CoCt No. 77
The People &c.,
Appellant, v. Jerry W. Moore,
Respondent.
2005 NY Int. 84
June 7, 2005
This memorandum is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
J. Michael Marion, for appellant. Mary P. Walek, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM:
The order of the County Court should be affirmed.
As relevant here, defendant was charged with criminal
trespass in the third degree ( seePenal Law § 140.10 [a]).
According to the information, defendant entered a public building
located on the campus of the State University of New York at
Buffalo on September 4, 2002. This conduct allegedly violated a
"persona non grata" letter, issued on June 11, 1999 and again on
November 28, 2000 by school officials, barring defendant from the
campus. The supporting deposition describes a verbal exchange
with a university employee. City Court granted defendant's
motion to dismiss the information as jurisdictionally defective
because it did not set forth every element of criminal trespass
in the third degree, and County Court affirmed. A Judge of this
Court granted leave to appeal and we now affirm.[1]
The Penal Law provides that "[a] person is guilty of
criminal trespass in the third degree when he knowingly enters or
remains unlawfully in a building or upon real property (a) which
is fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude
intruders" (Penal Law § 140.10 [a]). Although previous versions
of the statute contained nearly identical language, the "fenced
or otherwise enclosed" requirement was not contained in a
separate subdivision until the statute was amended in 1987 (L
1987, ch 192). Prior to the amendment, the statute had
apparently been interpreted so that knowingly entering or
remaining unlawfully in any building -- fenced or unfenced --
constituted criminal trespass in the third degree, as did
knowingly entering or remaining unlawfully upon real property
which was fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner to exclude
intruders. Under the prior statute, "the building was not
required to be fenced or otherwise enclosed" (Donnino, Practice
Commentary, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law
Article 140, at 13). The plain language of the statute as
amended, however, clearly requires that both buildings and real
property be fenced or otherwise enclosed in order to increase the
level of culpability from trespass ( seePenal Law § 140.05) to
criminal trespass in the third degree. The 1987 amendment thus
narrowed the definition of criminal trespass in the third degree
to require one of several enumerated conditions to be present.
This reading is consistent with the general scheme of
article 140 of the Penal Law. Starting with the violation of
trespass ( seePenal Law § 140.05), the crimes become
progressively more serious as they approach criminal trespass in
the first degree ( seePenal Law § 140.17). Since the violation
of trespass requires only that a person "knowingly enters or
remains unlawfully in or upon premises" (Penal Law § 140.05),
which includes buildings ( seePenal Law § 140.00 [1]), section
140.10 (a) is properly interpreted as requiring the additional
aggravating element that the building or area entered be fenced
or otherwise enclosed in order to exclude intruders to elevate
the crime from a violation to a class B misdemeanor.
The remaining subsections of section 140.10 also
support this interpretation of the statute. If knowingly
entering or remaining unlawfully in any building were sufficient
to establish third-degree criminal trespass, it would be
unnecessary to include the further enumerated aggravating
elements for trespass in particular buildings, such as elementary
and secondary schools or public housing projects ( seePenal Law §
140.10 [b]-[f]), and both trespass and third-degree criminal
trespass would be committed by the identical conduct of knowingly
entering or remaining unlawfully in an unfenced or unenclosed
building.
"[A]n information which fails to contain nonhearsay
allegations establishing 'if true, every element of the offense
charged and the defendant's commission thereof' . . . is fatally
defective" ( People v Alejandro, , 70 NY2d 133, 136 [1987] [internal
citation omitted]). Since the information and supporting
deposition here fail to allege facts establishing that the campus
building defendant entered into was in any way "fenced or
otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders"
(Penal Law § 140.10 [a]) -- a required element of the crime -- it
was insufficient to establish criminal trespass in the third
degree ( see CPL 100.15 [3], 100.40 [1][c]). Thus, the
information was properly dismissed as facially insufficient.
Footnotes
1 As we hold that the information is defective for failure
to specify every element of the crime of criminal trespass in the
third degree, we need not determine whether the "persona non
grata" letter is a lawful order within the meaning of Penal Law §
140.00 (5).