Women and Justice: Court: Constitutional Court of South Africa (Konstitutionele Hof van Suid Afrika)

Domestic Case Law

South African Police Service v. Barnard Constitutional Court of South Africa (Konstitutionele Hof van Suid Afrika) (2014)

Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The South African Police Service (“SAPS”) had adopted the Employment Equity Plan (“EEP”), which sets numerical goals to produce gender and racial diversity. The appellant, Ms. Barnard, applied twice for a position in the National Evaluation Service of the SAPS in 2005. Despite being shortlisted, interviewed, and recommended as the best-suited candidate, she did not get the position on either occasion. This case concerns her second attempt, where the National Commissioner did not appoint Ms. Barnard on the grounds that it would not enhance racial representation at that salary level and that it was not necessary to fill the vacancy immediately because the post was not critical. While the Labor Court found that SAPS had unfairly discriminated against the appellant, the Labor Appeal Court found in favor of SAPS. On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA”) reversed the Labor Appeal Court’s decision and held that Ms. Barnard had been the victim of unfair discrimination on the basis of race, in violation of Section 9(3) of the Constitution and Section 6(1) of the Employment Equity Act (the Act). The Constitutional Court granted SAPS leave to appeal and unanimously reversed the SCA’s ruling in favor of Ms. Barnard. As the Court noted, the SCA found that SAPS had failed to rebut the presumption that the discrimination against Ms. Barnard was unfair. But, since the EEP was a valid affirmative action measure, the issue was not whether the Plan could overcome such presumption, but whether the decision the National Commissioner made under it was open to challenge. The Court found that the Commissioner properly exercised his discretion. Appointing Ms. Barnard would have aggravated the overrepresentation of white women at that salary level. And, the decision did not bar Ms. Barnard from future promotions.

Die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisiediens ("SAPD") het die Indiensnemingsplan ("EHOU") aangeneem, wat numeriese doelwitte stel om geslags-en rassediversiteit te produseer. Die appêlant, Me. Barnard, het twee keer aansoek gedoen vir 'n pos in die Nasionale Evalueringsdiens van die SAPD in 2005. Ten spyte van op die kortlys wees, ondervra, en aanbeveel as die beste geskik kandidaat, het sy nie die posisie op beide geleenthede gekry nie. Hierdie saak gaan oor haar tweede poging, waar die Nasionale Kommissaris nie Me. Barnard aangestel het nie op die grond dat dit nie rasseverteenwoordiging op daardie salarisvlak sou verbeter nie en dat dit nie nodig was om die vakature onmiddellik te vul nie omdat die pos nie krities was nie. Terwyl die Arbeidshof bevind het dat SAPD teen die appêlant onbillik gediskrimineer het, het die Arbeidsappèlhof ten gunste van die SAPD bevind. Op verdere appèl het die Hoogste Hof van Appèl ("SCA") die Arbeidsappèlhof se besluit omgekeer en gehou dat Me. Barnard die slagoffer van onbillike diskriminasie op grond van ras was, in die skending van artikel 9(3) van die Grondwet en artikel 6(1) van die Wet op Billike Werksgeleenthede (die Wet). Die Konstitusionele Hof het die SAPD laat appelleer en die SCA se beslissing ten gunste van Me. Barnard omgekeer. Soos die Hof opgemerk het, het die SCA bevind dat die SAPD versuim het om die vermoede dat die diskriminasie teen Me. Barnard onregverdig was te weerlê. Maar aangesien die EHOU 'n geldige regstellende aksieplan was, was die kwessie nie of die plan so 'n vermoede kon oorkom nie, maar of die Nasionale Kommissaris se besluit daaronder oop was om te daag. Die hof het bevind dat die Kommissaris sy diskresie behoorlik uitgeoefen het. Die aanstelling van Me. Barnard sou die oorverteenwoordiging van wit vroue op daardie salarisvlak vererger het. Die besluit het nie Me. Barnard van toekomstige promosies belet nie.

