1 No. 147
Excess Insurance Company Ltd.,
et al.,
Respondents, v. Factory Mutual Insurance Company,
&c.,
Appellant.
2004 NY Int. 142
December 2, 2004
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
Bernard London, for appellant. Richard A. Walker, for respondents.
G. B. SMITH, J.:
The issue presented by this appeal is whether
respondents' obligation to pay sums for certain loss adjustment
expenses arising from a "follow the settlements" clause is
subject to the indemnification limit stated in a reinsurance
policy. Like the Appellate Division, we conclude that it is, and
therefore affirm the order of the Appellate Division. In December 1990, appellant Factory Mutual Insurance
Company (formerly known as Allendale Mutual Insurance Company)
entered into an agreement with Bull Data Systems Inc. to provide
property insurance with an indemnification limit of $48 million.
Specifically, the policy covered against the risk of loss or
damage to Bull Data's personal computer inventory stored in a
warehouse located in Seclin, France. In turn, Factory Mutual
obtained facultative reinsurance[1]
from various London reinsurers
which have severally subscribed to the reinsurance agreement at
issue in this litigation. The reinsurance policy states, in
pertinent part:
REASSURED:ALLENDALE INSURANCE COMPANY
ASSURED:BULL DATA CORPORATION and/or as
original. PERIOD:Twelve months at 1st June,
1991 and/or as original. Both
days inclusive. LOCATIONS:Bull Data Corporation, Seclin,
France as original
INTEREST:Goods and/or Merchandise
incidental to the Assured's
business consisting
principally of personal
computers and/or as original. LIMIT:US $ 7,000,000 any one
occurrence p/o US $ 13,500,000
any one occurrence excess of
US $ 25,000,000 any one
occurrence. CONDITIONS:As original and subject to
same valuation, clauses and
conditions as contained in the
original policy or policies
but only to cover risks of All
Risks of Physical Loss or
Damage but excluding Inventory
Shortage. Including Strikes,
Riots, Civil Commotions and
Malicious Damage risks if and
as original. Premium payable
as in original. Reinsurers
agree to follow the
settlements of the Reassured
in all respects and to bear
their proportion of any
expenses incurred, whether
legal or otherwise, in the
investigation and defence of
any claim hereunder. Service
of Suit Clause (U.S.A.).
Insolvency Clause. In June of 1991, a fire that generated a spate of
litigation, in the United States and abroad, destroyed the
warehouse. Bull Data presented a claim to Factory Mutual and,
suspecting that the fire was the result of arson, Factory Mutual
refused to satisfy it. Bull Data brought suit in the courts of France to
recover under its insurance policy. Factory Mutual also
commenced an unsuccessful litigation against Bull Data in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, claiming that the loss was due to arson, and the limit
of liability under the insurance policy was $48 million. After
incurring approximately $35 million in litigation expenses, both
lawsuits were terminated and Factory Mutual settled the claims
with Bull Data for nearly $100 million. Factory Mutual thereafter sought payment from
respondent-reinsurers. The reinsurers refused payment and filed
an action in the courts of England seeking a declaration that the
reinsurance contract was invalid. The English courts dismissed
the case for lack of jurisdiction. During that period, Factory
Mutual commenced a declaratory judgment action in the United
States District Court for the District of Rhode Island seeking $7
million from the reinsurers and an additional $5 million in loss
adjustment expenses, allegedly the proportionate share of
expenses that the reinsurers owed Factory Mutual for having
defended the Bull Data claim. Factory Mutual later discontinued
the action upon stipulation and commenced a similar action in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York. District Judge Shira A. Scheindlin granted partial
summary judgment to the reinsurers and dismissed Factory Mutual's
claim for loss adjustment expenses ( Allendale Mutual Ins. Co. v
Excess Ins. Co. Ltd., 970 F Supp 265 [SDNY 1997], modified
following motion for reargument, 992 F Supp 271 [SDNY 1997]).
