Whether a trial court should charge the jury with the extreme emotional disorder defense, if requested by a defendant following a confession revealing the defendant's psychological background and circumstances of the crime.

Yes. The jury should be charged with the extreme emotional disturbance defense if a defendant proves the required subjective state of mind at the time of the crime and the objective reasonableness of his actions.

Defendant confessed to killing a long-time friend in response to the friend's crude boasting that he could engage in an amorous relationship with Defendant's girlfriend. As an affirmative defense, Defendant argued that he was suffering from an "extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse" Penal Law § 125.25(1)(a).

The trial court found the evidence of "extreme emotional disturbance" insufficient to submit to the jury as an affirmative defense and convicted Defendant of second degree murder. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial after finding this case analytically indistinguishable from People v. Moye, 66 N.Y. 2d 887 (1985) which allowed the defense.

A defendant is entitled to the defense when he can show that an extreme emotional disturbance influenced his conduct and that the criminal conduct was objectively reasonable for a person in his mental condition. See People v. White, 79 N.Y. 2d 900, at 903 (1992); People v. Casassa, 49 N.Y. 2d 668, at 679 (1980). On similar facts, the Court in Moye permitted the jury to hear the defense following evidence of a loss of control by the defendant which, considered from the defendant's perspective at that time, could have explained his actions. Consistent with Moye, the Court held that due to the defendant's psychological background, the circumstances of the crime, and the statements in his confession, a rational jury could conclude that defendant experienced a severe loss of control that could explain or mitigate his criminal conduct.