Whether a Connecticut Court's dismissal of a paternity petition "with prejudice" must be given res judicata effect in New York courts under the United States Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause.

No. For the purposes of res judicata and the application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, a dismissal "with prejudice" is not considered a determination on the merits in a paternity petition. When deciding whether to give such a decision preclusive effect, courts must consider the factual circumstances of the case and balance competing interests.

In October 1994, Plaintiff, a New York resident, filed a paternity petition in New York that named Defendant, a Connecticut resident, as the father of her infant daughter. The petition was transferred to Connecticut, where, on April 3, 1995, a Magistrate ordered that all parties submit to blood tests. Due to the Connecticut Support Enforcement Division's failure to notify Defendant of his scheduled blood test during the specified period and the Assistant Attorney General's unawareness of that fact, the Magistrate granted Defendant's motion to dismiss the petition "with prejudice" for failure to comply with the Magistrate's order. The Magistrate denied Plaintiff's motion for a rehearing. The Connecticut Superior Court then dismissed the Assistant Attorney General's appeal of the Magistrate's decision for "failure to prosecute." In 1997, another Connecticut Magistrate dismissed Plaintiff's second paternity petition because Defendant successfully argued that res judicata barred the proceedings. An action was subsequently filed in New York, and Plaintiff successfully argued that New York should not give full faith and credit to the Connecticut dismissal. The parties were ordered to submit to blood tests that proved Defendant was indeed the child's father, and Family Court reinstated the paternity petition. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that res judicata and full faith and credit considerations barred Plaintiff from bringing this claim because the Connecticut court dismissed "with prejudice."

The Court of Appeals reversed. The Court noted that because the purpose of the United States Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause is to avoid relitigation of issues in one State that have already been decided in another, New York courts should accord the Connecticut dismissal the same preclusive effect it would have had under Connecticut law. The Court then determined that under Connecticut law, on these facts, the phrase "with prejudice" did not constitute a decision on the merits. The Court cited several Connecticut Supreme Court decisions indicating that cases disposed of on technical grounds, on the basis of untimeliness, or for failure to prosecute with reasonable diligence, do not constitute judgments on the merits. The Court further noted that in determining the preclusive effect of a decision, Connecticut courts look to the factual circumstances of the dismissal and consider the competing concerns of finality of judgments, providing litigants a legal forum to redress grievances, and other social policies such as the identification and financial accountability of a parent-child relationship. In applying this same standard of review, the Court found that in paternity determinations powerful considerations exist which, "combined with the Attorney General's mishandling of the case and the dismissal on technical grounds, outweigh the finality concerns of res judicata." The Court reversed the Appellate Division and remanded, noting that "Luna and her child deserve their day in court."