563 U.S. 647
UNITED STATES v . TINKLENBERG
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit
The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (Act) provides, inter alia, that in any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial shall commence within seventy days after the arraignment, 18 U.S.C. 3161(c)(1), but lists a number of exclusions from the 70-day period, including delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion, 3161(h)(1)(D).
Respondent Tinklenbergs trial on federal drug and gun charges began 287 days after his arraignment. The District Court denied his motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the trial violated the Acts 70-day requirement, finding that 218 of the days fell within various of the Acts exclusions, leaving 69 nonexcludable days, thus making the trial timely. On Tinklenbergs appeal from his conviction, the Sixth Circuit agreed that many of the 287 days were excludable, but concluded that 9 days during which three pretrial motions were pending were not, because the motions did not actually cause a delay, or the expectation of delay, of trial. Since these 9 days were sufficient to bring the number of nonexcludable days above 70, the court found a violation of the Act. And given that Tinklenberg had already served his prison sentence, it ordered the indictment dismissed with prejudice.
Held :
1.The Act contains no requirement that the filing of a pretrial motion actually caused, or was expected to cause, delay of a trial. Rather, 3161(h)(1)(D) stops the Speedy Trial clock from running automatically upon the filing of a pretrial motion irrespective of whether the motion has any impact on when the trial begins. Pp. 312.
(a)The Sixth Circuit reasoned that subparagraph (D)s delay resulting from phrase, read most naturally, requires a court to apply the exclusion provision only to motions that actually cause a trial delay, or the expectation of such a delay. While such a reading is linguistically reasonable, it is not the only reasonable interpretation. The subparagraph falls within a general set of provisions introduced by the phrase: The following periods of delay shall be excluded. 3161(h). That phrase is followed by a list that includes [a]ny period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including. 3161(h)(1). This latter list is followed by a sublist, each member (but one) of which is introduced by the phrase delay resulting from . Ibid. Those words are followed by a more specific description, such as any pretrial motion from its filing through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion. 3161(h)(1)(D). The whole paragraph can be read as requiring the automatic exclusion of the members of that specific sublist, while referring to those members in general as periods of delay and as causing that delay, not because Congress intended the judge to determine causation, but because, in a close to definitional way, the words embody Congress own view of the matter. Thus, language alone cannot resolve the basic question presented. Pp. 47.
(c)Several considerations, taken together, compel the conclusion that Congress intended subparagraph (D) to apply automatically. First, subparagraph (D) and neighboring subparagraphs (F) and (H) contain language that instructs courts to measure the time actually consumed by the specified pretrial occurrence, but those subparagraphs do not mention the date on which the trial begins or was expected to begin. Second, during the 37 years since Congress enacted the statute, every other Court of Appeals has rejected the Sixth Circuits interpretation. Third, the Sixth Circuits interpretation would make the subparagraph (D) exclusion significantly more difficult to administer, thereby hindering the Acts efforts to secure fair and efficient trials. Fourth, the Courts conclusion is reinforced by the difficulty of squaring the Sixth Circuits interpretation with the automatic application rule expressed in, e.g., Henderson v. United States , 476 U.S. 321. Fifth, the legislative history also supports the Courts conclusion. Sixth, because all the subparagraphs but one under paragraph (1) begin with the phrase delay resulting from, the Sixth Circuits interpretation would potentially extend well beyond pretrial motions and encompass such matters as mental and physical competency examinations, interlocutory appeals, consideration of plea agreements, and the absence of essential witnesses. Pp. 712.
2.The Sixth Circuit also misinterpreted 3161(h)(1)(F), which excludes from the 70-day calculation delay resulting from transportation of any defendant to and from places of examination , except that any time consumed in excess of ten days shall be presumed to be unreasonable. The lower courts agreed that a total of 20 transportation days had elapsed when Tinklenberg was evaluated for competency, and that because the Government provided no justification, all days in excess of the 10 days specified in the statute were unreasonable. However, the Sixth Circuit exempted 8 weekend days and holidays from the count on the theory that subparagraph (F) incorporated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 45(a), which, at the time, excluded such days when computing any period specified in rules and court order[s] that was less than 11 days. Thus, the Circuit considered only two transportation days excessive, and the parties concede that the eight extra days were enough to make the difference between compliance with, and violation of, the Act.
