This divorce case involved a couple that was married for 25 years. The petitioner-wife filed for divorce due to unreasonable behavior and adultery. She requested custody of their minor child, property rights as the court deemed fit, and that the respondent-husband vacate the marital home, pay a dissolution settlement, and cover court costs. The respondent, who was the family’s primary source of financial support, funded the construction of the parties’ marital home. Despite her inability to contribute financially, the wife oversaw construction of the home and took care of the couple’s children while the husband was away for years, both for work and in prison. The Supreme Court determined that, despite her failure to contribute financially to the parties’ acquisition of the marital home, the wife’s in-kind contributions to the family entitled her to a share of the marital home. Specifically, the court held that “principles of general fundamental human rights require that a person who is married to another and generally supervises the home, such that the other partner has a free hand to engage in economic activities, must not be discriminated against in the distribution of properties acquired during the marriage when the marriage is dissolved.”
Women and Justice: Court: Supreme Court
Domestic Case Law
Quartson v Quartson Supreme Court (2012)
Gutiérrez Castillo, Ignacio v. Red de Televisión Chilevisión S.A. (Case Nº 5984-2017) Supreme Court (2017)
The Supreme Court rejected the appeal of a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals of Santiago (Case No. 11717-2016), which had ratified the judgment of the 12th Civil Court of Santiago finding for the plaintiff in a complaint for violation of the Article 2 of Law No. 20,069 by the defendant. The plaintiff, a host in a TV show, claimed discrimination for his sexual orientation by his employer, the TV show. The Trial Court found that, in light of focus group research that found the plaintiff was well received by the audience of his TV show, there was no basis for his change in roles other than his sexual orientation, and that the actions of the TV show that forced the plaintiff to make his sexual orientation public were not reasonable or proportional. Thus, the defendant violated the plaintiff’s right to privacy.
La Corte Suprema rechazó el recurso de apelación de una decisión de la Corte de Apelaciones de Santiago (Causa No. 11717-2016), que había ratificado la sentencia del 12º Juzgado Civil de Santiago en favor de la demandante en su denuncia de la violación del demandado del artículo. 2 de la Ley N ° 20.069. El demandante, presentador de un programa de televisión, reclamó discriminación por su orientación sexual por parte de su empleador, el programa de televisión. El Tribunal de Primera Instancia determinó que, a la luz de la investigación de grupos focales que encontró que el demandante fue bien recibido por la audiencia de su programa de televisión, no había ninguna base para su cambio de roles además de su orientación sexual, y que las acciones del programa de televisión que obligaron al demandante a hacer pública su orientación sexual no eran razonables ni proporcionales. Por lo tanto, el acusado, el programa, en efecto violó el derecho a la privacidad del demandante.
González Pino, Alejandra v. Ortúzar Novoa, Graciela y otro (Case Nº 38238-2016) Supreme Court (2017)
The plaintiff, a councilwoman in the Comune of Lampa, identified as a woman and presented herself to society as a woman, filed a discrimination complaint against the defendant, claiming arbitrary discrimination for failure by the Mayor, as representative of the State, to respect her gender identity. She sued, claiming a violation of Anti-Discrimination Law No. 20.069 (“the Law”). The court, on appeal, reversed the trial court judgment and imposed a fine, finding that the Mayor of the Comune of Lampa had arbitrarily discriminated against plaintiff by failing to respect her gender identity as a woman. The court held that arbitrary discrimination means any distinction, exclusion, or restriction made by agents of the State or individuals that lacks reasonable justification, and that causes deprivation, disturbance, or threat in the legitimate exercise of the fundamental rights established in the Constitution or international treaties on human rights ratified by Chile and in effect, including gender identity as defined by the LGBTI Unit of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, which includes transgender identity. Therefore, the right to an identity is constitutionally protected, including the right to identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersexual. Any deprivation, disturbance or threat to such identifying rights constitutes an arbitrary discrimination within the meaning of Article 2 of Law No. 20,609.
La demandante, vecina de la comunidad de Lampa, identificada como mujer y presentada a la sociedad como mujer, interpuso una denuncia de discriminación contra la imputada, alegando discriminación arbitraria por incumplimiento del Alcalde, como representante del Estado, de respetar su identidad de género. Ella demandó, alegando una violación de la Ley contra la Discriminación No. 20.069 (“la Ley”). El tribunal, en apelación, revocó la sentencia del tribunal de primera instancia e impuso una multa, al considerar que el alcalde de la comuna de Lampa había discriminado arbitrariamente a la demandante al no respetar su identidad de género como mujer. El tribunal sostuvo que “discriminación arbitraria” significa toda distinción, exclusión o restricción realizada por agentes del Estado o personas que carece de justificación razonable, y que ocasiona privación, alteración o amenaza en el legítimo ejercicio de los derechos fundamentales consagrados en la Constitución o en las normas internacionales, tratados de derechos humanos ratificados por Chile y en vigencia, incluida la identidad de género según la definición de la Unidad LGBTI de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, que incluye la identidad transgénero. Por lo tanto, el derecho a la identidad está protegido constitucionalmente, incluido el derecho a identificarse como lesbiana, gay, bisexual, transgénero e intersexual. Cualquier privación, alteración o amenaza a tales derechos identificativos constituye una discriminación arbitraria en el sentido del artículo 2 de la Ley N ° 20.609.
