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“Statements compelled by police interrogations of course may not be used against a defendant at trial, see Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286, 56 S.Ct. 461, 80 L.Ed. 682 (1936), but it is not until their use in a criminal case that a violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause occurs, see United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264, 110 S.Ct. 1056, 108 L.Ed.2d 222 (1990) (‘The privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment is a fundamental trial right of criminal defendants. Although conduct by law enforcement officials prior to trial may ultimately impair that right, a constitutional violation occurs only at trial’ (emphases added; citations omitted)); Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 692, 113 S.Ct. 1745, 123 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (describing the Fifth Amendment as a ‘ “trial right” ’); id., at 705, 113 S.Ct. 1745 (O’CONNOR, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing ‘true Fifth Amendment claims’ as ‘the extraction and use of compelled testimony’ (emphasis altered)).

“Here, Martinez was never made to be a ‘witness’ against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause because his statements were never admitted as testimony against him in a criminal case. Nor was he ever placed under oath and exposed to ‘ “the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt.” ’ Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 445, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974) (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964)). The text of the Self-Incrimination Clause simply cannot support the Ninth Circuit’s view that the mere use of compulsive questioning, without more, violates the Constitution.”

J. Thomas, Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 767 (2003).