Whether Appellant TIG's "Total Pollution Exclusion Endorsement" unambiguously excluded coverage for an injury caused by the inhalation of paint fumes used by Respondent, the insured, while painting an office.

No. The language contained in the exclusion does not unequivocally bar coverage for the incident in question, and thus Appellant is compelled to defend and indemnify the insured.

In 1997, Joseph Cinquemani filed suit against Respondent, Belt Painting Corp., alleging that he had been injured from inhaling paint fumes used while Respondent was performing work on an office. Respondent submitted the claim to its insurer, TIG, but it was rejected on the basis of the "Total Pollution Exclusion Endorsement". The Endorsement excludes coverage for "'bodily injury' or 'property damage' which would not have occurred in whole or part but for the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of pollutants at any time. 'Pollutants' are defined as any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acid, alkalis, chemicals and waste."

Respondent commenced this action, seeking a declaratory judgment that TIG was obligated to defend the lawsuit. Supreme Court granted TIG's motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed their order and granted summary judgment to Respondent, noting that the exclusion clause should be read in a "common-sense" fashion, and that it only applied to damages that "are truly environmental in nature" or resulted from "pollution of the environment." The Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Court first noted that insurance policies are read "in light of 'common speech' and the reasonable expectations of a business person", and "any ambiguity [is] resolved against the insurer" (see Thomas J. Lipton Inc. v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 34 NY2d 356, 361 [1974]). It also reviewed the history of pollution exclusions and determined that "the general purpose of the clause is to shield insurers from the costs of environmental cleanups." With this in mind, the Court concluded that TIG's exclusion clause does not unequivocally exclude the personal injury claim in question - one that arose from indoor exposure to Respondent's "tools of the trade." The Court rejected TIG's arguments that essentially would have "strained the plain meaning, and obvious intent, of the language", and thus it affirmed the Appellate Division's order, awarding summary judgment to Respondent.