Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District

APPROPRIATE EDUCATION

Petitioner Endrew F. (“Endrew”) argues that the Tenth Circuit’s de minimis benefit standard contravenes the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s (“IDEA”) decree to provide a Free Appropriate Public Education (“FAPE”). Examining the IDEA's text, purpose, and structure, Endrew argues that the IDEA requires school districts to do all they can, within their means, to promote greater academic achievement. In analyzing the text of the IDEA, Endrew juxtaposes “appropriate” and “de minimis," activities, the former being specifically suitable, fit or proper, and the later being trifling, eligible or insignificant. In doing so, Endrew contends that the Tenth Circuit’s de minimis standard suggests that a student’s minimum achievement in reading without any achievement in the subject of math would constitute an “appropriate” provision of public education. Endrew argues that this ideal is contrary to the very purpose of the IDEA. Turning to statutory interpretation and Supreme Court precedents, Endrew purports that the word “appropriate” modifies “public education” in the IDEA, in an effort to suggest a “more than merely de minimis” education standard. Further, Endrew construes the word “appropriate” as embodying Court precedents that consistently recognize the importance of education to both the personal and professional development of individuals. Endrew claims that the IDEA’s provision of “appropriate education” signals to schools that they must attain more than just-above-trivial education standards for their students with disabilities.

Respondent Douglas County School District (“Douglas County”) argues that the word “appropriate” in “free appropriate public education” should not be read expansively in light of the IDEA’s purpose. Douglas County points to Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982), which struck down a student’s claim that “appropriate” was synonymous to “specially suitable.” In addition, Douglas County looks to the legislative history to conclude that Congress equated “appropriate education” to the receipt of personalized, but not more than de minimis, services. Douglas County argues that the textual source of the “some educational” benefit standard is explicit. They contend that the sole requirement of the IDEA is that it be reasonably calculated to confer some educational benefit. Douglas County rejects Endrew’s argument that a more than de minimis benefit is a trivial benefit. They argue that any reasonable official reading the IDEA would recognize its aim as providing something more than a trivial benefit.

PURPOSE OF THE IDEA

Endrew argues that one must look at the object and policy of a statute on a whole in order to determine that statute’s purpose. In applying this logic to the IDEA, Endrew contends that historical precedent along with Congress’s explicit intent shine light on the purpose of the IDEA’s “free appropriate public education” provision. Endrew claims that the purpose of this provision, as declared by Congress, is to improve educational results for children with disabilities and to prepare them for additional education, employment opportunities, and independent living. Endrew supports this finding by analyzing historical precedent: before the IDEA was passed, children with disabilities were neither having their educational needs met, nor receiving adequate educational services to ensure full equality of opportunity. Endrew rebukes any notion that a statute designed to promote equal opportunity and effective educational efforts would simultaneously allow states to seek di minimum educational advancements for children with disabilities.

Additionally, Endrew claims that the IEP is the primary vehicle for implementing the IDEA, and thus, sheds light on the “appropriate” purpose of FAPE. Endew questions why the IEP would require annual goals to ensure that a child’s educational needs are met, a description of how meeting these goals will be monitored, and results that measure the child’s ability to improve if schools only needed to provide de minimis educational benefits. Endrew purports that Congress linked the IDEA with the Elementary and Secondary Education Act’s (“ESEA”) insistence on challenging academic standards and individualized assessments because it found that children in special education classes were falling behind academically. In turn, Endrew provides that children with disabilities are to be held to the same standards as all other children in effort to promote equality of opportunity. According to Endrew, this shifts a school’s focus from process accountability to substantive performance accountability, which arguably cannot be met through mere de minimis educational benefits.

Douglas County argues that the IDEA’s obligations are inherently unambiguous.Douglas County reasons that the IDEA was enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause, and thus, its components are to be interpreted much like a contract. Douglas Country contends that the clear-notice requirement regarding obligations that go with federal funds, supports the argument that the IDEA’s standard must remain unambiguous. Accusing Endrew of dubiously shifting from a standard of substantial educational benefit to substantially equal opportunity, Douglas County argues that this shifting standard conflicts with the IDEA’s explicit clear-notice rule. Douglas County also denies Endrew’s claims that the IDEA requires states to provide substantially equal educational opportunity or significant progress; the County argues that an official looking at the definition of the FAPE’s key terms, sub-definitions, requirements, and cross-references could never identify a requirement that states must provide substantial educational progress to children with disabilities. Douglas County asserts that this sort of substantive standard is absent from the IDEA’s language. For instance, Douglas Country argues that the phrase “free appropriate education” is unambiguously defined under the IDEA, and provides that four explicit requirements be met.Douglas County argues that the “some benefits standard” is also consistent with the IDEA’s purpose to provide (a) procedures that IEP teams must follow in developing an individual child’s IEP and (b) systemic requirements that educational agencies must implement state-wide. Because it is through these means that Congress chose promote educational achievements, Douglas County contends that it is unnecessary to infer that a substantive standard stems from Congressional intent.