Odamtten and Others v. Wuta-Ofei Supreme Court (2018)
This case concerns the ability of women to pass on their life interest in an estate to their children under customary law. In this case, the deceased, the grandfather of the appellants, died intestate. According to the customary law of the Ga people of Osu, the deceased’s female descendants only have a life interest in the estate rather than ownership rights. The first respondent, having outlived his siblings, claimed the right as the head of the family to sell one piece of the estate’s property. The appellant, the daughter of the deceased’s daughter, sought to set aside the sale of said property by the first respondent on the grounds that she was not consulted before the sale, and additionally sought an order of perpetual injunction restraining the respondents from dealing with the property. The appellant contended that the Court of Appeal erred in holding that the customary law of Gas prevent a female child who inherits property from a deceased parent to pass on her interest to her children. However, the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal’s decision, holding that the Court of Appeal stated the true position of customary law and practice of the devolution of property in Osu and other parts of Ghana, and that this customary property system is backed by judicial precedents on patrilineal forms of inheritance. The appellants’ argument that the Intestate Succession Law banned this patrilineal inheritance practice failed to take into account that it is not retroactive and thus does not apply to estates that have already been distributed. Thus, the sale of the property was deemed valid.
Arthur v. Arthur Supreme Court (2014)
This Supreme Court case is notable for solidifying the “Jurisprudence of Equality” doctrine as predominant in determining the sharing of marital property upon divorce. Following the termination of the marriage, the wife was granted by the High Court of Accra in May 2010 (i) custody of the children; (ii) ownership of a house and a “half share of the ‘storey building’; and (iii) a half share of ‘the shops at Weija, Accra. The husband appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal set aside and replaced the orders of the High Court. The wife appealed that decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court restored the decision of the trial judge in its entirety and noted that its decision was based on the marriage equality principle delineated in Article 16 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948. The Court affirmed the principle that property acquired during marriage is a joint property and that the sharing of spousal property should no longer be dependent on the substantial contribution principle.
Mensah v. Mensah Supreme Court (1998)
This case concerns the sharing of spousal property upon divorce. On 22 December 1986, the High Court dissolved the marriage between the husband (“H”) and his wife (“W”) on a petition and cross-petition for divorce filed by H and W, respectively. Subsequently, the Court heard the parties’ claims for ancillary relief in which both H and W claimed ownership of the same house. The High Court found that W was the sole owner of the house. H appealed to the Court of Appeal, which concluded that the main house belonged to both H and W but since the extensions to the house were solely funded by W, W was the sole owner of the extensions. H appealed this decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found that H made some contribution to the extensions as well as to the household expenses and the clear intention of the parties in acquiring the extensions was to provide more space in the house for their joint benefit and that of their children. It was therefore held, dismissing the appeal, that the principle that property jointly acquired during marriage became joint property applied; and such property was to be shared equally on divorce.
Mensah v. Mensah Supreme Court (2012)
The petitioner filed for divorce and sought an equal share of assets acquired during the marriage. At the time of marriage, neither party owned any property. During their marriage, the plaintiff assisted in building their business and managed their shop while her husband continued to work for the Controller and Accountant General's Department. The plaintiff also advised the respondent on property investments. The respondent denied that the petitioner contributed to the business and claimed that she embezzled money from him, and therefore should not be considered an equal holder of marital assets. The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the petitioner, finding that she was a joint owner of the property and was therefore entitled to an equal share of the marital assets. The Supreme Court affirmed. Previous case law denied a wife a share in property acquired during the marriage unless the wife could show that she had made a "substantial contribution" to the acquirement of these assets. Yet, because more recent cases supported the "equality is equity" principle in the division of marital assets, the Supreme Court concluded that "the death knell has been sung to the substantial contribution principle, making way for the equitable distribution as provided for under Article 22 (3) of the Constitution 1992." Thus, the court held that even if it determined that the petitioner did not make a substantial contribution to the acquisition of marital property, she would still be entitled to a share of the property. To further support its decision, the Supreme Court referenced Article 1 and Article 5 of CEDAW, in addition to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which emphasize equality between the sexes.
Processo nº 35/2011 Supreme Court (2011)
In a proceeding following a divorce, the appellant wife argued that she had married her husband under a regime of separate property. The court determined that a couple married under such a regime can only switch to a community property regime upon agreement between the parties, which had not occurred in this case.
Case of Sebastian Ramirez Ledesma Supreme Court (1999)
Sebastian Ramirez Ledesma was found guilty of murdering his father by the lower court. The lower court sentence was confirmed by the Court of Appeals. However, in 1997, the Supreme Court overturned the sentence and absolved the accused of all charges because he acted in self-defense. On the day the events took place, Joaquin Ramirez, father of the accused was drunk and threatening to kill his wife, Francisca Ledesma de Ramirez. Joaquin Ramirez regularly hit his wife. In light of these circumstances, the accused intervened trying to defend his mother, which enraged his father. Joaquin Ramirez took out a gun and fired three shots at the accused, missing him. Then, Joaquin Ramirez continued the aggression against his wife. Subsequently, the accused was able to grab the gun from his father. When Joaquin Ramirez realized that his son took the gun, he took out a knife. At this point, the accused fired the gun at his father, killing him. The Supreme Court overturned the sentence because it found that the accused was acting in self-defense and also was trying to protect his mother.
El tribunal inferior declaró a Sebastián Ramírez Ledesma culpable de asesinar a su padre. La sentencia de éste tribunal fue confirmada por el Tribunal de Apelaciones. Sin embargo, en 1997, la Corte Suprema anuló la decisión y absolvió al acusado de todos los cargos por actuar en legítima defensa propia. El día en que ocurrieron los hechos, Joaquín Ramírez, padre del imputado, estaba ebrio y amenazaba con matar a su esposa, Francisca Ledesma de Ramírez. Joaquín Ramírez golpeaba regularmente a su esposa. Ante estas circunstancias, el imputado intervino tratando de defender a su madre, lo que enfureció a su padre. Joaquín Ramírez sacó un arma y disparó tres tiros al imputado, fallando. Luego, Joaquín Ramírez continuó la agresión contra su esposa. Posteriormente, el imputado pudo arrebatarle el arma a su padre. Cuando Joaquín Ramírez se dio cuenta de que su hijo tomó la pistola, sacó un cuchillo. En este punto, el acusado disparó contra su padre y lo mató. La Corte Suprema anuló la sentencia porque encontró que el acusado actuó en defensa propia y también en defensa de otros, tratando de proteger a su madre.