During the pendency of Factory Mutual's appeal to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, that court
decided an unrelated case which affected the subject matter
jurisdiction of the pending case, resulting in dismissal of the
appeal and vacatur of the judgment of the District Court ( Allendale Mutual Ins. Co. v Excess Ins. Co. Ltd., 62 F Supp 2d
1116 [SDNY 1999]). The reinsurers thereafter commenced this declaratory
judgment action in Supreme Court, New York County, seeking to
annul the reinsurance agreement based on material nondisclosures
and misrepresentations or, in the alternative, a judgment
awarding damages.[2]
Factory Mutual interposed a counterclaim,
seeking the $7 million indemnification limit under the
reinsurance policy as well as $5 million in loss adjustment
expenses incurred by Factory Mutual in the litigation of the
original claim with Bull Data. Both Factory Mutual and the
reinsurers moved for partial summary judgment on Factory Mutual's
counterclaims seeking loss adjustment expenses in excess of the
amount stated in the indemnification limit. Supreme Court denied
the reinsurers' motion, granted Factory Mutual's cross-motion and
declared that the reinsurers' obligation to pay their
proportionate share of the loss adjustment expenses was not
subject to the stated indemnity limit of $7 million.
The Appellate Division reversed by granting the
reinsurers' motion and denying Factory Mutual's cross-motion.
The court thus declared that any portion of the loss adjustment
expenses that the reinsurers were obligated to bear was subject
to the $7 million limit stated in the reinsurance policy. The
Appellate Division granted Factory Mutual leave to appeal to this
Court. We now affirm the order of the Appellate Division. In resolving the issue before us, we are mindful that
in interpreting reinsurance agreements, as with all contracts,
the intention of the parties should control. To discern the
parties' intentions, the court should construe the agreements so
as to give full meaning and effect to the material provisions
( see Breed v Insurance Co. of North America, , 46 NY2d 351, 355
[1978]; see also Greenfield v Phillies Records, Inc., , 98 NY2d 562, 569 [2002]; Slatt v Slatt, , 64 NY2d 966, 967 [1985]). Here, there is no dispute that the reinsurance
agreements set the policy limit at $7 million per occurrence. The
so-called "follow the settlements" clause is thereafter set forth
in the section of the policy entitled "Conditions."[3]
As provided
in the agreement, the clause requires the reinsurers to pay their
portion of expenses incurred in the investigation and defense of
any claim under the agreement. The reinsurers, however, contend
that their liability to pay is subject to the $7 million cap
negotiated under the policy. By contrast, Factory Mutual argues
that the reinsurers' liability to pay the defense expenses are
separate and apart from the indemnification cap on the policy. We agree with the reinsurers and hold that they cannot
be required to pay loss adjustment expenses in excess of the
stated limit in the reinsurance policy. Once the reinsurers have
paid the maximum amount stated in the policy, they have no
further obligation to pay Factory Mutual any costs related to
loss adjustment expenses. In so holding, we follow the decisions
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit as
expressed in Bellefonte Reinsurance Co. v Aetna Cas. and Surety
Co. (903 F2d 910 [2d Cir 1990]) and Unigard Security Ins. Co.,
Inc. v North River Ins. Co. (4 F3d 1049). In both cases, the
ceding insurers claimed that a similar "follow the fortunes"
clause required the reinsurers to reimburse litigation costs
beyond the stated limit in the policy. The court in both cases
concluded that such a reading of the policy would render
meaningless the liability cap negotiated in the policy.