Gumede v. President of the Republic of South Africa & Others Constitutional Court of South Africa (Konstitutionele Hof van Suid Afrika) (2008)

Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Gender discrimination, International law, Property and inheritance rights

Mrs. and Mr. Gumede, both domiciled in KwaZulu-Natal, entered into a monogamous customary marriage in 1968 and four children were born during their marriage. Because she was forbidden by her husband to take up employment, Mrs. Gumede never worked and could not contribute to the accumulation of the family’s estate, which included two family homes. She was always the primary caregiver of the children. After forty years, the marriage broke down irretrievably. Mrs. Gumede had no family and was dependent for financial support upon her children and her old-age pension. In 2003, Mr. Gumede instituted divorce proceedings before the Divorce Court. Mrs. Gumede also approached the High Court and obtained an order invalidating the discriminatory legislative provisions on which the Divorce Court could rely. The Constitutional Court subsequently was approached by the Minister of Home Affairs and the KwaZulu-Natal Member of the Executive Council for Traditional Leaders and Local Government Affairs who resisted the order, for the reevaluation of the order of the High Court declaring constitutionally invalid certain sections of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, of the KwaZulu Act on the Code of Zulu Law 16 of 1985 and certain sections of the Natal Code of Zulu Law (Proc R155 of 1987), which regulate the proprietary consequences of customary marriages. In a lengthy judgment, the Constitutional Court took great pains to explain that any distinction between the consequences of customary marriages entered into before and after the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act came into operation is discriminatory, inconsistent with the Constitution, and invalid. The Constitutional Court noted the international instruments that South Africa has ratified that prohibit forms of discrimination against women, including CEDAW. It held that the two provisions are patently discriminatory, unfair, and not justifiable. In terms of the judgment, all monogamous customary marriages entered into before the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act came into operation are now ipso facto in community of property, excluding customary marriages which had been terminated by death or by divorce before the date of the judgment. The Constitutional Court further held that the constitutional invalidity of Section 7(1) was limited to monogamous marriages and should not concern polygynous relationships or their proprietary consequences, determining that polygynous marriages should continue to be “regulated by customary law until parliament intervenes.”

Mev. en Mnr. Gumede, beide in KwaZulu-Natal gedomisilieer, het 'n monogame huwelik in 1968 aangegaan en vier kinders is tydens hulle huwelik gebore. Omdat sy deur haar man verbied is om te werk, het Mev. Gumede nog nooit gewerk nie en kon nie bydra tot die bydrae van die familie se boedel nie, wat twee familie-huise ingesluit het. Sy was altyd die primêre versorger van die kinders. Na veertig jaar het die huwelik onherstelbaar verbrokkel. Mev. Gumede het geen familie gehad nie en was afhanklik van finansiële steun van haar kinders en haar pensioen. In 2003 het Mnr. Gumede egskeiding verrigtinge voor die Egskeidingshof ingestel. Mev. Gumede het ook die Hooggeregshof genader en 'n bevel verkry wat die diskriminerende wetgewende bepalings waarop die Egskeidingshof op kon staatmaak, ongeldig maak. Die Konstitusionele Hof is vervolgens deur die Minister van Binnelandse Sake en die KwaZulu-Natal lid van die Uitvoerende Raad vir Tradisionele Leiers en Plaaslikeregeringsake wat die bevel teengestaan het, vir die herevaluering van die bevel van die Hooggeregs Hof wat sekere afdelings van die Wet op die Erkenning van Gebruiklike Huwelike, van die KwaZulu- Wet op die wet op Zoeloe Wetgewing 16 van 1985 en sekere afdelings van die Natalse wet op Zulu regte (B.proc R155 of 1987), wat die gevolge van gebruiklike huwelike reguleer, ongrondwetlik verklaar het. In 'n lang uitspraak het die Konstitusionele Hof baie moeite gedoen om te verduidelik dat enige onderskeid tussen die gevolge van gebruiklike huwelike wat voor en na die inwerkingtreding van die Wet op Erkenning van Gebruiklike huwelike aangegaaan is, diskriminerend, strydig is met die Grondwet en ongeldig is. Die Konstitusionele Hof het kennis geneem van die internasionale instrumente wat Suid-Afrika bekragtig het wat vorme van diskriminasie teen vroue verbied, insluitend CEDAW. Dit het beslis dat die twee bepalings oorwegend patriminerend, onbillik en nie regverdigbaar is nie. Ingevolge die uitspraak is alle monoggame gebruiklike huwelike aangegaan voor die Erkenning van Gebruiklike Huwelike Wet in werking gekom het, tree nou ipso facto binne gemeenskap vangoedere op, uitsluitend gebruiklike huwelike wat beëindig is deur die dood of deur egskeiding voor die datum van die vonnis. Die Konstitusionele Hof het verder bevind dat die grondwetlike ongeldigheid van artikel 7(1) beperk was tot monogame huwelike en behoort nie poligame huwelike of hul eie gevolge te bemoei nie, met die bepaling dat poligame huwelike steeds gereguleer word deur gewoontereg totdat die Parlement ingryp.