This Court exercises its discretion to consider the subsidiary subparagraph (F) question because doing so is fairer to Tinklenberg, who has already served his sentence. In the Courts view, subparagraph (F) does not incorporate Rule 45. The Act does not say that it does so, the Government gives no good reason for such a reading, and the Rule itself, as it existed at the relevant time, stated it applied to rules and court orders, but said nothing about statutes. The fact that Rule 45 is revised from time to time also argues against its direct application to subparagraph (F) because such changes, likely reflecting considerations other than those related to the Act, may well leave courts treating similar defendants differently. The better reading includes weekend days and holidays in subparagraph (F)s 10-day period under the common-law rule that such days are included when counting a statutory time period of 10 days unless a statute specifically excludes them. Many courts have treated statutory time periods this way, and Congress has tended specifically to exclude weekend days and holidays from statutory time periods of 10 days when it intended that result. Indeed, Rule 45 has been recently modified to require a similar result. Pp. 1214.
3.Although the Sixth Circuits interpretations of subparagraphs (D) and (F) are both mistaken, the conclusions the court drew from its interpretations in relevant part cancel each other out, such that the courts ultimate conclusion that Tinklenbergs trial failed to comply with the Acts deadline is correct. Pp. 1415.
579 F. 3d 589, affirmed.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy, Ginsburg, Alito, and Sotomayor, JJ., joined, and in which Roberts, C.J., and Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined as to Parts I and III. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Roberts, C.J., and Thomas, J., joined. Kagan, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER
v.
JASON LOUIS
TINKLENBERG
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit
Justice Scalia , with whom The Chief Justice and Justice Thomas join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join Parts I and III of the Courts opinion. I agree with the judgment of the Court in Part II that a pretrial motion need not actually postpone a trial, or create an expecta-tion of postponement, in order for its pendency to be excluded under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(1)(D) (2006 ed., Supp. III). But I think that conclusion is entirely clear from the text of the Speedy Trial Act, and see no need to look beyond the text. The clarity of the text is doubtless why, as the Courts opinion points out, ante , at 8, every Circuit disagrees with the Sixth Circuits conclusion. That is the direction in which the causality proceeds: Clarity of text produces unanimity of Circuitsnot, as the Courts opinion would have it, unanimity of Circuits clarifies text.
As the Court discusses, ante , at 5, the word delay can mean postponement, but it can also mean an interval of time between two events. American Heritage Dictionary 480 (4th ed. 2000). One might refer to the delay between two ticks of a clock, or between seeing lightning and hearing thunder, but that does not imply that the first postponed or slowed the second. Here there are substantial textual indications that the word delay similarly refers to the period between ticks of the speedy trial clockin other words, the period during which the Speedy Trial Acts 70-day requirement is tolled.
Interpreting the delay referred to in 3161(h)(1)(D) (or referred to anywhere else in 3161(h)) as the delay of a trial date* * would make little sense in light of the context of the provision and the structure of the statute. Section 3161(h)(1)(D) specifies starting and stopping points for the excludable delay that bear no relation whatsoever to the actual amount of time that a trial might be postponed by a pretrial motion. It equates the delay resulting from any pretrial motion to the period of time between the filing of the motion and the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion. This equation is possible if delay refers to an interval of time excludable for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act, but it makes no sense if delay refers to the time a trial is postponed. Consider, for example, a pretrial motion that is pending for 10 days but causes the district court to push back a trials beginning by only one day. In such a situation, 3161(h)(1)(D) would require that the entire 10-day period be excluded for Speedy Trial Act purposes.
