.