Whether the content of newspaper articles was a matter of legitimate public concern sufficient to impose upon Plaintiff the burden of proving that Defendants were grossly irresponsible in writing and publishing them.

Yes. Where the content of an article is arguably within the sphere of legitimate public concern, and is reasonably related to matters warranting public exposition, a private plaintiff must prove a publisher's or broadcaster's gross irresponsibility.

Plaintiff was the husband and financial manager for Melba Moore, a popular actress and recording artist. Following their divorce, Defendant Daily News published three articles that reported on Defendant Moore speaking out as a victim of economic spousal abuse, based on her belief that her husband had cheated her out of her interest in the entertainment management company they had built together, leaving her destitute. The articles concerned other issues as well, such as physical abuse, ex parte divorce proceedings, and orders of protection. Pursuant to these articles, Plaintiff brought this action in libel.

Supreme Court granted summary judgment for Defendants on the ground that the allegedly defamatory statements were constitutionally protected as expressions of opinion rather than statements of fact. The Appellate Division modified, holding that some of the statements which accused Plaintiffs of various criminal acts were factual and actionable, and that, with regard to those statements, triable issues of fact existed as to whether Defendants were negligent in publishing them. The Appellate Division found that the statements at issue were not a matter of public concern sufficient to require proof of the higher standard of gross irresponsibility, rather than negligence, since the parties' divorce and the business arrangement incidental thereto were essentially private affairs. The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal upon the certified question of whether its order was properly made.

The Court of Appeals reversed and held that Plaintiff must prove that Defendants were grossly irresponsible in publishing any untruths injurious to Plaintiff's reputation to prevail. The Court also remitted to the supreme court for a review and determination of the parties' submissions under the gross irresponsibility standard.

Normally, in defamation actions against a public official or public figure, a plaintiff must prove the statement was made with actual malice, defined as either with knowledge that it was false or reckless disregard for the truth. Where the defendant is a media publisher or broadcaster and the plaintiff is neither a public official nor a public figure, however, but the statement involves a matter of public concern, the plaintiff must still prove constitutional malice to recover presumed or punitive damages. According to the United States Supreme Court, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual when actual damages are at issue, as long as they don't impose liability without fault. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347. Therefore, when a matter of public concern is at issue, a private plaintiff is constitutionally required to show that defendants were at fault but the states are given discretion to require a higher degree of culpability than simple negligence.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held in Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, 38 N.Y.2d 196, that a private plaintiff must prove the gross irresponsibility of publisher or broadcaster "where the content of the article is arguably within the sphere of legitimate public concern, which is reasonably related to matters warranting public exposition." Id. at 199. Furthermore, in order to make the determination of whether content is within the sphere of legitimate public concern, the alleged defamatory statements can only be viewed in the context of the writing as a whole, and not as disembodied words, phrases or sentences. Gaeta v. New York News, 62 N.Y.2d 340, 349. A matter is not of public concern when it is mere gossip or prurient interest, nor when it is a matter of purely private concern directed only to a limited private audience.

Under the Chapadeau standard, absent clear abuse by publishers, the courts will give deference to editorial decisions as to what constitutes matters of genuine public concern, and as to whether the portions of the article to which a plaintiff objects are reasonably related to matters warranting public exposition. Furthermore, there is no abuse of editorial discretion if a published report can be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern of the community. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146. The Court further stated that a matter may be of public concern even though it is a "human interest" portrayal of events in the lives of persons who are not themselves public figures, so long as some theme of legitimate public concern can reasonably be drawn from their experience. Thus, the Chapadeau standard applied to statements about a private legal dispute if those statements, in the context of the entire publication, are illustrative of a larger subject of legitimate concern to the public. The Court noted that in the articles at issue, what the reporter identified as the important social issue of economic spousal abuse, was at least arguably within the sphere of legitimate public concern, thus triggering the Chapadeau standard of journalistic fault. Further, the Court refused to second-guess the reporter's editorial determination that Moore's personal experiences were reasonably related to this social issue. Finally, the Court stated that the Appellate Division had not accorded the proper deference to editorial judgment that precedent required.