Case of Joao María Dos Santos Supreme Court (1997)
S.J.D.S and M.J.D.S (16 and 13 years old) were sexually abused by their father, Joao María Dos Santos on several occasions. The victims testified that they were forced to have sexual relations with their father. The accused admitted that he raped them. The accused was sentenced to 16 years in prison. His sentenced was confirmed by the Supreme Court in 1997.
Case of Francisco Ramírez Irala Supreme Court (2011)
In 2008, Francisco Ramírez Irala was found guilty of domestic violence against his wife. The Justice of the Peace ordered the accused to refrain from living at their home or being within 300 meters of his house or any other place that represented a risk for the victim for a period of 60 days. The accused appealed, and the sentence was confirmed. Subsequently, the accused filed a request before the Supreme Court alleging that the sentence caused him great harm because he is a colonel in the military with an impeccable career and being evaluated for a promotion. The Supreme Court rejected his motion.
En 2008, Francisco Ramírez Irala fue declarado culpable de violencia doméstica contra su esposa. El Juez de la primera corte le ordenó al acusado abstenerse de vivir en su domicilio o estar a menos de 300 metros de su casa o de cualquier otro lugar que representara un riesgo para la víctima por un período de 60 días. El acusado apeló, pero se confirmó la sentencia. Posteriormente, el acusado presentó una solicitud ante la Corte Suprema alegando que la sentencia le causó un gran daño de reputación por tratarse de un coronel en el ejército con una trayectoria impecable y estar siendo evaluado para un ascenso. Aún así, la Corte Suprema rechazó su petición.
Case of Emilio Garay Franco Supreme Court (1996)
Emilio Garay Franco was accused of murdering his mother, María Roque Franco González, in her home on August 3, 1983 at around 11:00 pm. The weapon used to commit the crime was a knife. The accused was sentenced to 30 years in prison. The accused appealed the sentence, but the action was dismissed by the Supreme Court. The Court confirmed the sentence, noting “no hay delito más horrendo” ("there is no more horrendous crime”) than patricide.
Emilio Garay Franco fue acusado de asesinar a su madre, María Roque Franco González en su case el 3 de Agosto del 1983 alrededor de las 11 de la noche. El arma usada para cometer el crimen fue un cuchillo. El acusado fue sentenciado a 30 años de cárcel. Él apeló la sentencia pero la acción fue rechazada por la Corte Suprema, la cúal afirmó la sentencia y agregó que, “no hay delito más horrendo” que el parricidio.
Case of Gilberto Arrúa González (No. 573) Supreme Court (2001)
Gilberto Arrúa González was accused of murdering his mother, Lidia Blanca González in her home on April 3, 1993 at around 7:00 pm. The weapon used to commit the crime was a 21 cm long knife. The police questioned Jorge Arrúa Godoy who testified that on that day his wife, the victim, and he returned to their home to find the accused, their son, drinking wine and listening to music on the patio of the house. At one point, the defendant hit the radio with his hand, so his mother rebuked him, asking him to stop. The defendant ignored her, and his mother grabbed him by his shirt and shook him. In turn, the defendant’s father grabbed the victim by the arm, asking her to release his son. When they released him, the defendant said “I will kill you all,” then ran into the kitchen where he grabbed the knife and tried to stab his father. However, his mother stepped between them and the defendant fatally stabbed her. The defendant was sentenced to 25 years in prison. The accused appealed the sentenced but the Supreme Court confirmed the 25 year-prison sentence.
Gilberto Arrúa González fue acusado de asesinar a su madre, Lidia Blanca González, en su domicilio el 3 de abril de 1993 alrededor de las 19:00 horas. El arma utilizada para cometer el crimen fue un cuchillo de 21 cm de largo. La policía interrogó a Jorge Arrúa Godoy, quien declaró que ese día su esposa, la víctima, y él regresaron a su domicilio para encontrar al imputado, a su hijo, bebiendo vino y escuchando música en el patio de la casa. En un momento, el acusado golpeó la radio con la mano, por lo que su madre lo reprendió y le pidió que se detuviera. El acusado la ignoró, y su madre lo agarró por la camisa y lo sacudió. A su vez, el padre del acusado agarró a la víctima del brazo y le pidió que soltara a su hijo. Cuando lo liberaron, el acusado dijo “Los mataré a todos”, luego corrió a la cocina donde agarró el cuchillo y trató de apuñalar a su padre. Sin embargo, su madre se interpuso entre ellos y el acusado la apuñaló fatalmente. El acusado fue condenado a 25 años de prisión. Él apeló al condenado pero el Tribunal Supremo confirmó la pena de 25 años de prisión.
Case of W.F.C.M. and L.M.S.V., No. 556 Supreme Court (2005)
L.M.S.V. and W.F.C.M were accused of sexual coercion against the victim L.del R.A., an 18 year old woman, who was sexually coerced by the two accused males with a knife. The accused, who were minors, were sentenced to 3 years in prison. L.M.S.V appealed and the Court of Appeals confirmed the lower court sentence. Finally, L.M.S.V challenged the decision before the Supreme Court which partially overturned the decision. The Supreme Court found that because L.M.S.V. was a minor at the time of the crime and, in order to hold minors criminally responsible, minors must have sufficient psycho-social maturity (“madurez sico-social”) to understand the criminality of their actions, the sentence should be reduced to two years in prison. The court also ordered that during the probation period, L.M.S.V. must live no less than 10 kilometers away from the victim.
