People v. Robinson, 2001 N.Y. Int. 0143 (Dec. 18, 2001).

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION - N.Y. CONST. ART. I § 12 - SEARCH AND SEIZURE - PROBABLE CAUSE - EQUAL PROTECTION - FOURTH AMENDMENT - VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW - TRAFFIC VIOLATION - PRETEXTUAL STOP

The decision to stop a vehicle is valid whenever a police officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred, regardless of the officer's ulterior motivations. Accordingly, defendants cannot challenge such search and seizures on the grounds that the stop was pretextual.

SUMMARY

• In the first case, People v. Robinson, police officers stopped a cab after they observed it running a red light, allegedly to give the driver safety tips. However, when one of the officers noticed that Defendant passenger was wearing a bulletproof vest, officers ordered Defendant out of the car and found a gun where he was sitting. The officers arrested Defendant and charged him with criminal possession of a weapon and unlawfully wearing a bulletproof vest.
  
• In People v. Reynolds, while following a vehicle on a solicitation suspicion, a police officer ran a computer check of the vehicle's license plate and stopped the truck for having an expired registration. The officer then arrested Defendant for driving while intoxicated and operating an unregistered motor vehicle.
  
• In People v. Glenn, police noticed a cab turn without signaling and saw one of the backseat passengers leaning forward. The officers stopped the cab on the suspicion that a robbery was in progress. Thereupon, they found drugs on the rear seat and in Defendant's possession. Defendant was arrested and charged with federal drug violations.

The Court, in resolving all three cases, held that when a police officer has a valid reason to stop a vehicle based on a perceived traffic violation, the stop is lawful regardless of any secondary intent. Furthermore, a defendant cannot challenge search and seizures made during the stop based on the grounds that the stop was pretextual. In its decision, the Court expressly adopted the standard of Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), as a matter of New York state law. In Whren, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that a vehicle stop is reasonable when police have probable cause to believe that a vehicle or traffic violation has occurred. In adopting Whren, the Court of Appeals found that ulterior motives are irrelevant when an actual traffic violation has occurred, and that challenges to the validity of subsequent search or seizure will not turn on whether the reasonable stop was pretextual. The Court did discuss equal protection concerns, stating that this case "addresses only the initial police action upon which the vehicular stop was predicated. The scope, duration and intensity of the seizure, as well as any search made by the police subsequent to that stop, remain subject to the strictures of Art. I § 12 of the New York State Constitution and to judicial review." In its holding, the Court expressly rejected both the "primary motivation" test and "reasonable police officer" test.

The dissent argued that because driving is a ubiquitous activity, and because "total compliance with traffic and safety laws is nearly impossible," the majority's decision sweeps too broadly and allows officers to conduct search and seizures in a manner that violates the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

ISSUE & DISPOSITION

Issue(s)

Disposition

AUTHORITIES CITED

• Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
• New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
• Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
• United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
• Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
• United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 1995).
• United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777 (2nd Cir. 1994).
  
• Brown v. State of New York, 89 N.Y.2d 172 (N.Y. 1996).
• People v. Spencer, 84 N.Y.2d 749 (N.Y. 1995).
• People v. Harris, 77 N.Y.2d 434 (N.Y. 1991).
• People v. David L., 81 A.D.2d 893 (N.Y. 1982).
• People v. Troiano, 35 N.Y.2d 476 (N.Y. 1974).

• U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (Search & Seizure)
• U.S. CONST. amend XIV. (Equal Protection Clause).
• N.Y. CONST. art. I § 12.
• Veh.& Traf. Law § 1101.
• Abraham Abramovsky and Jonathan I. Edelstein, Pretext Stops and Racial Profiling after Whren v United States: The New York and New Jersey Responses Compared, 63 Alb. L. Rev. 725 (2000).
• David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: "Driving While Black" Matters, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 265, 296 (1999).
• Hon . Phyllis W. Beck and Patricia A. Daly, State Constitutional Analysis of Pretext Stops: Racial Profiling And Public Policy Concerns, 72 Temp. L. Rev. 597 (1999).
  

RELATED SOURCES

• People v. Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d 98 (N.Y. 1967)
• People v. Ynoa, 223 A.D.2d 975 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)
• People v. James, 217 A.D.2d 969 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)
• People v. Vasquez, 173 A.D.2d 580 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)
• People v. Watson, 157 A.D.2d 476 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990)
• People v. Flanigan, 56 A.D.2d 658 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977)
• State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833, 842-43 (Wash. 1999)
• David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 Sup. Ct. Rev. 271 (1997).
  
• Robert M. Pitler, Independent State Search and Seizure Constitutionalism: The New York State Court of Appeals' Quest for Principled Decisionmaking, 62 Brook. L. Rev. 1, 282-283 (1996).
  

