Whether a judgment award was properly structured in accordance with both the language of C.P.L.R. art. 50-A, 50-B and the legislative intent in enacting those provisions, even though the structured judgment award exceeded the jury's future damage award, where the final structured judgment included both the jury's consideration of future inflation and the statutory four percent annuity inflation adjustment.

Yes. Pursuant to the specific and unequivocal language of C.P.L.R. art 50-A, 50-B, and the Court's own past holdings, a plaintiff's structured judgment should be calculated according the letter of the statutory provisions, despite the possibility that plaintiff's ultimate cumulative award might exceed the future damage award determined by the jury.

Plaintiff sued Defendants for medical malpractice that resulted in long lasting physical damage and suffering which requires a lifetime of intensive medical care. The only issue at trial was damages. The jury awarded Plaintiff a judgment not only for past pain and suffering, but also for future damages to compensate for future pain and suffering and the costs of medical care for the span of Plaintiff's fifty-five year life expectancy. The Supreme Court structured the future damages judgment in accordance with the language of C.P.L.R. art. 50-A, so that after adjustments made for litigation and other expenses, the judgment would be divided by Plaintiff's life expectancy. That amount, already inclusive of the jury's estimation of future inflation "would then be used as the first year's award and compounded at a rate of four percent per year," as mandated by statute. The court held that the four percent annual increase in annuity payments, as required by statute, in no way negated the jury's consideration of inflation on future payments, and thus the two were "not mutually exclusive." See Schultz v. Harrison Radiator Div. General Motors Corp., 90 N.Y.2d 311 (1997).

Defendant claimed that Plaintiff's judgment should be based on "actual losses." Defendant's proposed approach would take the jury's total amount of recovery and work backwards, using the interest rate projected by the jury for a total of fifty five years to determine the discounted amount to be awarded to Plaintiff. Under this alternative, the four percent annuity adjustment mandated by statute would be ignored. Defendant claimed this latter interpretation - where the jury judgment would represent a plaintiff's maximum payment - was the more appropriate calculation. The Supreme Court rejected this "elastic" interpretation of the statutory language in favor of a more mechanical adherence to statutory procedure, noting that it was consistent not only with the letter of the legislation (C.P.L.R. § 5031(e)), but also with past holdings. See Bryant v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 93 N.Y.2d 592 (1999). The Appellate Division affirmed and certified to the Court the question of whether the Supreme Court's order was properly made. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Court, refusing to question the statute's unequivocal language, recognized the balance of interests considered in the legislature's enactment of the many tort reform laws of 1985 and specifically those provisions regarding structured judgments. As a result of these reforms, some plaintiffs might reap a higher judgment than that awarded by the jury. However, those same plaintiffs also lost their right to a lump sum payment representing the present value of future damages, payable immediately, and the opportunity to "seek their own rate of return." The Court suggested that this tradeoff might justify the four percent annual increase of medical services compensation mandated by the structured judgment (C.P.L.R. § 5031(e)). Additionally, the Court pointed out, this allows defendants to garner the pecuniary benefits of a plaintiff who dies before the estimated life expectancy. Finally, the Court noted that this scheme makes the provision of insurance a more financially viable practice by allowing the insurer to earn interest on the balance of the award before installments come due, while simultaneously protecting the money judgments awarded to injured plaintiffs.

The Court, while cognizant of the separation of powers and wed to the letter of the legislative directives as they currently exist, strongly urged the Legislature that, as it has been over eighteen years since the enactment of C.P.L.R. art. 50-A, they should reexamine its legislative purpose by "revisit[ing] the statute to determine whether, in actual operation, it is… indeed overcompensating plaintiffs."