L.M.S.V. y W.F.C.M fueron acusados de fuerza sexual contra la víctima L. del R.A., una mujer de 18 años, quien fue forzada sexualmente por los dos hombres acusados con un cuchillo. Los acusados, que eran menores de edad, fueron condenados a 3 años de prisión. L.M.S.V apeló y el Tribunal de Apelaciones confirmó la sentencia del tribunal inferior. Finalmente, L.M.S.V atacó la decisión ante la Corte Suprema que revocó parcialmente la decisión. La Corte Suprema determinó que debido a que L.M.S.V. era menor en el momento del delito y, para responsabilizar penalmente a los menores, los menores deben tener suficiente madurez psicosocial (“madurez psico-social”) para comprender la criminalidad de sus actos, la pena debía reducirse a dos años de prisión. El tribunal también ordenó que durante el período de prueba, L.M.S.V. debía vivir a no menos de 10 kilómetros de la víctima.
Case of Guido Arturo Villalba and Other Supreme Court (2016)
Clorinda Mora Romero was sentenced to jail for seven years and six months because the lower court of Asunción found that she was guilty with her co-defendant Guido Arturo Villalba of human trafficking with the purpose of sexual exploitation. She appealed the sentence, and the Court of Appeals rejected her motion, confirming the lower court sentence. Finally, she challenged the decision before the Supreme Court, which dismissed the action in 2016.
Clorinda Mora Romero fue condenada a siete años y seis meses de cárcel porque el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Asunción determinó que ella era culpable con su coacusado Guido Arturo Villalba de trata de personas con fines de explotación sexual. Ella apeló la sentencia y el Tribunal de Apelaciones rechazó su moción, confirmando la sentencia del tribunal inferior. Finalmente, presentó la decisión ante la Corte Suprema, que desestimó la acción en 2016.
Case of Clarisa Velázquez de Acosta Supreme Court (1995)
Quijote, S.R.L., (the “Company”) fired the plaintiff while she was pregnant. The Labor Appeals Court (the “Court”) found that the firing was illegal because the law seeks to protect pregnant women, and though the medical certificate is a guarantee for the employer, it is not a requirement. The Court ordered the company to reinstate the plaintiff to her position and pay her lost wages. The Company challenged the court order in 1993, but the Supreme Court dismissed the challenge as an unconstitutional action in 1995. Consequently, the Labor Appeals Court ruling remained in effect.
Quijote, S.R.L., (la “Compañía”) despidió a la demandante mientras estaba embarazada. La Corte de Apelaciones Laborales (la “Corte”) determinó que el despido era ilegal porque la ley busca proteger a las mujeres embarazadas y, aunque el certificado médico es una garantía para el empleador, no es un requisito. El Tribunal ordenó a la empresa que reinstalara a la demandante en su puesto y le pagara su salario perdido. La Compañía impugnó la orden judicial en 1993, pero la Corte Suprema desestimó la impugnación como una acción inconstitucional en 1995. En consecuencia, la sentencia de la Corte de Apelaciones Laborales se mantuvo vigente.
Case of Juan Alveiro Gómez Supreme Court (1997)
In 1994, a married woman was sexually abused and raped by Juan Aveiro Gómez in her home. Law 104 (dated December 17, 1990) modified Paraguay’s penal code to punish the rape of a married woman with prison. The Criminal Appeals Court sentenced the defendant to 12 years in prison. However, the Supreme Court reduced the sentence to eight years in prison on February 20, 1997.
En 1994, una mujer casada fue abusada sexualmente y violada por Juan Aveiro Gómez en su casa. La Ley 104 (de 17 de diciembre de 1990) modificó el código penal de Paraguay para sancionar con tiempo en la prisión la violación de una mujer casada. El Tribunal de Apelaciones en lo Penal condenó al acusado a 12 años de prisión. Sin embargo, la Corte Suprema redujo la pena a ocho años de prisión el 20 de febrero de 1997.
Nxumalo v. Ndlovu Supreme Court (2011)
The executor of the estate of a deceased man (the appellant) brought an application to the High Court for a declaration that the civil marriage to the respondent was bigamous and invalid because of a number of pre-existing customary marriages between the deceased and three other women. The deceased considered the marriages over when the women left him and never returned. The deceased had executed a will and later four codicils. The High Court found that the respondent’s civil law marriage was a lawful marriage in community of property, and the will was declared null and void. The appeal is of the order of the High Court. The Supreme Court heard testimony from one of the wives married to the deceased under customary law and from experts in Swazi law and custom relating to the dissolution of customary marriages. The Supreme Court found in favour of the appellant. The decision of the High Court was set aside and the Master of the High Court was to appoint a suitable and proper person to administer the deceased estate. This case is important as it illustrates the importance and status of Swazi law.
Dlamini v. The Quadro Trust & 8 Others Supreme Court (2016)
The appellant sought to set aside a lower court’s decision and remove his deceased paternal grandmother’s estate executors. The lower court found that the appellant had no locus standi to bring forth the application as he was not the lawful beneficiary of his grandmother’s estate—he was born out of wedlock and his father predeceased his now deceased paternal grandmother. Therefore, the appellant had no right of inheritance intestate. The Supreme Court found that Section 31 of the Constitution (the abolition of the common law status of illegitimacy of a person born out of wedlock) abolishes the principle that children cannot inherit from their father. The Court upheld the appeal and found that the applicant had locus standi to institute or defend legal proceedings relating the deceased estate.
J.E.R.A. v. Attorney General's Office Supreme Court (2009)
The defendant in this case sexually assaulted his stepdaughter, who was 12-years-old at the time. The defendant was sentenced to 15 years in prison for rape. During his appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court failed to legally assess all the evidence presented. During her initial testimony, the victim declared that it was her stepfather who had caused the sexual abuse apparent in her psychological and physical examinations. However, she recanted two months later and stated that the abuse had actually been inflicted by her boyfriend. Nonetheless, the trial court convicted the victim’s stepfather. On appeal the Court found no error. It reasoned that the timing between the contradictory declarations and, most importantly, the nature of the second declaration indicated that the first testimony was correct. The Court found that such a declaration was a product of the stepfather’s pressure as it lacked many details and appeared disingenuous. The Court dismissed the procedural challenge and confirmed the sentence.