UNDERSTANDING THE ROWLEY HOLDING

Endrew claims that the Tenth Circuit’s “merely more than de minimis” benefit test misinterprets Rowley.Endrew agrees with the Court’s decision in Rowley, that the school district was not obliged to provide a disabled student with a potential-maximizing education. Nevertheless, Endrew highlights a portion of the case holding that the Tenth Circuit overlooks; describing the purpose of the IDEA as to supply enough substantial educational benefit to make access “meaningful.” Endrew argues that this provision, mandating that an education be reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve passing marks, and advance grades, is more creditable than and contradicts the Tenth Circuit’s de minimis benefit approach. In addition to arguing that this de minimis benefit standard negates the idea of making access to public education meaningful, Endrew claims that the Tenth Circuit misinterpreted the “some” educational benefit” clause in Rowley. Endrew asserts that this provision read in isolation may mean a “slight amount,” but when read in the context of the case opinion, it modifies the text to suggest that the IDEA imposes not only procedural, but also a substantive obligation on schools to provide individualized instruction and services. Endrew turns to subsequent amendments to the IDEA in 1997 and 2004, to support his claim that providing a appropriate education must also include substantive provisions of equality of opportunity, while maximizing students’ access to curriculum.

Douglas Country argues that Rowley’s “some educational benefit standard” is the only level of benefit that a school district must confer on children with disabilities to remain compliant with FAPE requirements. Rebutting Endrew’s claim that schools carry the burden of providing substantive benefits, Douglas County turns to the IDEA’s text to argue that states must only adopt procedures which would result in the instruction for each child. In describing the requirements of these procedural benefits, Douglas County claims that Rowley’s provision of some educational benefit must not be construed as requiring a particular level of benefit, and that the only insufficient level of benefit is none. Douglas County argues that the Rowley Court explicitly rejected any substantive standard prescribing the level of education to be accorded children with disabilities. Identifying the Court’s reluctance to establish a single substantive test, Douglas County argues that Rowley reflects the Court’s acknowledgement that whether a child’s IEP is reasonable calculated to confer benefit will depend on individualized, but not substantive, circumstances. Douglas County also reproves Endrew’s claim that Rowley’s provision of “meaningful” access to education must provide more than a de minimis benefit. Douglas Country accords the Rowley’s holding as providing that a meaningful education need only be sufficient to confer some educational benefit upon a handicapped child. Pointing to case precedent, Douglas County argues that this provision of some specialized benefit must be delinked from any provision of meaningful access to grade achievement. Because stare decisis requires adherence to Rowley, Douglas County argues that the provision of some educational benefit must hold, and that a more than de minimis benefit sufficiently encapsulates the Rowley rule.

FAPE REQUIRMENTS

Endrew argues that the purpose of a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) is to provide a child with disabilities the equal opportunity as that afforded to children without disabilities, to achieve academic success, give back to society, and become self-sufficient. In interpreting the text, purpose, and structure of the IDEA, Endrew contends that IDEA’s FAPE requirement obliges schools to provide children with disabilities with “substantially equal opportunity,” and furthermore, that this provision of equal opportunity is workable. Looking to the IDEA’s text and purpose, Endrew claims that an “appropriate” education ensures equal opportunity without demanding strict equality and that the IDEA’s provisions that implement the FAPE requirement also dictate this standard. Furthermore, Endrew asserts that this equality standard is attainable, flexible, and aligns with the Department of Education’s Education (“DOE”) Program. Endrew points to the DOE’s regulations explaining that a school must adapt its instruction to ensure that a child can meet educational standards that “apply to all children” as evidence that the substantially equal opportunity standard is workable. In addition, Edward claims that the substantially equal opportunity standard has flexibility necessary to be administered effectively, further justifying an IEP requirement that is reasonably calculated to provide a child with a disability a substantially equal chance of academic success. .

Douglas County argues that FAPE requirements must not be met through substantive provisions, such as equal opportunity and individualized treatment, but by both schools complying with the procedures set forth in the IDEA, and ensuring that the IEP is reasonably calculated to enable a child to receive benefits. Douglas County contends that Rowley rejected the idea that FAPE requirements be based on equal opportunity. Douglas County turns to the text of the Rowley to identify a provision that states are not required to maximize the potential of each child with a disability commensurate with the opportunity provided a child without one. In addition, Douglas County argues that Endrew’s proposed standards are unworkable. They argue that the standards’ vagueness, along with their imposition of confusing and onerous legal requirements, make them ill-suited. For instance, Douglas County questions how a state can be tasked with interpreting whether progress promised by an IEP is significant or appropriate in light of each individual’s particular needs. In addition, Douglas County argues that evaluating the IEP’s enforcement mechanisms is a difficult task that should not be left to a court with limited expertise in the field of education. Douglas County acknowledged that there will be many borderline cases under the de minimis standard, as with any standard, but claims that these cases can be resolved best by commonsense judgments without delving into tough questions of educational policy