According to the Bellefonte court, to "allow[] the 'follow the
fortunes' clause to override the limitation on liability -- would
strip the limitation clause and other conditions of all meaning;
the reinsurer would be obliged merely to reimburse the insurer
for any and all funds paid. * * * The 'follow the fortunes'
clauses in the certificates are structured so that they coexist
with, rather than supplant, the liability cap. To construe the
certificates otherwise would effectively eliminate the limitation
on the reinsurers' liability to the stated amounts" (903 F2d at
913). Likewise here, the parties negotiated an indemnity
limit of $7 million per occurrence. Thus, any obligation on the
part of the reinsurers to reimburse Factory Mutual, whether it be
for settling the original insurance claim with Bull Data or for
the loss adjustment expenses incurred in the protracted
litigation that ensued, must be capped by the negotiated limit
under the policy. Otherwise, the reinsurers would be subject to
limitless liability. Indeed, this case well illustrates such an
injustice as Factory Mutual now seeks to saddle the reinsurers
with a portion of a litigation bill that exceeds the negotiated
policy limit by more than 70%.[4]
To permit such a result would
render the liability cap a nullity. Factory Mutual asserts that this case is
distinguishable from Bellefonte and Unigard in that those cases
involved liability insurance while this case involves property
insurance. According to Factory Mutual, a liability insurance
product normally encompasses the obligation to pay the legal
defense costs on behalf of the insured as well as the cost of the
loss itself. Thus, the risk to be spread in reinsurance would
already include loss adjustment expenses. However, a property
insurance product would cover only the value of the property item
to be insured. Under those circumstances, Factory Mutual
contends, an insurer would have no contractual obligation to
incur investigation or litigation costs and the risk of those
costs is not already included in the reinsurance product. We
find this argument unpersuasive and conclude that this
distinction does not provide a sufficient basis to extend the
reinsurers' liability beyond the limit stated in the reinsurance
policy. The limit clause in the policy is intended to cap the
reinsurers' total risk exposure. Although Judge Scheindlin's
decision in Allendale was vacated and is not binding, we find her
reasoning persuasive, "Whether [the reinsurers] reimburse
[Factory Mutual] for claims for property losses or defense costs
makes no difference to them. Reinsurers of property insurance
policies have the same interest in controlling their maximum
exposure as do reinsurers of liability insurance policies. Thus,
Bellefonte and Unigard's holdings that the limit clauses define
the reinsurers' bargained-for maximum exposure to liability
inclusive of all costs and expenses are applicable even where the
underlying insurance policy does not oblige the insurer to cover
the insured's defense costs" (992 F Supp at 277). Of course, both parties were well aware of the type of
product that was being reinsured. It would be far from
unreasonable to expect that at the time of procuring reinsurance,
Factory Mutual could anticipate the possibility of incurring loss
adjustment expenses in settling a claim from Bull Data.
Certainly, nothing prevented Factory Mutual from insuring that
risk either by expressly stating that the defense costs were
excluded from the indemnification limit or otherwise negotiating
an additional limit for loss adjustment expenses that would have
been separate and apart from the reinsurers' liability on the
insured property. Failing this, the reinsurers were entitled to
rely on the policy limit as setting their maximum risk exposure. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division
should be affirmed, with costs, and the certified question
answered in the affirmative.
Excess Ins. Co. v Factory Mutual Ins. Co.
No. 147
READ, J. (DISSENTING):
I see no way to tell from the plain language of this
certificate whether the parties intended for costs and expenses
to be included in the reinsurance limit or excluded from it.
Further, in my view the majority has misinterpreted Bellefonte
Reins. Co. v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (903 F2d 910 [2d Cir 1990]) in
ways that augur further expansion of its much debated holding.
Accordingly, I dissent.
I.