En este caso, el acusado agredió sexualmente a su hijastra, que tenía 12 años en ese momento. El acusado fue condenado a 15 años de prisión por violación. Durante su apelación, el acusado argumentó que el tribunal de primera instancia no evaluó legalmente todas las pruebas presentadas. En su testimonio inicial, la víctima declaró que fue su padrastro quien había causado el abuso sexual aparente en sus exámenes físicos y psicológicos. Sin embargo, ella se retractó dos meses después y declaró que el abuso había sido infligido por su novio. No obstante, el tribunal de primera instancia condenó al padrastro de la víctima. En la apelación, La Corte no encontró ningún error. Razonó que el momento entre las declaraciones contradictorias y, lo más importante, la naturaleza de la segunda declaración indicaban que el primer testimonio era correcto. El Tribunal determinó que la segunda declaración era producto de la presión del padrastro, ya que carecía de muchos detalles y parecía poco sincera. El tribunal terminó la apelación y confirmó la sentencia como decisión final.
D.A.V.G. v. Attorney General's Office Supreme Court (2013)
The defendant in this case spent 11 days at a hotel in Honduras with a 13-year-old girl. The victim and defendant had sexual relations throughout this time. Following a trial, the defendant was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for the crime of special, or statutory, rape. The defendant challenged this decision on several grounds. First, he claimed that he lacked the requisite mens rea, as he was unaware of the victim’s age. He claimed that was due to both the victim’s physical appearance and her statements to him affirming that she was an adult. The Court dismissed this argument, and found the defendant capable of knowing that he was committing a crime when having sexual intercourse with the victim. Furthermore, the Court found that actual knowledge of the victim’s age was irrelevant, as special rape is a statutory crime. In addition to his claim regarding intent, the defendant also claimed that the evidence presented did not demonstrate sexual intercourse. The defendant pointed to a physical examination preformed on the victim, showing that her hymen was intact. The Court considered that oral statements during trial proved that there was sexual intercourse and that the state of the victim’s hymen was irrelevant, as sexual penetration does not always entail the hymen’s breaking. Therefore, the Court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the sentence.
En este caso, el acusado pasó 11 días en un hotel en Honduras con una niña de 13 años. La víctima y el acusado tuvieron relaciones sexuales durante este tiempo. Después de un juicio, el acusado fue sentenciado a 15 años de prisión por violación estatutaria. El demandado desafió esta decisión por varios motivos. En primer lugar, afirmó que no cumplía los requisitos para la condena, ya que desconocía la edad de la víctima. Afirmó que esto se debía tanto a la apariencia física de la víctima como a las declaraciones que le hizo afirmando que era una persona adulta. Sin embargo, el tribunal desestimó este argumento y encontró que el acusado debia de saber que estaba cometiendo un delito al tener relaciones sexuales con la víctima. Además, el Tribunal argumentó que el conocimiento real de la edad de la víctima era irrelevante, ya que la violación estatutaria es un delito legal independiente del conocimiento del acusado. Además de su reclamo con respecto a la intención, el acusado también alegó que la evidencia presentada no demostró relaciones sexuales. El acusado señaló un examen físico realizado en la víctima, lo que demuestra que su himen estaba intacto. El Tribunal consideró que las declaraciones orales durante el juicio probaron que habían habido relaciones sexuales y que el estado del himen de la víctima era irrelevante, ya que la penetración sexual no siempre implica la ruptura del himen. Por lo tanto, el Tribunal desestimó la apelación y confirmó la sentencia.
Attorney General's Office v. P.T.B.L. Supreme Court (2010)
In 2005, an 8-year-old girl was grabbed in the street and taken to an inhabited home. There she was sexually assaulted by a man exposing his genitals. The victim’s mother found the child and the defendant in the abandoned home where she physically attacked him, causing him to flee. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to four years of imprisonment for acts of lust. The prosecutor challenged this decision. Although distinct challenges where submitted, the principal argument raised was that the accused actions amounted to attempted special rape, also known as statutory rape, as the victim was under 14-years-old at the time. The prosecutor argued that the defendant’s actions demonstrated intent to rape the child, and was only frustrated in his attempt due to the intervention of the victim’s mother. The Court agreed with the prosecutor and considered it unnecessary to review the other challenges raised by the defendant. The defendant was re-sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.
En el 2005, una niña de 8 años fue agarrada en la calle y llevada a una casa habitada. Allí fue atacada sexualmente por un hombre que expuso sus genitales ante ella. La madre de la víctima encontró a la niña y al acusado en la casa abandonada donde ella lo atacó físicamente, lo que provocó que el huyera. El acusado fue declarado culpable y condenado a cuatro años de prisión por actos de lujuria. El fiscal impugnó esta decisión. Aunque se presentaron distintos desafíos, el principal argumento que se planteó fue que las acciones del acusado equivalían a un intento de violación estatutaria, también conocida como violación legal, ya que la víctima tenía menos de 14 años. El fiscal argumentó que las acciones del acusado demostraron su intención de violar a la niña y solo no se pudieron llevar a cabo debido a la intervención de la madre de la víctima. El Tribunal estuvo de acuerdo con el fiscal y consideró innecesario revisar los otros desafíos planteados por el acusado. El acusado fue condenado a 10 años de prisión.