Omar v. Government of the RSA Constitutional Court of South Africa (Konstitutionele Hof van Suid Afrika) (2006)

Domestic and intimate partner violence

The Durban Magistrate's Court issued a protection order under the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 prohibiting Mr. Omar from abusing his wife, Ms. Joolab, and their children. When Mr. Omar allegedly breached the terms of that order, the warrant was executed but was subsequently suspended. He applied to the High Court alleging that section 8 of the Act was unconstitutional and the application was dismissed. On appeal, the Court held that section 8 does not violate the rights of access to the courts and serves to provide a mechanism to ensure compliance with protection orders and protect complainants against further domestic violence.

Die Durban Landdroshof het 'n beskermingsbevel uitgereik kragtens die Wet op huishoudelike geweld 116 van 1998 wat Mnr. Omar verbied om sy vrou, Me. Joolab, en hulle kinders, te mishandel. Toe Mnr. Omar na bewering die bepalings van daardie bevel oortree het, is die lasbrief uitgevoer, maar is daarna opgeskort. Hy het aansoek gedoen by die Hooggeregshof om te beweer dat artikel 8 van die Wet ongrondwetlik is en die aansoek van die hand gewys is. Die appèl het op appeèl beslis dat artikel 8 nie die regte van toegang tot die howe skend nie en dat dit dien om ‘n meganisme te bied om die nakoming van beskermingsvebele te verseker en om klaers teen verdere huishoudelike geweld te beskerm

State v. Baloyi Constitutional Court of South Africa (Konstitutionele Hof van Suid Afrika) (2000)

Domestic and intimate partner violence

An army officer was convicted for breaching an interdict issued by a magistrate ordering him not to assault his wife or prevent her or their child from leaving their home. He appealed to the Transvaal High Court which declared that Section 3(5) of the Prevention of Family Violence Act was unconstitutional to the extent that it placed the burden on him to disprove his guilt. The Constitutional Court overturned the High Court's judgment, finding that the purpose of an interdict was to protect the victim of domestic violence and indicate that society would not stand by in the face of spousal abuse. As such, fairness to the complainant required that the enquiry proceedings be speedy and dispense with the normal process of charge and plea, but in fairness to the accused, the presumption of innocence would still apply to the summary enquiry.

'n Weermag beampte is skuldig bevind aan die oortreding van 'n interdik wat deur 'n landdros uitgereik is, wat hom beveel het om nie sy vrou aan te val of te verhoed dat sy of hul kind hul huis verlaat nie. Hy het appèl aangeteken by die Transvaal se Hooggeregshof wat verklaar het dat artikel 3(5) van die Wet op die Voorkoming van Gesinsgeweld ongrondwetlik was in die mate dat dit die las op hom geplaas het om sy skuld te weerlê. Die Konstitusionele Hof het die uitspraak van die Hooggeregshof omgekeer en gevind dat die doel van 'n interdik was om die slagoffer van huishoudelike geweld te beskerm en te kenne te gee dat die samelewing nie die mishandeling van ‘n huweliksmaat sou bystaan nie. As sodanig het billikheid teenoor die klaer vereis dat die ondersoekverrigtinge vinnig moes verloop en met die normale proses van aanklag en pleit afgehandel word, maar in billikheid teenoor die beskuldigde, sal die vermoede van onskuld steeds van toepassing wees op die ondersoek.