Neighboring statutory provisions, moreover, link the excludable delay to the time consumed by the specified event, not the number of days a trial is postponed. Section 3161(h)(1)(H), for example, excludes delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty days, during which any proceeding concerning the defendant is actually under advisement by the court. And 3161(h)(1)(F) excludes delay resulting from transportation except that any time consumed in excess of ten days from an order directing such transportation, and the defendants arrival at the destination shall be presumed to be unreasonable. If delay means trial delay, it makes little sense for Congress to have placed a limit upon the time consumed in transporting a defendant rather than upon the permissible postponement of trial date.
The Speedy Trial Acts structure also suggests that 3161(h)(1)(D) is meant to apply automatically and is not dependent on predicate findings of postponement. Section 3161(h) lists various types of delay that may be excluded, the first six of which (including 3161(h)(1)(D)) make no reference to any required findings. But the seventh, which excludes delay resulting from a continuance granted by any judge, conditions that exclusion upon certain findings, 3161(h)(7)(A). In light of this difference in formulation, we have held that the first six exclusions are automatic, apply regardless of the specifics of the case, and require no district-court findings. Bloate v. United States , 559 U.S. ___, ___, n.1, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 1, n.1, 6); see also Henderson v. United States , 476 U.S. 321, 327 (1986) . Tinklenbergs incorporation of a threshold inquiry into 3161(h)(1)(D) would make it none of these things.
Delay of trial is also ruled out by the fact that the text is forward looking. It says that the following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within which the trial must commence . 3161(h) (emphasis added). This is designed to enable the determination in advance of the date by which the trial must commence. Quite obviously, if the specified delays did not count unless and until they delayed the trial, one could not know whether they counted until after the fact. And on that interpretation the provision should have read, not the time within which the trial must commence, but rather the time within which the trial should have commenced.
And finally, there are the administrative difficulties that arise when delay is taken to mean delay in trial, discussed in the Courts opinion at pages 910. These are not relevant on their own, but only because they bear upon the meaning of the text. When one of two possible meanings yields impracticable results, the other meaning is more likely correct.
Tinklenberg would invent a threshold inquiry applicable only to 3161(h)(1)(D): If, he says, at least some delay of the trial date has occurred, then the entire period specified in 3161(h)(1)(D) may be excluded. This makes no sense. First, nothing in the statute supports treating the word delay as a trigger for an exclusion of an unrelated period of time; quite the opposite, 3161(h)(1)(D) treats the period of delay and the pendency of the pretrial motion equivalently. Second, that interpretation would ascribe different meanings to the word delay as it is used throughout the Speedy Trial Act. [D]elay resulting from any interlocutory appeal, 3161(h)(1)(C), for example, would refer to the number of days a trial was postponed; but delay resulting from any pretrial motion, 3161(h)(1)(D), would refer to the different period specified in that paragraph. Identical words used in different parts of a statute are pre-sumed to have the same meaning absent indication to the contrary, and here no such indication exists. See IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez , 546 U.S. 21, 34 (2005) .
Tinklenberg also argues that his interpretation draws support from the phrase resulting from, which appears after the word delay in 3161(h)(1)(D). He asserts that this phrase underscores that Subsection (D) excludes periods of delay that occur as a consequence of pretrial motions, not merely the time during which such motions are pending. Brief for Respondent 17. That is true enough, but it sheds no light on the meaning of the word delay. Cf. Bloate , supra, at ___, n.9 (slip op., at 8, n.9). There is nothing odd in saying that an interval of excludable time under 3161(h)(1)(D) arises as a consequence of a partys having filed a pretrial motion; if no pretrial motion is filed, no delay results.
Notes
* *I consider only this possibility, and not the extended meaning invented by the Sixth Circuit (expectation of a dela[y] of trial)presumably to explain how delay can be computed ex ante, before any trial delay has actually occurred. See 579 F.3d 589, 598 (2009). [E]xpectation of a delay is simply not one of the possible meanings of delay.