The certificate pertains to reinsurance of a
$13,500,000 layer ($25,000,000 to $38,500,000) of a $48,000,000
property insurance policy issued by Factory Mutual. Two
provisions are at issue. The first provides that the "limit" is
"US$7,000,000 any one occurrence part of US$13,500,000 any one
occurrence excess of US$25,000,000 any one occurrence."[5]
The
second notes several "conditions," including one whereby the
certificate is made "subject to the same valuation, clauses and
conditions as contained in the original policy" (a "following
form" provision) and one whereby "reinsurers agree . . . to bear
their proportion of any expenses incurred" (a "follow the
settlements" provision). In essence, the majority concludes that the only
reasonable interpretation of these provisions is that the policy
contains a $7,000,000 limit (any one occurrence) which is cost-
inclusive. This conclusion rests too heavily on the "follow the
settlements" provision of the certificate, and fails to consider
the "following form" provision. An equally plausible reading is
that the parties, who "conditioned"[6]
the certificate on the same
"valuation, clauses and conditions" as exist in the primary
property policy -- where costs are commonly paid in addition to
the policy limit[7]
-- could have intended to create a cost-
exclusive reinsurance limit. Moreover, the parties did not
expressly state that the limit was "subject to" the conditions
and therefore capped all liability under the certificate ( see e.g. Bellefonte). Because the certificate may reasonably be
interpreted in either of two ways, I conclude that it is
ambiguous ( see Evans v Famous Music Corp., 1 NY3d 452 [2004]).[8]Moreover, I disagree with the majority's apparent
reading of Bellefonte. In Bellefonte, Aetna issued primary and
excess liability policies to A.H. Robins Co., the manufacturer of
the Dalkon Shield. Aetna reinsured the excess policies with
various reinsurers. After an "explosion" of litigation over the
device, Aetna and Robins disputed the extent of Aetna's liability
for defense expenses under the excess policies, and ultimately
reached a monetary settlement in excess of the limit stated in
the excess policy. Aetna then looked to the reinsurers for the
excess paid on the underlying policy. The reinsurers refused to
pay, arguing that their liability was limited by the reinsurance
certificate. The certificate stated that the reinsurance was
provided "subject to the . . . amount of liability set forth
herein" (903 F2d at 911). The court concluded that this created
a cap on the reinsurers' liability whether reached through
payment of expenses or settlement of claims. The Second Circuit
reasoned that "[a]ny other construction of the reinsurance
certificates would negate" the "subject to" provision of the
certificate ( id. at 914; see also Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v North
Riv. Ins. Co., 4 F3d 1049 [2d Cir 1993] [following Bellefonte as
certificate included same "subject to" language]). The Bellefonte Court also considered and rejected a
second argument made by Aetna, which the Appellate Division
applied below (2 AD3d 150 [1st Dept 2003]) and the majority now
adopts. Aetna argued that the "follow the fortunes" doctrine, as
embodied in a clause in the certificate,[9]
obligated the
reinsurers to pay all Aetna's settlements even if they were in
excess of the liability limit in the reinsurance policy. The
Bellefonte court rebuffed this argument, noting that "[t]he
'follow the fortunes' clauses in the certificates are structured
so that they coexist with, rather than supplant, the liability
cap. To construe the certificates otherwise would effectively
eliminate the limitation on the reinsurers' liability to the
stated amounts" ( id. at 913 [emphasis added]). Critically, this
prong of the court's analysis was based on its conclusion that
the certificate created a cap on liability through the "subject
to" and the "limitation" clauses, and that "the 'follow the
fortunes' doctrine does not allow Aetna to recover defense costs
beyond the express cap stated in the certificates" ( id.). The Appellate Division disregarded the "subject to"
analysis in Bellefonte, as does the majority, summarily
concluding that "all contracts are subject to their terms and
conditions" (2 AD3d at 152). Instead, the Appellate Division
relied on Bellefonte's "follow the fortunes" analysis, and
concluded that the "overriding determination in Bellefonte and
Unigard was that the 'follow the fortunes' clauses of the
reinsurance contracts considered there coexisted with, and did
not supplant, the contract limitations" ( id.). In my view, this
was error. Bellefonte's holding was not intended as a general rule
applicable to any and all reinsurance certificates ( see
Goldstein, Bellefonte Lives, 8-10 Mealey's Litig. Rep.
Reinsurance 9 [1997] [noting that Bellefonte should have been
limited to "the specific contract language" in the certificate]).
The holding relies on specific certificate language -- "the first
two provisions of the reinsurance certificates" (903 F2d at 913)
-- which the court determined contained a "cap" on the
reinsurers' liability. Because the certificate had a cap, the
"follow the fortunes" clause in the certificate could not
supplant the cap, which therefore limited expenses.[10]The Appellate Division and now the majority have
converted a rule unique to the specific certificate language in
Bellefonte into a general principle that a "follow the fortunes"
clause never supplants a policy limit. Thus, the majority, like
the Appellate Division before it, expands Bellefonte from a
contract-specific holding into a rule of general applicability. When the holding of Bellefonte -- that the reinsurance
certificate's specific policy language controls whether costs are
included or excluded from the limit -- is applied here, it is
easily distinguished. There is no "subject to" language in the
reinsurance certificate at issue on this appeal. Rather, the
certificate contains two discrete provisions -- "limit" and
"conditions" -- and neither offers any guidance as to whether the
"conditions" are subject to the "limit."
