liibulletin: Shumsky v. Eisenstein

TORT - LEGAL MALPRACTICE - ATTORNEY - CPLR 214(6) - BRIGHT-LINE RULE - CONTINUOUS REPRESENTATION OR TREATMENT DOCTRINE


ISSUE & DISPOSITION

Issue(s)

Whether the continuous representation doctrine tolls the Statute of Limitations in legal malpractice cases, where the continuing representation relates directly to the specific subject matter underlying the malpractice claim.

Disposition

Yes. "[T]he continuous representation doctrine tolls the Statute of Limitations only where the continuous representation pertains specifically to the matter in which the attorney committed the alleged malpractice" and the client was aware that the representation should continue.

SUMMARY

Plaintiffs, David Shumsky and Marjorie Scheiber, retained Defendant, Paul Eisenstein, for the specific purpose of commencing an action against a home inspector. Defendant failed to commence the action before the Statue of Limitations expired in March 1994 and avoided Plaintiffs' inquiries regarding the case's status. In September 1997, Plaintiffs filed a disciplinary grievance against Defendant, and in December 1997, Plaintiffs commenced this legal malpractice action, sounding in both contract and tort.

The Supreme Court denied Defendant's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the continuous representation doctrine tolled the Statute of Limitations. The Appellate Division reversed, holding the continuous representation doctrine did not apply to these facts. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed.

The Court stated that amended CPLR 214 (6), effective in September 1996, shortened the Statute of Limitations from six to three years for all claims seeking breach of contract damages, regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort. In Brothers v. Florence, 95 N.Y.2d 290 (2000), the Court developed the bright-line rule, which states that "for those cases not immediately time-barred as of the 1996 amendment's effective date, litigants would have 'no less than one year from the amendment's effective date to bring suit.'" Therefore, under this rule, Plaintiffs' Statute of Limitations did not expire until September 1997. However, Plaintiffs filed this action on December 1997, activating the time-bar, unless the continuous representation doctrine applied.

"[T]he rule of continuous representation tolls the running of the Statute of Limitations on the malpractice claim until the ongoing representation is completed." The Court stated that in legal malpractice cases, the doctrine only applies where the continuous representation pertains specifically to the matter in which the attorney committed the alleged malpractice. Since Plaintiffs "were acutely aware of . . . [the] need for further representation on the specific subject matter underlying the malpractice claim and there was mutual understanding to that effect," the representation was continuous. Plaintiffs' case status inquiries are analogous to a patient's follow-up visit and therefore are part of the "course of treatment." Thus, the Court concluded that Defendant continuously represented Plaintiffs "at least until . . . after his extended failure to return [Plaintiffs'] telephone inquiries."


Prepared by the liibulletin-ny summer board.