1. Whether the three-year Statute of Limitations provided by CPLR 214 (2) for statutory causes of action, rather than the six-year limitations period provided by CPLR 213 (8) for fraud, applies to a cause of action brought under General Business Law § 349.

2. Whether Plaintiffs' actions accrued when they purchased and received their policies, rather than when Defendants, life insurers, demanded additional premium payments beyond the dates by which they led Plaintiffs to believe that premium payments would "vanish."

1. Yes. The three-year Statute of Limitations provided by CPLR 214 (2) applies to actions brought under General Business Law § 349, even though § 349 is "akin to the common-law" cause of action for fraud, because "§ 349 encompasses a significantly wider range of deceptive business practices that were never previously condemned by decisional law."

2. No. Plaintiffs' actions accrued when Defendants demanded additional premium payments beyond the dates by which they led Plaintiffs to believe that premium payments would "vanish."

In 1987, the Gaidon Plaintiffs purchased an insurance policy from Defendant, Guardian Life, upon the assurance of Guardian Life's agents that "after a specified period, 'the policy's dividends would thereafter cover the premium costs.'" In 1995, Guardian Life proceeded to demand premium payments from the Gaidon Plaintiffs after the purported date the premiums were supposed to be offset by dividends. The Gaidon Plaintiffs brought suit in 1996, asserting various claims, including one under General Business Law § 349. In the Supreme Court, and upon appeal to the Appellate Division, First Department, the case was dismissed. The Court of Appeals modified the decision and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for consideration of undecided issues on appeal to that court. The Appellate Division, First Department, reversed the dismissal. The Court rejected Guardian Life's challenge that the action was time-barred, determining that the cause of action accrued at the time the extra payments were demanded, which is within the three years required by CPLR 214 (2). The Appellate Division granted Guardian Life leave to appeal on the certified question: whether the cause of action accrued at the time the extra payments were demanded.

In 1989, the Russo Plaintiffs purchased a similar life insurance policy with a vanishing premium from Defendant, Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company (Mass Mutual). The Russo Plaintiffs commenced a proposed class action in 1996, asserting various claims, including one under General Business Law § 349. The Supreme Court dismissed the § 349 claim, denied class certification, and granted Mass Mutual's motion for summary judgment to dismiss the remaining claims. Plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Division, Third Department, where the court affirmed. The affirmation of the dismissal of the § 349 claim was based upon a time-bar under CPLR 214 (2) because the cause of action accrued at the time the insurance policy was purchased. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to determine which Appellate Division was correct about the time of accrual for a § 349 claim concerning vanishing premium insurance policies.

The Statute of Limitations provided by CPLR 214 (2) applies to statutory causes of action (1) that do not "merely codify or implement . . . existing common-law liability" or (2) that "although akin to common-law causes, would not exist but for the statute." The Court ruled that, because General Business Law § 349 creates a cause of action which "encompasses a significantly wider range of deceptive business practices" than was previously available at common law, CPLR 214 (2) applies to § 349.

The Court determined that under § 349, the cause of action accrues "when plaintiff has been injured by a deceptive act." The date Plaintiffs were injured was "when they were first called upon to pay additional premiums beyond the date by which they were led to believe that policy dividends would be sufficient to cover all premium costs." Therefore, the Court affirmed the First Department and reversed the Third Department's ruling on the § 349 claim.