Further, it is worth observing that practitioners in
the reinsurance industry have consistently criticized Bellefonte.
Specifically, commentators have noted that in ruling "based
solely on a textual interpretation of the language of the
certificates," the Bellefonte Court ignored important extrinsic
evidence of industry custom and practice showing that the nature
of the underlying policy often controlled whether the reinsurance
limit was cost-inclusive or cost-exclusive ( see Goldstein,
Bellefonte Lives ["[n]otwithstanding Bellefonte . . . the
industry for the most part has continued to follow the custom and
practice of reinsurers providing coverage for expenses in
addition to limits where the reinsured policy also covers
expenses in addition to limits"]). There was a fear "that the
Bellefonte rule would be applied to the same certificate language
but where the reinsured policy covered defense costs in addition
to limits" ( id.). When Unigard was decided, this fear was realized.
There, the certificate language was nearly identical to that in
Bellefonte. The Second Circuit rejected extrinsic evidence that
the reinsurers covered expenses in addition to the policy limit,
instead choosing to rely on its holding in Bellefonte and the
similar certificate language (4 F3d at 1071). Commentators have similarly faulted Allendale Mut. Ins.
Co. v Excess Ins. Co. Ltd. (992 F Supp 278 [SDNY 1998], rearg
granted, original decision adhered to 992 F Supp 271, vacated by
172 F3d 37 [2d Cir 1999]). The federal district court in
Allendale was the first court to rule on the case now before us,
holding that the plain language of the certificate meant that
expenses were included in the policy limit.[11]
Citing Bellefonte
and Unigard, the court rejected Factory Mutual's request to
distinguish these cases on the basis of the specific certificate
language or the nature of the underlying policies (992 F Supp at
274-275). Allendale was thus judged to be "a significant
extension" of Bellefonte on both fronts ( see Goldstein,
Bellefonte Lives; see also Goldstein, For Whom Does Bellefonte
Toll? It Tolls for Thee, 9-7 Mealey's Litig. Rep. Reinsurance 12
[1998] ["Because Allendale involved reinsurance of a property
policy, rather than a liability policy that provided a defense
for the insured, and because the contract at issue lacked certain
critical language contained in the Bellefonte and Unigard
decisions, Allendale clearly expanded the breadth of the
Bellefonte Rule"]).[12]Today, the majority adopts the Allendale rationale, and
suggests that Factory Mutual should have negotiated language
"expressly stating that the defense costs were excluded from the
indemnification limit," or otherwise setting forth "an additional
limit for loss adjustment expenses that would have been separate
and apart from the reinsurers' liability on the insured property"
(majority op at 10). But Factory Mutual first obtained the
relevant certificate in London in December 1990, about eight
months after the Second Circuit decided Bellefonte. It seems
harsh and unrealistic for us to fault Factory Mutual for not
having drafted this certificate to conform with a recently
decided case whose potential future reach could hardly have been
predicted at the time.
II.
Here, both parties moved for summary judgment, arguing
that the certificate was unambiguous. Although neither party
argued that the certificate was ambiguous, ambiguity is an issue
of law for the courts ( Greenfield, 98 NY2d at 569). Factory
Mutual opposed the reinsurers' motion for summary judgment with
extrinsic evidence of industry custom and practice, and thereby
created a question of fact concerning the parties' intent ( Mallad
Constr. Corp. v County Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., , 32 NY2d 285, 290-
293 [1973]). Our precedent establishes that where there is
ambiguity in a reinsurance certificate, the surrounding
circumstances, including industry custom and practice, should be
taken into consideration ( see London Assurance Corp. v Thompson,
170 NY 94 [1902];[13] see also Christiania General Ins. Corp. v
Great American Ins. Co., 979 F2d 268, 274 [2d Cir 1992] [citing
London Assurance]; Russ & Segalla, Couch on Insurance 3d § 9:15,
at 9-53).