COMMENTARY

State of the Law Before Robinson

Nevertheless, a number of New York opinions have expressed concern about pretextual police conduct. For example, the Court in People v. Spencer, 84 N.Y.2d 749 (N.Y. 1995), held that it was illegal for an officer to stop a motorist who did not commit a traffic violation in order to ascertain certain information from the driver. The Court found the search to be invalid because the officer did not have an objective standard, such as the Vehicle & Traffic Law, to judge whether he should stop the vehicle. The Appellate Division has also rebuked pretextual traffic stops. In People v. Flanigan, 56 A.D.2d 658 (1977), the Second Department held that "heading off" the defendant's car with an unmarked police car in order to ticket him for a minor double-parking violation was an obvious pretext to search his car for drugs, since the defendant was observed in an area with a high volume of drug, stolen car, and stolen property arrests. In fact, all four Departments expressed disdain for pretextual traffic stops prior to the Whren decision. People v. Ynoa, 223 A.D.2d 975 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)(Third Dept.); People v. James, 217 A.D.2d 969 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)(Fourth Dept); People v. Vasquez, 173 A.D.2d 580 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)(Second Dept.); People v. Watson, 157 A.D.2d 476 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990)(First Dept.).

This disfavor of pretextual stops arises from the concern that police officers will selectively and arbitrarily stop certain motorists based on their racial or ethnic identities. In order to calm these concerns, courts have allowed officers to use the general standard described above in order to determine when to conduct a valid stop, while simultaneously encouraging defendants who felt unfairly singled out to seek recourse under the U.S. Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. Prior to Whren, the New York Court of Appeals held, in Brown v. State of New York, 89 A.D.2d 172 (1996), that in such circumstances defendants have a cause of action under the New York Constitution's Equal Protection Clause and Search and Seizure Clause. Likewise, after Whren the Court in Robinson held that the "scope, duration, and intensity of the seizure, as well as any police search made subsequent to the stop, remain subject to the strictures of Article I § 12 of the New York State Constitution and to judicial review." People v. Robinson, 2001 N.Y. Int. 0143 (Dec. 18, 2001) (citing People v. Troiano, 35 N.Y.2d 476 (N.Y. 1974) and People v. Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d 98 (N.Y. 1967)).

Effect of Robinson on Current Law

The Court explicitly held that the Supreme Court's standard outlined in Whren concerning pretextual police traffic stops applies in New York State as well. This means that when a police officer effectuates a routine stop based on a traffic violation, however minor, and that stop leads to the discovery of another violation, whether or not the second violation relates to the reason for the initial stop, the arrest for the second violation remains valid. In sum, if a police officer has probable cause for the initial stop, the defendant cannot challange an otherwise constitutionally valid subsequent search and seizure based on the alleged pretextual nature of the traffic stop.

In Whren, the Supreme Court held that such a stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. In Robinson, the New York Court of Appeals held that these pretextual stops were also permissible under Article 1 § 12 of the New York Constitution (which is identical to the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and protects and confers generally the same rights). Before Robinson, the Court had not addressed the effect of Whren on the activities of New York police officers. In explaining its decision to adopt Whren, the Court emphasized that it does not have a history of providing New York defendants with more extensive rights than those provided in the U.S. Constitution; likewise, it declined to do so here. The Court also reasoned that this holding would foster uniformity in constitutional standards for law enforcement practices.

Unanswered Questions

Another related question is whether the application of the Whren standard will "allow the police to stop vehicles in almost countless circumstances" (dissent), due to the ubiquity of vehicle traffic in New York and the frequency of traffic violations. Does this decision give the police an almost unfettered ability to stop any person at any time? It is rare that a person always follows every traffic rule, and if a police officer is patient, the officer could eventually find a reason to pull over almost anyone he or she wishes.

Survey of the Law in Other Jurisdictions

Very few states rejected the Whren analysis and offered their citizens additional protections beyond those set forth by the Supreme Court. For instance, the only state high court to reject Whren outright is the Washington State Supreme Court. In State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833, 842-43 (Wash. 1999), that court refused to adopt Whren and held that pretextual stops violate Article I § 7 of the Washington State Constitution. Arkansas also rejected Whren's formulation in State v. Sullivan, 11 S.W.3d 526, 528 (Ark. 2000). Both states instead gauge the reasonableness of a traffic stop by the subjective motivations of the police.

The appendix to the Robinson opinion provides an extensive list of cases in which courts have endorsed the Whren rationale.

Prepared by:

Steve Pilnyak '03
Christopher Scarff '03
Maura Wilson '03