J.A.C.Z. v. Attorney General's Office Supreme Court (2010)
The defendant in this case took a female victim by the mouth, put her against the wall and sexually abused her. Following trial he was sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment on for rape. His appeal advanced two primary arguments. The first argument was that the evidence presented in the case was contradictory and was not sufficiently reliable to convict him of rape. While some witnesses’ statements showed that the defendant grabbed the victim by the mouth, other witnesses suggested that he took her by the back. The Court dismissed this argument, finding that the relevant fact is that the accused used force to make the victim have sexual intercourse with him, and that fact constitutes the crime of rape. The defendant’s second argument was that physical exams of the victim revealed that she had an intact hymen. The defendant argued that the exam demonstrated the lack of any sexual abuse on his part. The Court disagreed and found that sexual abuse, included forced penetration, does not necessarily result in the breaking of a hymen. Therefore, the rape conviction was confirmed by the Supreme Court.
El acusado en este caso agarró a la víctima por la boca, la puso contra la pared, y abusó sexualmente de ella. Después del juicio, él fue sentenciado a 10 años de prisión por violación. Su apelación adelantó dos argumentos principales. El primer argumento fue que las pruebas presentadas en el caso eran contradictorias y no eran lo suficientemente confiables para condenarlo por violación. Mientras que las declaraciones de algunos testigos mostraron que el acusado agarró a la víctima por la boca, otros testigos sugirieron que la tomó por la espalda. El Tribunal desestimó este contradiccion y concluyó que el hecho relevante es que el acusado utilizó la fuerza para que la víctima tuviera relaciones sexuales con él, y ese hecho automáticamente constituye el delito de violación. El segundo argumento de la acusada fue que los exámenes físicos de la víctima revelaron que tenía un himen intacto. El acusado argumentó que el examen demostró la falta de abuso sexual por su parte. El tribunal no estuvo de acuerdo y encontró que el abuso sexual, incluida la penetración forzada, no necesariamente resulta en la ruptura de un himen. Por lo tanto, la condena por violación fue confirmada por el Tribunal Supremo.
A.R.M.P. v. Attorney General's Office Supreme Court (2010)
The defendant was seized by police officers at his parents’ domicile for domestic violence against his wife. During the arrest, the defendant proceeded to insult the victim, threaten her, grab her by the hair and spit on her face. The defendant was sentenced to two years of imprisonment on the count of domestic violence. During his appeal, the defendant had three arguments for repealing his conviction. First, as the defendant’s conduct was governed under both Honduras criminal law and Honduras Domestic Violence Act, he argued that only the most recent law, the Honduras Domestic Violence Act, should be applied. That more recent piece of legislation does not establish any criminal punishment. The Court disagreed, and found that the defendant used force and intimidation to cause emotional harm which is covered under the criminal statute. The defendants second argument was that certain statements offered as evidence against the accused were not sufficiently convincing to meet criminal law threshold and therefore could not sustain a count for domestic violence. The Court concluded that this argument did not meet the threshold for rejection of evidence in criminal law. The defendant’s final argument was that the evidence showed that the facts discussed at trial indicated that his behavior was different those covered under the law on which the Tribunal’s decision were based. Nonetheless, as those facts also indicate force and intimidation resulting in psychological damage for the victim, no grounds for reversal of the decision were found. The conviction for domestic violence was confirmed and the decision was sustained.
La policía capturó al acusado en el domicilio de sus padres por violencia doméstica contra su esposa. Durante el arresto, el acusado procedió a insultar a la víctima, amenazarla, agarrarla por el pelo y escupirle la cara. El acusado fue condenado a dos años de prisión por el cargo de violencia doméstica. Durante su apelación, el acusado tenía tres argumentos para revocar su condena. Primero, dado que la conducta del acusado violaba la ley penal de Honduras y la Ley de Violencia Doméstica de Honduras, argumentó que solo se debería aplicar la ley más reciente, la Ley de Violencia Doméstica. Esa legislación más reciente no establece ningún castigo penal. El tribunal no estuvo de acuerdo y encontró que el acusado utilizó la fuerza y la intimidación para causar un daño emocional que está cubierto por el estatuto penal. El segundo argumento del acusado fue que ciertas declaraciones ofrecidas como evidencia contra el no eran lo suficientemente convincentes para cumplir con el umbral de la ley penal y, por lo tanto, no podían sostener un recuento de la violencia doméstica. El Tribunal concluyó que este argumento no calificaba para el rechazo de pruebas en el derecho penal. El argumento final del acusado fue que la evidencia mostraba que los hechos discutidos en el juicio indicaban que su comportamiento era diferente a los contemplados en la ley en que se basaba la decisión del Tribunal. No obstante, dado que sus hechos también indican fuerza e intimidación que causaron daños psicológicos a la víctima, no se encontraron motivos para revertir la decisión. Se confirmó la condena por violencia doméstica y se sostuvo la decisión.
R.R.R. v. Attorney General's Office Supreme Court (2013)
The defendant invited a 16-year-old girl for a walk to a park, but refused to take her home when she requested. He instead took her to another residence and, along with other individuals, sexually assaulted her using force, insults and intimidation. The defendant was subsequently sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for rape. He appealed the sentence alleging that the facts demonstrated establish that the accused had only “sexual relations” with the victim and Honduras criminal law, rape necessitates acts beyond sexual relations; specifically, penetration, which he claimed was not demonstrated in the facts. The Court reasoned that “sexual relations” was not limited to penetration, but included penetration. Therefore the Court rejected the appeal. The case was dismissed and the sentence upheld.