Accordingly, I would modify the order of the Appellate
Division by denying both motions, and remand the matter for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Footnotes
1 "Facultative reinsurance is policy-specific, meaning that
all or a portion of a reinsured's risk under a specific contract
of direct coverage will be indemnified by the reinsurer in the
event of loss" ( Travelers Cas & Sur Co v Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd's of London, , 96 NY2d 583, 587 [2001]).
2 Factory Mutual moved Supreme Court to dismiss the action on
the grounds of forum non conveniens and also commenced an action
in the Superior Court of Providence, Rhode Island. Supreme Court
granted Factory Mutual's motion. While the reinsurers appealed
the order, they sought a preliminary injunction in Supreme Court
to enjoin the Rhode Island proceeding, which that court denied.
While the Rhode Island court was considering Factory Mutual's
motion for partial summary judgment on its claims for loss
adjustment expenses in excess of the indemnification limit, the
Appellate Division reversed the order of Supreme Court,
reinstated the reinsurer's lawsuit and enjoined the Rhode Island
litigation.
3 In the reinsurance industry a "follow the settlements"
clause "refers to the duty to follow the actions of the cedent in
adjusting and settling claims" (Barry R. Ostrager and Thomas R.
Newman, Handbook on Insurance Coverage Disputes, § 16.01[b] at
944 [11th ed. 2002]). Thus, the reinsurers will be bound by the
settlement or compromise agreed to by the cedent unless it can
show impropriety in arriving at the settlement ( id.).
4 Such an outcome would be particularly unfair given that the
"follow the settlements" clause gave the reinsurers no control
over the management of the unsuccessful litigation that Factory
Mutual launched against Bull Data and no voice in limiting the
$35 million litigation expense.
5 Sorema N.A. reinsured the remaining $6,500,000 of the
$13,500,000 layer. Unlike Excess, Sorema paid up to its limit and
also paid its proportion of costs.
6 The word "conditions" is not illuminative. The Restatement of
Contracts defines a condition as "an event, not certain to occur,
which must occur, unless its non-occurrence is excused, before
performance under a contract becomes due." As the comments note, the
term "condition" "is used with a wide variety of other meanings in
legal discourse" (Restatement [Second] of Contracts § 224).
7 The courts below did not determine whether or not this was the
case here.
8 Indeed, the history of this case betokens ambiguity: five
courts have now interpreted the certificate with varying results.
Supreme Court and the Rhode Island Superior Court concluded that the
certificate does not contain a cap and therefore the limit is cost-
exclusive ( see Factory Mutual Insurance Co. v Excess Insurance Co.,
Superior Court, Providence, Rhode Island, May 22, 2001, Hurst, J., PC
00-0760 [litigation enjoined by order of the Appellate Division, First
Department, July 5, 2001]; Excess Insurance Co. v Factory Mutual
Insurance Co., Sup Ct, NY County, August 22, 2002, Moskowitz, J.,
Index No. 605759/99). The majority now joins the Appellate Division
and the United States District Court for the Southern District, which
found that the limit is cost-inclusive ( see 2 AD3d 150 [1st Dept
2003]; Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v Excess Ins. Co. Ltd., 992 F Supp 278
[SDNY 1998], rearg granted, original decision adhered to 992 F Supp
271, vacated by 172 F3d 37 [2d Cir 1999]).
9 The clause provided that "the liability of the Reinsurer . . .
shall follow that of [Aetna]" (903 F2d at 911). These clauses are
generally construed to mean that "the reinsurer follows the insurer's
fortunes under the latter's insurance policies, subject to the stated
exclusions and limitations in the reinsurance agreement . . . .
