The negligent placement claim is premised on an allegation in the complaint that the County "failed to * * * prepare adequate home evaluations," which were relied upon by the court in placing Jarrett with his aunt. The home study contains no specific recommendation, however, and did not effectuate the placement. Rather, placement was court-ordered after all parties, including plaintiff's attorney and Jarrett's law guardian, agreed. Thus, despite prior characterization of the claim at issue here as one of negligent placement, it can only be depicted as one premised on a faulty home evaluation by the DSS caseworker.

The County asserts that plaintiff's claim should fail because the court, not the County, placed Jarrett, and because the court-ordered home study evaluation is cloaked in judicial immunity. According to the County, the caseworker's acts were essential to the judicial decision-making process and the caseworker functioned as an "arm of the court." Thus, the County asserts that, like the Family Court, it is immune from suit based on its having performed the court-ordered home study. Under these circumstances, we agree. "Courts have recognized that it is imperative to the nature of the judicial function that Judges be free to make decisions without fear of retribution through accusations of malicious wrongdoing" (Tarter v State, , 68 NY2d 511, 518 1986]; see also Antoine v Byers & Anderson, 508 US 429, 435 1993]) . Judicial immunity discourages inappropriate collateral attacks on court rulings and fosters judicial independence by protecting courts and judges from vexatious litigation. Indeed, "[m]ost judicial mistakes or wrongs are open to correction through ordinary mechanisms of review, which are largely free of the harmful side-effects inevitably associated with exposing judges to personal liability" (Forrester v White, 484 US 219, 227 [1988]). Allowing members of the judiciary to exercise independent judgment, without the threat of legal reprisal, is "critical to our judicial system" (Tarter, 68 NY2d at 518).

Recognizing the distinct nature of the judicial process, " judicial immunity protects Judges only in the performance of their judicial functions" (id.). A logical extension of this premise is that "other neutrally positioned government officials, regardless of title, who are delegated judicial or quasi-judicial functions should also not be shackled with the fear of civil retribution for their acts" (id.). "[T]he common law provide[s] absolute immunity from subsequent damages liability for all persons -- governmental or otherwise -- who [a]re integral parts of the judicial process" (Briscoe v LaHue, 460 US 325, 335 [1983]; see also Prosser and Keeton, Torts § 132, at 1508 [5^th ed] ["judicial immunity has been extended to * * * adjuncts in the judicial process"]). Notably, this extension of judicial immunity to those whose actions are an integral part of the judicial process is limited. It is circumscribed to claims arising from the performance of the specific judicially delegated function.

In this case the Family Court, whose order placed Jarrett in Mosher's custody, is immune from a claim of negligent placement; the placement was undeniably the execution of a judicial function. In fact, plaintiff makes no attempt to raise such a claim. It follows then that the antecedent fact-gathering process necessary for the court to reach this placement decision also must be cloaked with judicial immunity. The court-ordered DSS home study was an integral part of the judicial decision- making process. The caseworker gathered and reported pertinent information to assist the court in determining an appropriate place for Jarrett to live. The information necessary for the placement decision was available only by way of evaluations that would be impracticable for the court to perform itself.

Indeed, the Social Services Law recognizes the important role played by caseworkers in gathering information on behalf of the Family Court (see Social Services Law § 424[12] ["Each child protective service shall * * * assist the family court or criminal court during all stages of the court proceeding in accordance with this title and the family court act"]). Thus, the caseworker functioned as an extension of the court and was acting within the scope of the court's order when he completed the study. The County is therefore entitled to judicial immunity.[4] In a slightly different context, one court has noted that "to permit a [DSS caseworker] to become a 'lightning rod for harassing litigation aimed at judicial orders' would seriously imperil the effectiveness of state child protection schemes" (Coverdell v Department of Social & Health Servs., 834 F2d 758, 765 [9^th Cir 1987]). Similar concerns inform our decision here.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.

Footnotes

1   Plaintiff's attorney specifically noted that she agreed with the stipulation, provided she could re-petition the court for expanded visitation after receiving counseling and an evaluation. The law guardian also ratified the stipulation.

2   28 USC 1367(c)(3) provides that "[t]he district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if * * * the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction * * *."

3   Without opposition from the County, the court also granted plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint to withdraw the causes of action brought by her individually.

4   In light of this determination, we need not address whether the County also had a defense to liability for allegations of an inadequate home study evaluation or negligent placement on a theory of governmental immunity (see Haddock v City of New York, , 75 NY2d 478, 484 [1990]; Tango v Tulevech, , 61 NY2d 34, 40-42 [1983]; but see Barnes v County of Nassau, 108 AD2d 50 [2d Dept 1985]).