IN THE MATTER OF HON. JOHN F. SKINNER, A JUSTICE OF THE COLUMBIA
TOWN COURT, HERKIMER COUNTY, PETITIONER, FOR REVIEW OF A DETERMINATION
OF STATE COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT, RESPONDENT.
91 N.Y.2d 142, 690 N.E.2d 484, 667 N.Y.S.2d 675 (1997).
December 18, 1997
SCJC No. 260
[97 NY Int. 0231]
DecidedDecember 18, 1997
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication
in the New York Reports.
PER CURIAM:
Disciplinary charges against petitioner, for nearly
40 years a Justice of the Columbia Town Court in Herkimer County, arose
out his handling of two criminal matters, both in late 1994. The first
involved a social acquaintance who had beenaccused of sexual abuse for
reaching into the car window of his newspaper delivery person and touching
her breast. Departing from his customary procedure, petitioner set an arraignment
date without informing the Herkimer County District Attorney. At a hearing,
without the prosecutor or complainant present, petitioner heard testimony
from the accused and his wife and then summarily dismissed the case.
The second matter involved an 18 year old who had
allegedly passed a bad check. When defendant appeared before him, petitioner
asked if he intended to "make good" on the check and defendant answered
in the affirmative. Without apprising him of the right to assigned counsel,
petitioner told him that he would have two weeks to pay the debt and resulting
fines, totaling $335. When defendant returned with all but $50 of the judgment,
petitioner responded that he would not accept installment payments and
sentenced him to 30 days in jail. Defendant's mother later paid the remaining
$50 and he was released.
The Commission on Judicial Conduct found that
petitioner had granted special consideration in the first matter and had
disregarded his obligation to inform defendant of his right to assigned
counsel in the second. In addition, the Commission noted that petitioner
had made "disingenuous and evasive" statements regarding both matters.
Based on its findings, the Commission sustained the two charges againstpetitioner
and determined that he should be removed from office. One member dissented
as to sanction only. He agreed that the charges against petitioner were
serious, but because they were only two improper episodes in an otherwise
long, unblemished judicial career, censure was more appropriate. Petitioner
requested review of the Commission's determination.
Upon our plenary review, we agree with
the Commission that petitioner's behavior in both charged instances constituted
serious misconduct deserving sanction: he improperly displayed favoritism,
and he ignored his duty to advise a defendant of the right to assigned
counsel. Concluding that petitioner committed serious misconduct does not,
however, end our inquiry. We also must determine whether the misconduct
warranted the extreme sanction of removal (see, e.g., Matter
of Cunningham, 57 NY2d 270, 275; Matter of Steinberg, 51 NY2d
74, 83). Removal is excessive where the misconduct amounts solely to poor
judgment, even extremely poor judgment (see, e.g., Matter
of Kiley, 74 NY2d 364, 369 370; Matter of Shilling, 51 NY2d
397, 403).
Several factors here suggest that the
sanction of removal is unduly severe. First, petitioner, now in his seventies,
has for nearly four decades been the elected choice of the voters to hold
the office of Town Justice, with no evidence of any prior complaints regarding
his judicial service (see, Matter of Edwards, 67 NY2d 153,
155 [where Town Justice's 21 year tenure marked by single incident of ticket
fixing, censure ratherthan removal imposed]; cf., Matter of Sardino
v State Commn. on Judicial Conduct, 58 NY2d 286, 289 292 [judge removed
for failing to inform defendants of rights in 62 documented cases]). Second,
there is no indication that petitioner was motivated by personal profit,
vindictiveness or ill will (see, Matter of Lonschein, 50
NY2d 569, 573 [determined sanction excessive given absence of venal or
malevolent purpose]). Finally, we note that the discrepancies in petitioner's
testimony before the Commission did not necessarily reflect dishonesty
or evasiveness (see, Matter of Kiley, 74 NY2d at 370 371,
supra [refusing to accept Commission's finding of lack of candor
while emphasizing that its use as an aggravating element "should be approached
cautiously"]). Thus, we conclude that the two isolated incidents should
under the circumstances result in censure rather than removal from office
(see, by contrast, Matter of Roberts, ___ NY2d ___ [decided
today]).
Accordingly, the determined sanction should be rejected, without costs,
and the sanction of censure imposed.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Determined sanction rejected, without costs, and the sanction of censure
imposed. Opinion Per Curiam. Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Titone, Bellacosa,
Smith, Levine, Ciparick and Wesley concur.