In re Benjamin L., 1999 N.Y. Int. 0002 (Feb. 11, 1999).

Due Process - Family Court Act - Speedy Trial Provisions - Pre-Petition Hearing - Juvenile Delinquent

As a matter of fundamental fairness to juveniles, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a constitutional right to a speedy trial.

[SUMMARY] | [ISSUE & DISPOSITION] | [AUTHORITIES CITED] | [COMMENTARY]

SUMMARY

On July 7, 1994, fifteen year-old Benjamin L. was arrested and detained overnight for acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crimes of second degree attempted robbery and third degree menacing. The next day, a pre-petition detention application was submitted to Family Court pursuant to sections 307.3 and 307.4 of the Family Court Act. Family Court denied the application at a hearing later that day and remanded Appellant to his mother's care with a court-sanctioned curfew.

A little over a year later, on August 2, 1995, the Westchester County Attorney's Office filed a petition relating to the July 7, 1994 incident. Six days later, on August 8, 1995, Appellant made an initial appearance with counsel and entered a denial. The matter was adjourned for a fact-finding hearing on September 13, 1995. On August 30, 1995, Appellant moved to dismiss the petition, alleging that the delay in the petition's filing violated his statutory right to a speedy hearing as codified in the Family Court Act sections 310.2, 320.2 and 340.1, or alternatively that his constitutional right to due process pursuant to People v. Singer, 44 N.Y.2d 241 (N.Y. 1978), had been violated.

Family Court, relying on the factors set forth in People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442 (N.Y. 1975), concluded that the delay did not "rise to the level of a speedy trial violation" and without a hearing denied Benjamin's motion to dismiss. Taranovich listed several factors that should be examined in determining the merits of a speedy trial claim: (1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charge; (4) whether there had been an extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) whether there is any indication that the defense has been impaired by the reason of the delay. The Family Court concluded that there was no speedy trial violation without addressing the statutory speedy hearing arguments.

After concluding the fact-finding and disposition hearings, the court deemed Appellant a juvenile delinquent and gave him probation for one year. Appellant raised the same speedy trial/due process contentions on appeal. The Appellate Division affirmed, also relying on Taranovich and also without reference to the statutory contentions. Appellant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals contending that the Family Court Act prohibits specified delays between the filing of the pre-petition detention application, which should be equated with a petition of commencing the statutory period prescribed, and the commencement of the fact-finding hearing. Although rejecting Benjamin's statutory contentions, the Court of Appeals reversed and remitted the matter to Family Court for further proceedings.

ISSUE & DISPOSITION

Issue

Whether the constitutional right to a speedy trial, which is afforded to every defendant in criminal prosecutions in New York, should be extended to juveniles in delinquency proceedings.

Disposition

Yes. Although New York does not have a constitutional speedy trial provision, that right is guaranteed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Many of the same policies that warrant the articulation and enforcement of a criminal defendant's right to a speedy trial are applicable as a matter of fundamental fairness to juveniles in delinquency proceedings.

AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases Cited by the Court

Other Sources Cited by the Court

RELATED SOURCES

COMMENTARY

State of the Law Before Benjamin L.

Until 1967, the juvenile justice system used procedural mechanisms different from those of the adult system. Such proceedings were usually viewed as "special" due to their rehabilitative and informal nature and were therefore not subject to the provisions of either the State or Federal Constitution. So, for much of this century, juveniles were not afforded the same procedural rights as adults. The constitutional parameters of juvenile proceedings were altered after the landmark Supreme Court decision In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), where the Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required that states follow certain fundamental procedural rights in juvenile proceeding. Gault, and many cases before it (see, Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966)), extended due process protections to juvenile delinquency proceedings including: the right to written notice of specific charges in advance of the hearing; notification of the right to counsel and to appointed counsel in cases of indigence; privileges against self-incrimination; and the right to a hearing based on sworn testimony with the corresponding right of cross-examination. These cases, however, do not transpose every constitutional protection present in a criminal prosecution because of the special purpose of juvenile proceedings.

In order to comply with the holding of Gault, the New York legislature amended the Family Court Act to include specific procedural rights for juveniles. Particularly, time limitations govern each stage of the proceeding from arrest through final disposition. The amendment codified a concern previously recognized by the Court with the swift and certain adjudication at all phases of the delinquency proceeding (see, People ex rel. Guggenheim v. Mucci, 32 N.Y.2d 307 (N.Y. (1973); Matter of Frank C., 70 N.Y.2d 408 (N.Y. 1987); and Matter of Willie E., 88 N.Y.2d 205 (N.Y. 1996)). Finally, although the statute explicitly prescribes a procedural difference between pre-detention and commencement of the proceeding when the juvenile is not at a detention facility, it does not set a time limitation for the period between filing a pre-petition detention application and filing a petition itself.