Without such a concept -- and on occasion even with it -- the
reinsurer could successfully assert a defense to a claim under the
reinsurance agreement, that was not asserted by the insurer with
respect to the insurance claim, leaving the insurer with an
unidentified liability" (Staring, Law of Reinsurance, § 18:1).
10 Our decision in Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v Certain Underwriters
at Lloyd's of London (96 2 583 [2001]) is not to the contrary.
There, we were asked whether a "follow the fortunes" clause negated an
insurer's obligation to apply the allocation methodology contained in
the reinsurance policy. In rejecting this argument, we agreed with
the "rationale" of the Second Circuit that the follow the fortunes
doctrine "does not alter the terms or override the language of
reinsurance policies" ( id. at 596). Thus, Travelers supports the
proposition that each reinsurance policy must be interpreted according
to its own terms.
11 On reargument, however, the Allendale court acknowledged that
"[i]n a purely semantic sense, the reinsurance Agreement is ambiguous"
(992 F Supp at 276). Nonetheless, the judge concluded that the
certificate was only reasonably interpreted to be cost-inclusive. The
Allendale court (like the majority) seemed concerned that a reinsurer
would otherwise accept open-ended liability for costs (992 F Supp at
276 n 4), and thus appears to have "alter[ed] the contract to reflect
its personal notions of fairness and equity" ( Greenfield v Philles
Records, , 98 NY2d 562 [2002]).
12 Other courts have regarded Bellefonte and Unigard skeptically.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v Philadelphia Reins. Corp. (1995 US Dist LEXIS
4806 [EDPA]) followed Bellefonte, but only because Aetna was a party
in Bellefonte and therefore was collaterally estopped from
relitigating the issue. The court in Philadelphia Reinsurance
preferred the analysis used in Penn Re, Inc. v The Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co. (1987 US Dist LEXIS 15252 [EDNC]). There, the court (deciding the
issue prior to Bellefonte) interpreted a reinsurance policy containing
a "subject to" provision and found that the reinsurer was liable for
costs in addition to the limit of the policy. Bellefonte rejected the
analysis of Penn Re. In North River Ins. Co. v Cigna Reins. Co. (52
F3d 1194 [3d Cir 1995]), the court was faced with a Bellefonte
question, which it avoided by holding that whether the certificate
placed a cap on the policy was not timely raised. In TIG Premier Ins.
Co. v Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. (35 F Supp 2d 348, 350 [SDNY
1999]), the court sidestepped Bellefonte by applying California law,
which allows use of extrinsic evidence to reveal a "latent ambiguity"
in a contract that "appears unambiguous on its face." Accordingly,
the court reviewed extrinsic evidence showing that reinsurers commonly
pay expenses in addition to limits. Finding a genuine issue of fact,
the court denied the motion for summary judgment. In addition,
arbitrators have apparently declined to follow Bellefonte, at least in
some cases ( see Monin and Brady, Reinsurance Disputes: Death of the
Handshake, 61 Def. Couns. J. 529, 538, n 22 [Oct. 1994]; Monin and
Brady, Updating Reinsurance Law Developments: The Gloves are
Beginning to Come Off, 63 Def. Couns. J. 219, 223 [April 1996]; see
also Wilker and Lenci, Much Ado About Nothing: A Response Regarding
Bellefonte's Reach,9-10 Mealey's Litig. Rep. Reinsurance 16 [September
24, 1998] [stating that "arbitration panels, even those sitting in the
Second Circuit, are free to ignore Bellefonte, Unigard and Allandale"
and suggesting that "most properly constituted arbitration panels will
not follow those decisions or any generalized Bellefonte rule unless
it is shown that it was clearly the cedent's and reinsurer's intention
not to cover expenses in addition to the liability limit of the
certificate in question"]).
13 "Reinsurance, like any other contract, depends upon the
intention of the parties, to be gathered from the words used, taking
into account, when the meaning is doubtful, the surrounding
circumstances. Custom or usage is presumed to enter into the intention
when it is found as a fact, not only that it existed, but was uniform,
reasonable and well settled, and either known to the parties when the
contract was made, or so generally known as to raise a presumption
that they had it in mind at the time" (170 NY at 99).