MELENDEZ-DIAZ v. MASSACHUSETTS
- Syllabus [HTML] [PDF]
- Opinion, Scalia [HTML] [PDF]
- Concurrence, Thomas [HTML] [PDF]
- Dissent, Kennedy [HTML] [PDF]
MELENDEZ-DIAZ v. MASSACHUSETTS
certiorari to the appeals court of massachusetts
At petitioners state-court drug trial, the prosecution introduced certificates of state laboratory analysts stating that material seized by police and connected to petitioner was cocaine of a certain quantity. As required by Massachusetts law, the certificates were sworn to before a notary public and were submitted as prima facie evidence of what they asserted. Petitioner objected, asserting that Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36, required the analysts to testify in person. The trial court disagreed, the certificates were admitted, and petitioner was convicted. The Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed, rejecting petitioners claim that the certificates admission violated the Sixth Amendment.
Held: The admission of the certificates violated petitioners Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. Pp. 323.
(a) Under Crawford, a witnesss testimony against a defendant is inadmissible unless the witness appears at trial or, if the witness is unavailable, the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. 541 U. S., at 54. The certificates here are affidavits, which fall within the core class of testimonial statements covered by the Confrontation Clause, id., at 51. They asserted that the substance found in petitioners possession was, as the prosecution claimed, cocaine of a certain weightthe precise testimony the analysts would be expected to provide if called at trial. Not only were the certificates made, as Crawford required for testimonial statements, under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial, id., at 52, but under the relevant Massachusetts law their sole purpose was to provide prima facie evidence of the substances composition, quality, and net weight. Petitioner was entitled to be confronted with the persons giving this testimony at trial. Id., at 54. Pp. 35.
(b) The arguments advanced to avoid this rather straightforward application of Crawford are rejected. Respondents claim that the analysts are not subject to confrontation because they are not accusatory witnesses finds no support in the Sixth Amendments text or in this Courts case law. The affiants testimonial statements were not nearly contemporaneous with their observations, nor, if they had been, would that fact alter the statements testimonial character. There is no support for the proposition that witnesses who testify regarding facts other than those observed at the crime scene are exempt from confrontation. The absence of interrogation is irrelevant; a witness who volunteers his testimony is no less a witness for Sixth Amendment purposes. The affidavits do not qualify as traditional official or business records. The argument that the analysts should not be subject to confrontation because their statements result from neutral scientific testing is little more than an invitation to return to the since-overruled decision in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56, which held that evidence with particularized guarantees of trustworthiness was admissible without confrontation. Petitioners power to subpoena the analysts is no substitute for the right of confrontation. Finally, the requirements of the Confrontation Clause may not be relaxed because they make the prosecutions task burdensome. In any event, the practice in many States already accords with todays decision, and the serious disruption predicted by respondent and the dissent has not materialized. Pp. 523.
69 Mass. App. 1114, 870 N. E. 2d 676, reversed and remanded.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion. Kennedy, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Breyer and Alito, JJ., joined.