El acusado invitó a una niña de 16 años a caminar al parque, pero se negó a llevarla a su casa cuando lo solicitó. Él, en cambio, la llevó a otra residencia y, junto con otros individuos, la agredió sexualmente usando la fuerza, insultos, e intimidación. El acusado fue posteriormente condenado a 15 años de prisión por violación. Apeló la sentencia alegando que los hechos demostrados establecen que el acusado solo tenía "relaciones sexuales" con la víctima y con la ley penal de Honduras, la violación requiere actos más allá de las relaciones sexuales. Específicamente, la violación require la penetración, que según él no se demostró en los hechos. El Tribunal razonó que las "relaciones sexuales" no se limitaban a la penetración, sino que meramente incluían la penetración, sin ser un hecho exclusivo. Por lo tanto, el Tribunal rechazó la apelación. El caso fue desestimado y la sentencia fue confirmada.
J.A.H. v. Attorney General's Office Supreme Court (2011)
The defendant, 52 years old, appealed a conviction stemming from the rape of a 13-year-old girl. The victim became pregnant following the assault, and the defendant supplied her with pills to prevent intestinal worms. The pills resulted in the victim experiencing minor bleeding. Following a trial, the defendant was sentenced to prison for 15 years for aggravated rape and four years for attempted abortion. On appeal, the defendant argued that there had been no aggravated rape as the sexual intercourse was consensual and the claimant was unaware of the law prohibiting sexual intercourse with minors. Furthermore, the defendant argued that he sought to create a family with the victim. Concerning abortion, the accused argued that there was neither evidence demonstrating that the accused had the proper mens rea for the crime to arise, nor that the pills he provided could actually inflict an abortion on the victim. While the Court dismissed the defendant’s arguments regarding the rape, it held that the defendant was improperly convicted of attempted abortion. The Court found that the defendant did not possess the requisite means rea, nor did he engage in “unequivocal actions” of an attempt to inflict an abortion demonstrated.
El acusado, de 52 años de edad, apeló una condena por la violación de una niña de 13 años. La víctima quedó embarazada después del asalto, y el acusado le suministró pastillas para prevenir los gusanos intestinales. Las pastillas dieron como resultado que la víctima experimentara un sangrado menor. Tras un juicio, el acusado fue condenado a prisión durante 15 años por violación agravada y a cuatro años por intento de aborto. En la apelación, el acusado argumentó que no hubo violación agravada debido a que la relación sexual fue consensual y que él desconocía la ley que prohíbe las relaciones sexuales con menores. Además, el acusado argumentó que intentaba crear una familia con la víctima. En relación al aborto, el acusado dijo que no había pruebas que demostraran que él tenía los medios adecuados para que surgiera el delito, ni que las píldoras que él proporcionó podían infligir un aborto a la víctima. Mientras que la Corte desestimó los argumentos del acusado con respecto a la violación, la corte concluyó que él fue condenado indebidamente por intento de aborto. El Tribunal determinó que el acusado no poseía los medios necesarios, ni se involucró en "acciones inequívocas" con un intento demostrado de infligir un aborto.
A.R.T. v. Attorney General's Office Supreme Court (2012)
Mistakenly believing that a stranger was in his house, the defendant began insulting his wife and tried to beat her. He was prevented in succeeding in his attack after an intervention by their son. The defendant was consequently convicted of domestic violence and sentenced to 20 months in prison. Responding to the argument that a lack of force prevents his actions from satisfying the elements of domestic violence as codified in Honduras Penal Code, the Court responded that “intimidation” was within the elements of domestic violence. Furthermore, the Court held that that the accused failed to establish with particularity which elements were improperly decided. Therefore, it dismissed his appeal and confirmed the sentence.
Creyendo erróneamente que un extraño estaba en su casa, el acusado comenzó a insultar a su esposa y trató de golpearla. La intervención de su hijo previno el ataque. En consecuencia, el acusado fue declarado culpable de violencia doméstica y condenado a 20 meses de prisión. Respondiendo al argumento de que la falta de fuerza supuestamente impide que sus acciones satisfagan los elementos de violencia doméstica según lo codifica el Código Penal de Honduras, la Corte respondió que la "intimidación" satisface los elementos de violencia doméstica. Además, el Tribunal sostuvo que el acusado no pudo establecer con particularidad qué elementos se decidieron incorrectamente. Por lo tanto, desestimó su recurso y confirmó la sentencia.
Mifumi (U) Ltd. & Another v. Attorney General & Another Supreme Court (2015)
On appeal from the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Uganda held that the practice of asking for a bride price is constitutional but seeking a refund of the bride price as a precondition for the dissolution of a customary marriage is unconstitutional. The Court did not agree with Appellants that bride prices promote inequality in marriage or hamper free consent to marry.
Ragen, et al. v. Ministry of Transport, et al. Supreme Court (2011)
The petitioners sued the defendants for operating “mehadrin” bus lines for orthodox and ultra-orthodox Jews. Petitioners argue that these bus lines discriminate based on gender by allowing men to board and sit in the front of the bus while requiring that women board by the rear door, sit in the back, and dress modestly. Petitioners claim these restrictions violate their fundamental and constitutional rights to equality, dignity, freedom of religion, and freedom of conscience. Petitioners refused to comply with the gender restrictions, which respondents claimed were not compulsory but voluntary and thus legal. Petitioners, however, countered that the gender separation on mehadrin lines is not voluntary and that they were subjected to verbal harassment, threatened with physical violence, humiliated, and forced to leave the bus when they declined to observe the gender separation. After the respondents agreed to an examination of public transportation arrangements on lines serving the ultra-orthodox sector by an independent committee and the committee delivered its analysis, the Court ordered respondent 1 to instruct respondent 2 to publicize the cancellation of the separation arrangements (within 10 days of the date on which the judgment was rendered), and ordered respondent 2 to carry out its instructions within 30 days of the judgment. Within that period of time, respondents 2 and 3 were to post signs regarding the cancellation in all buses formerly subject to “mehadrin” arrangements, without exception.
