SMITH, J.:

The issue before this Court is whether a laborer injured while performing a two-year safety test on an elevator can recover under Labor Law § 241(6). Because the protections of Labor Law § 241(6) do not apply to claims arising out of maintenance of a building or structure outside of the construction context, such claims must fail.

Bruce Nagel was standing on top of an elevator, performing a two-year safety inspection, when he slipped on oil and fell, injuring his right shoulder. Nagel, and wife derivatively, brought an action against D&R Realty Corporation, the owner of the building, alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1) and 241(6). Specifically, the Nagels alleged that D&R failed to comply with Rule 23-1.7 (d)[1] of the Industrial Code. D&R answered and subsequently moved for summary judgment dismissal of the complaint.

The Nagels withdrew their claims pursuant to Labor Law §§ 200 and 240(1) and opposed the motion. They submitted Bruce Nagel's deposition testimony wherein he averred that he had been performing an inspection to "make sure that the saf[e]ties work[ed] properly on the elevator." He explained that in layperson's terms, he was making sure that the "brakes" on the elevator worked. He testified that the entire process took about two hours and that he had been working approximately one and one- half hours when the accident occurred.

Supreme Court granted D&R's summary judgment motion and dismissed the complaint, reasoning that the Nagels had no cause of action because Nagel was performing routine maintenance work that was not construction, demolition or excavation within the meaning of Labor Law § 241(6). The Appellate Division affirmed, reasoning that although some maintenance work could be considered construction, it could only be so considered where significant structural work rather than routine maintenance was involved. This Court granted leave, and we now affirm, but on a different ground.

On this appeal, the Nagels argue that Bruce Nagel's injury is a construction injury within the meaning of Labor Law § 241(6) because that statute specifically incorporates rules promulgated by the Board of Standards and Appeals. The Nagels argue that Rule 23-1.4(b)(13) of the Industrial Code defines construction work to include maintenance work, and neither the statute nor the rules distinguish between routine and non-routine maintenance.

D&R counters that routine maintenance is not a protected activity within the meaning of Labor Law § 6).

Section 241 of the Labor Law, entitled "Construction, excavation and demolition work," provides:

"All contractors and owners and their agents, * * * when constructing or demolishing buildings or doing any excavating in connection therewith, shall comply with the following requirements: * * *

"(6) All areas in which construction, excavation or demolition work is being performed shall be so constructed, shored, equipped, guarded, arranged, operated and conducted as to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety to the persons employed therein or lawfully frequenting such places."

That the statute is meant to protect workers engaged in duties connected to the inherently hazardous work of construction, excavation or demolition is confirmed not only by its title but also by review of the statute's legislative history. "Prior to 1962, section 241 * * * [contained] seven subdivisions, the first five of which contained specific, positive commands to all contractors and owners to provide protection deemed appropriate by the Legislature * * *. This nondelegable duty was made designedly broad to reach those who were thought to have the over-all responsibility for the construction of a building which the Legislature deemed a particular employment inherently hazardous, irrespective of fault and despite lack of control" (Allen v Cloutier Constr. Corp., , 44 NY2d 290, 297-298 [1978] [citations and quotations omitted]; see L 1909, ch 36, § 20, as amd by L 1911, ch 693; L 1913, ch 492; L 1919, 545, § 2). Subdivisions six and seven were rule-making in nature, and provided that the Board of Standards and Appeals might make rules for the protection of workers.

In 1962, the Legislature also sought to protect "construction workers not specifically covered by existing standards" (see Senate Introducer Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 1962, ch 450, at 17). The bill's introductory memorandum acknowledged that “Section 241 of the Labor Law is repealed and under a new Section 241 safety standards will apply to excavation workers even though the excavation work is not in connection with a building or structure. The detailed safety provisions which are now in section 241 are eliminated so as to permit the Board of Standards and Appeals greater flexibility in issuing Industrial Code Rules.” It therefore amended section 241, substituting in place of the prior seven subdivisions -- one paragraph setting forth only general duties of owners, general contractors and subcontractors, who must provide "reasonable and adequate protection and safety to the persons employed or lawfully frequenting such places." This paragraph corresponds to section six of the present statute.

The resulting statute, however, was devoid of specific directions imposing absolute liability and, thus, violation of the statute was merely some evidence of negligence (see Allen v Cloutier, 44 NY2d at 299). In effect, violation of the statute was merely breach of the common-law duty of an owner or general contractor to provide a safe place to work on the construction site (see Iuliani v Great Neck Sewer Dist., , 38 NY2d 885, 886 [1976]; Rusin v Jackson Hgts. Shopping Ctr., Inc., , 27 NY2d 103, 106 [1970]). "It soon became all too evident that the intent of the Legislature -- to give the work[er] in the hazardous employment of construction, demolition and excavation added protection, other than work[ers'] compensation, in the form of nondelegable duties cast upon the owner and general contractor with ensuing liability for breach of those duties -- was being circumvented under the 1962 version of section 241 by its requirement of control. Owners and contractors were able to insulate themselves from liability for injuries caused by dangerous and unlawful conditions on the job site * * *" (Allen v Cloutier 44 NY2d at 299).

Accordingly, in 1969, the Legislature again amended section 241 to restore the detailed provisions of section 241 that existed before the 1962 amendment. This was accomplished by enacting the prefatory paragraph _- which remains in the present statute -- and by deleting subcontractors from the scope of the statute and restoring former subdivisions one through five, which the 1962 amendment had excised (see L 1969, ch 1108, § 3). Subdivisions seven and eight of the 1969 amendment authorized the Board to promulgate rules and regulations for the protection of workers, a grant of authority identical to that contained in subdivisions six and seven as they had existed prior to 1962 (see Allen v Cloutier, 44 NY2d at 300).

That the Legislature sought to protect workers from industrial accidents specifically in connection with construction, demolition or excavation work is, therefore, patent. In the present case, Nagel's work of performing a two- year elevator test constituted maintenance work that was not connected to construction, demolition or excavation of a building or structure and is therefore not within the statute's coverage.