Effect of Benjamin L. on Current Law

This decision sets a procedural precedent that aims to ensure fundamental fairness to juveniles at all stages of delinquency proceedings. To determine the merits of a speedy trial, courts adjudicating juvenile matters must now adhere to the same balancing test used in adult criminal trials, specifically the five factor test previously articulated by the Court in Taranovich. The Court affirmed an expansion Taranovich to apply to due process issues although Taranovich dealt specifically with the Sixth Amendment. Recognizing the unique nature and goals of juvenile delinquency proceedings, however, a court must evaluate a juvenile's right to speedy proceedings in light of the Taranovich factors while remaining mindful of the "different connotations" that two of these factors--prejudice and length of delay--may carry. In the Matter of Benjamin L. at para. 20.

Determinations on a case-by-case basis of "speedy trial violations" must consider all relevant circumstances that impact the interests and particularized problems of the juvenile. Benjamin L.. at para. 23-24. As a result, due process will not only protect the juvenile from harms such as prejudice and unfairness, but will also protect his interest in prompt treatment and rehabilitation. Importantly, these latter interests may tend to weigh against a court's decision to dismiss a petition instigating juvenile delinquency proceedings since "a child in need of rehabilitative efforts should not be denied that ameliorative attention merely because of some delay." Benjamin L. at para. 24.

Finally, with regard to the statutory contentions made, the Court stated that pre-detention application cannot be equated with a petition under either the language of the Family Court Act or the procedural structure of the juvenile proceedings. The Court analogized the difference between the two to the difference between an application for detainment and the written accusation that formally commences the proceeding. Further, the Family Court Act does not set a time limitation for the period between filing a pre-petition application and filing the petition itself where the juvenile is not at a detention facility.

Unanswered Questions

The decision does not foreclose the possibility of a delinquency proceeding where a delay would still serve the interest of both the community and the juvenile. Although the Court noted that the circumstances surrounding the delay in this case were not known, it nevertheless gave guidelines which must be considered, such as "the needs and best interests of the juvenile" as wells as "the needs for protection of the community." What needs and interests of the juvenile or the community would be suitable under this Court's analysis remain to be seen.

The Court refused to articulate a per se rule on speedy trial violations. Rather, it favored a case-by-case treatment of such violations for juveniles. Several tough questions are left open for practitioners: When does delay become fundamentally unfair so that proceedings are unconstitutional? How long is too long? Which interests warrant a large delay and which do not? These questions will only be answered with more case law unless the Legislature responds by amending the Family Court Act with additional time limitations.

Survey of the Law in Other Jurisdictions

Other Jurisdictions

Other jurisdictions are split over whether and how to extend speedy trial rights to juveniles. Some states do not provide speedy trial rights to children; of the states that do require a speedy trial for juveniles, that protection can be based on the state or federal constitution, statute, or some combination of these authorities.

States Not Extending Speedy Trial Rights to Juveniles

Texas codifies the right to a speedy trial by a statutory grant, Texas Speedy Trial Act. It does not extend to juveniles since it only applies to criminal actions, and juvenile proceedings are civil, not criminal, in nature. See Deleon v. State, 728 S.W. 2d 935 (Tex. App. 1987). For similar reasons, Illinois courts also hold that speedy trial rights that apply to criminal proceedings do not apply to juvenile proceedings. See In re J.J.M., 701 N.E.2d 1170 (Ill. App. 1998).

Statutory Guarantees

In Florida, a juvenile's right to a speedy trial is specifically guaranteed by statute. West's F.S.A. R.Juv.Rules 8.090. The statute requires that a child be brought to an adjudicatory proceeding within 90 days of the earlier of (1) the date the child was taken into custody or (2) the date the petition was filed. The remedy for failure by the state to bring the child to a timely adjudicatory proceeding is the court's granting the child's Motion to Dismiss. West's F.S.A. R.Juv.P.Rules 8.090(d).

U.S. and State Constitutional Guarantees

Colorado courts have held that "fundamental fairness" requires that the speedy trial rights in the state constitution and statutes extend to juveniles. See, e.g., People v. Juvenile Court of Denver, 893 P.2d 81 (Colo. 1995); P.V. v. District Court In and For Tenth Judicial Dist., 609 P.2d 110 (Colo. 1980). This Court explicitly relied on federal cases applying the due process clause of the 5th and 14th Amendments. The Court found that fundamental fairness presented no bar to Colorado's statutory grant of authority to detain juveniles for up to 67 days before trial. Similarly, Colorado courts have held that the prescribed six month speedy trial period, which applies when the offender is not in custody, is required by the U.S. Constitution. See People in re N.P., 768 P.2d 706 (Colo. 1989).

Maryland relies on both the 6th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights in holding speedy trial requirements applicable to juvenile proceedings. Addressing the impact of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 to the constitutional requirement of a speedy trial, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland was led by "the spirit, if not the letter of Gault" to conclude that the Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial extends to juveniles. 617 A.2d 1120, 1123 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993).

California relies on its own constitution in giving juveniles the right to a speedy trial. See West's Ann.Const., Art. 1; Richard N. v. Superior Court, 172 Cal.Rptr.512 (1981).

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