Israel v. Ben-Hayim Supreme Court (2005)
The respondent, the manager of the Postmen Department at the Benei Berak branch of the Postal Authority, was acquitted of sexually harassing and victimizing a temporary employee, but convicted of unbecoming conduct. The Civil Service Disciplinary Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) found that the respondent promised to a promotion to the complainant, that he had conducted a sexual relationship with the complainant, and that he tried to prevent the complainant from making a complaint against him, which stated that he visited her apartment for several months and had sexual intercourse with her against her will. As a result, the complainant felt exploited and humiliated. The Tribunal held that the State failed to prove that the respondent abused his authority. The Tribunal then approved the sentencing agreement that the parties reached, although it admitted it was lenient. On appeal by the state, the Supreme Court held that the respondent’s power to influence the professional future of the workers was considerable and that he held a position of considerable power over the complainant, who was 22 years old at the time of the conduct while the respondent was 20 years older than her, which added to the his control. It follows that the complainant consented to the sexual acts was given because the respondent abused his authority over her, and therefore it was not a voluntary and genuine consent but instead “prohibited consensual intercourse.” The Court stated that “abuse of authority” need not involve a direct threat; in sexual harassment cases such abuse may be “express or implied, direct or indirect” and is no less potent if it is “in a veiled manner.” The Court added a one-year suspension from any managerial position to the sentence imposed by the lower Tribunal, explaining that this still amounted to a lenient punishment for the offense committed.
Supreme Court Decision 2013Do7787 Supreme Court (2015)
The defendant (a Private in the army) met the victim (a 10-year-old girl in the 4th grade) through an online gaming site. While video chatting, the defendant repeatedly requested that victim show her body from the waist down. Despite expressing her unwillingness, the victim showed her private parts on several occasions to Defendant while video chatting. The military prosecutor indicted Defendant on the charge of sexual abuse under the former Child Welfare Act. Two courts acquitted the Defendant and the military prosecutor appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that “sexual abuse” refers to sexual harassment, sexual assault, or similar acts, which can cause a victimized child to feel shame, can undermine a child’s health and welfare, or harm a child’s normal development. The Court also held that whether an act constitutes “sexual abuse” should be determined objectively according to social norms by factoring in specific circumstances, such as: (i) intent, gender, and age of the offender and victimized child; (ii) the extent to which the victimized child had knowledge of sexual values and the ability to exercise the right to sexual self-determination; (iii) the relationship between the offender and the victimized child; (iv) the background leading up to the act; (v) detail of the committed act; and (vi) the impact of such act on the victimized child’s personality development and mental health. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s judgment because the victim, who was just 10 years old, lacked knowledge of sexual values and did not have the ability to protect herself; therefore, she was not capable of exercising the right to sexual self-determination. The defendant took advantage of the victim’s ignorance and naivety for his own sexual satisfaction. Even if the victim complied with the defendant’s demand without expressing any resistance and did not experience physical/psychological pain due to the defendant’s act, the victim could not voluntarily and earnestly exercise the right to sexual self-determination. As such, the defendant’s act committed against the victim constituted sexual abuse. English version available here.
육군 이병이던 피고인은 인터넷 게임을 통하여 알게 된 초등학교 4학년의 피해자 (여, 10세)와 영상통화를 하던 중 ‘화장실에 가서 배 밑에 있는 부분을 보여달라’고 요구했다. 이에 피해자는 영상통화를 하면서 피고인에게 바지와 팬티를 벗고 음부를 보여주거나 아예 옷을 전부 다 벗고 음부를 보여주기도 했다. 한편 위 각 영상통화 과정에서 피해자는 음부를 보여주는 행동을 그만하겠다거나 못하겠다는 의사를 표시하기도 한 사실을 알 수 있다. 구 아동복지법상 금지되는 성적 학대행위라 함은 아동에게 성적 수치심을 주는 성회롱, 성폭행 등의 행위로서 아동의 건강, 복지를 해치거나 정상적 발달을 저해할 수 있는 성적 폭력 또는 가혹행위를 말한다. 이에 해당하는지 여부는 행위자 밎 피해 아동의 의사 성벽 연령, 피해 아동이 성적 자기결정권을 제대로 행사할 수 있을 정도의 성적 가치관과 판단능력을 갖추었는지 여부, 행위자와 피해 아동의 관계, 행위에 이르게 된 경위, 구체적인 행위 태양, 그 행위가 피해 아동의 인격 발달과 정신 건강에 미칠 수 있는 영향 등의 구체적인 사정을 종합적으로 고려하여 그 시대의 건전한 사회 통념에 따라 객관적으로 판단하여야 할 것이다. 만 10세에 불과한 피해자는 성적 가치관과 판단능력이 충분히 형성되지 아니하여 성적 자기결정권을 제대로 행사하기 어렵고 자신을 보호할 능력도 상당히 미약하다고 볼 수 있는데, 피고인은 위와 같은 피해자의 성적 무지와 타인의 부탁을 쉽게 거절하지 못하는 피해자의 성향을 이용하여 자신의 성적 만족을 얻기 위한 의도로 영상통화를 하면서 음부를 보여 달라는 요구를 반복하였다. 이 것은 구 아동복지법을 어기는 행위다. 설령 피해자가 피고인의 위와 같은 요구에 특별한 저항 없이 응하였다거나 이 때문에 현실적으로 유체적 또는 정신적 고통을 느끼지 아니한 사정이 있다 하더라도 당시 피해자가 자신의 성적 행위에 관한 자기결정권을 자발적이고 진지하게 행사한 것으로 보기는 어려우므로, 위와 같은 사정 때문에 피고인의 피해자에 대한 위와 같은 행위가 성적 학대행위에 해당하지 아니한다고 볼 수는 없다. 그러므로 원심판결을 파기하고, 사건을 다시 심리 판단하게 하기 위하여 원심법원에 환송하기로 하여, 관여 대법관의 일치된 의견으로 주문과 같이 판결한다.