The Tompkins County Support Collection Unit ("SCU") filed an order for a cost of living adjustment ("COLA") to increase Boyd Chamberlin's child support obligation from $57 to $64 per week. Under the Family Court Act, an SCU may review and adjust a support order to include a COLA based upon a statutory formula tied to the consumer price index for urban consumers. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 413-a (as codified in N.Y. Dom Rel. Law § 240-c). In addition, the SCU or either party may file an objection to the COLA. After filing for a COLA, Tompkins County SCU also filed, on behalf of Linda Chamberlin, an objection to the COLA, requesting a larger adjustment of the support order. Boyd Chamberlin sought to dismiss SCU's objection by motioning for summary judgment. The Family Court conducted a de novo review of the underlying support order and used the Child Support Standards Act ("CSSA") guidelines to increase his support obligation to $149.62 per week. Boyd Chamberlin argued that a de novo review and use of the CSSA guidelines during such a review expands the modification rights beyond what the statute permits. On appeal, the Appellate Division modified and remitted the order, holding that when confronted with a COLA objection, the Family Court does not have the authority to hold a de novo hearing, but is limited to deciding whether or not the COLA should apply, and that the COLA objection process could not be used to procure an entire support modification. Following the Family Court's ruling that the proposed COLA of $64 per week was appropriate, the Court of Appeals granted SCU leave to appeal, and reversed.
The Court explained that in order qualify for federal funding, states had to adopt uniform procedures for establishing, enforcing, reviewing and adjusting child support obligations. The federal government also mandated that those states choosing to implement COLA procedures must allow either party to contest an adjustment by requesting review and adjustment in accordance with state support guidelines, regardless of whether there had been a change in circumstances. The legislative history of the underlying federal statutes revealed that their purpose was to ensure the adequacy of child support orders and that there was no intention to restrict a party's access to review and adjustment. The legislative history of Family Court Act § 413 demonstrated that New York had adopted that legislation to comply with federal mandates and to further the goal of ensuring adequate child support.
The Court explained that § 413-a permits a court conducting a hearing regarding a COLA objection, to issue "a new order of support in accordance with the child support standards." Based on the plain meaning of § 413-a, the Court held that the statute clearly enables a court to adjust an order to conform to the CSSA guidelines rather than just determining whether the COLA is warranted. The Court distinguished a COLA from a modification by explaining that a change in the consumer price index triggered a COLA, as a mechanism for a broad approach of review and adjustment, whereas a party could seek a modification due to changes in circumstances at any time. Thus, the Court rejected Boyd Chamberlin's argument that the hearing for the COLA objection impermissibly expanded the parties' right to modification. See Family Court Act § 413-a[4]. The Court stated that reviewing courts would continue to consider existing agreements or stipulations when determining adjustments of support orders and would permit parties with agreements that differed from the CSSA guidelines to explain why the guidelines should not apply to their support orders. Finally, the Court rejected Chamberlin's constitutional claims, holding that the COLA did not impede Chamberlin's right to contract and that § 413 provides parties with adequate notice of the possibility and nature of a hearing due to an objection. Therefore, the Court reversed the order of the Appellate Division and remanded for further proceedings.
Prepared by the liibulletin-ny Editorial Board.